

# PROPAGANDA AND COMMUNICATION IN WORLD HISTORY

VOLUME III

A Pluralizing World  
in Formation

*edited by*

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AN EAST-WEST CENTER BOOK ㊦

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3 THE EAST-WEST CENTER—officially known as the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West—is a national educational institution established in Hawaii by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to promote better relations and understanding between the United States and the nations of Asia and the Pacific through cooperative study, training, and research. The Center is administered by a public, nonprofit corporation whose international Board of Governors consists of distinguished scholars, business leaders, and public servants.

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PROPAGANDA AND COMMUNICATION  
IN WORLD HISTORY

VOLUME I The Symbolic Instrument in Early Times

VOLUME II Emergence of Public Opinion in the West

VOLUME III A Pluralizing World in Formation

These three volumes are dedicated to

JEAN LERNER

our indispensable collaborator

who, with insight, skill, and good cheer,

did whatever needed to be done

through the years of these studies

## CONTENTS

Preface	xi
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### THE MULTIVALUE CONTEXT

1. Must Science Serve Political Power? <i>Harold D. Lasswell</i>	3
2. The Marriage of Science and Government <i>Jerome B. Wiesner</i>	16
3. Rising Expectations: Frustrations <i>Joseph J. Spengler</i>	37
4. The Respect Revolution: Freedom and Equality <i>Lewis M. Killian</i>	93
5. Love and Intimacy: Mass Media and Phallic Culture <i>Arnold A. Rogow</i>	148

### THE MULTIVARIATE PROCESS

✓ 6. The Language of Politics: General Trends in Content <i>Ithiel de Sola Pool</i>	171
7. The Media Kaleidoscope: General Trends in the Channels <i>W. Phillips Davison</i>	191
8. The Moving Target: General Trends in Audience Composition <i>L. John Martin</i>	249

9. The Effects of Mass Media in an Information Era	295
<i>Wilbur Schramm</i>	
10. The Social Effects of Communication Technology	346
<i>Herbert Goldhamer</i>	
THE SYMBOLIC INSTRUMENT—RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS	
11. The Historic Past of the Unconscious	403
<i>Andrew Rolle</i>	
12. Social Science and the Collectivization of Hubris	461
<i>Joseph J. Spengler</i>	
13. The Emerging Social Structure of the World	482
<i>Alex Inkeles</i>	
14. The Future of World Communication and Propaganda	516
<i>Harold D. Lasswell</i>	
Contributors	535
Index	539

## VOLUME I: The Symbolic Instrument in Early Times

1. Introduction *The Editors*
2. Continuities in Communication from Early Man to Modern Times *Margaret Mead*
3. Early Mesopotamia 2500-1000 B.C. *Jacob J. Finkelstein*
4. Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian Empires  
*A. Leo Oppenheim*
5. Egyptian Civilization *John Wilson*
6. Indian Civilization *R. S. Sharma*
7. On the Spread of Buddhism to China *Arthur F. Wright*
8. Chinese Civilization *Arthur F. Wright*
9. Classical Civilization *John Ferguson*
10. Judaism: The Psychology of the Prophets *Max Weber*
11. Christian Missions in the Ancient World *Charles W. Forman*
12. Communication in Classical Islam *George Kirk*

## THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: A COLLOQUY

13. The Modernization of Social Communication *Serif Mardin*
14. Ottoman Political Communication *Bruce McGowan*
15. Propaganda Functions of Poetry *Talat Sait Halman*
16. Communication Patterns in Centralized Empires  
*S. N. Eisenstadt*
17. Western Civilization: The Middle Ages *Robert Brentano*

## VOLUME II: Emergence of Public Opinion in the West

## THE ENLARGING SYMBOLIC OF THE MODERN WEST

1. The Renaissance and the Broadening of  
Communication *William Bouwsma*
2. The Impact of the Reformation Era on Communication and  
Propaganda *Nancy L. Roelker*
3. The Enlightenment as a Communication Universe *Peter Gay*
4. The Modern History of Political Fanaticism: A Search for the  
Roots *Zev Barbu*

## THE SYMBOLIC IN WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES

5. The Rise of Public Opinion *Hans Speier*
6. Millenarianism as a Revolutionary Force *Guenter Lewy*

7. Karl Marx—The Propagandist as Prophet *Saul K. Padover*
8. Communist Propaganda *William E. Griffith*

#### SYMBOL MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTINUING SPREAD OF CRISIS POLITICS

9. The Communication of Hidden Meaning *Hans Speier*
10. The Truth in Hell: Maurice Joly on Modern Despotism  
*Hans Speier*
11. Selections from *Dialogue in Hell Between Machiavelli and  
Montesquieu* *Maurice Joly*
12. Deception—Its Decline and Revival in International  
Conflict *Barton Whaley*

#### MOBILIZATION FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

13. The Revolutionary Elites and World Symbolism *Daniel Lerner*
14. Changing Arenas and Identities in World Affairs  
*Harold R. Isaacs*
15. Communication, Development, and Power *Lucian W. Pye*
16. Rhetoric and Law in International Political Organs  
*Oscar Schachter*

#### NUCLEAR POWER: A COLLOQUY

17. War Department Release on New Mexico Test, 16 July 1945
18. Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual  
Freedom *Andrei D. Sakharov*
19. The Chances for Peace *Hans Speier*

## PREFACE

The final volume of *Propaganda and Communication in World History* deals with the contemporary world situation. A salient feature is the technology that makes operative the first "world communication network." Just two centuries ago the American Declaration of Independence justified itself in terms of "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." Only in the past decade, however, has the technology of satellites produced a functioning global network that is instantaneous, simultaneous, and continuous.

This achievement has not met with universal enthusiasm. The phrase "cultural imperialism" has come into vogue among those who fear the intrusion of more developed countries (MDC) into less developed countries (LDC) via this network. The specter of "direct satellite broadcasting" has led to a humiliating defeat of American proposals for a free flow of information in the UN and UNESCO. These controversies over international and intercultural communication signal wide and deep differences in social and political values around the world.

The conflicts between old and new values can best be presented, for nonpartisan purposes, in terms of a "multivalue context." As some of these conflicts stem from the relationship between knowledge and power, Lasswell opens the volume with the crucial question: "Must science serve political power?"

Wiesner, a major figure in developing the highly visible technologies that have shaped the world image of contemporary America, then assesses the often troubled "marriage of science and government."

Inasmuch as MDC-LDC relations over the past quarter century usually have turned upon "development" (the current LDC version of the old MDC idea of "progress"), Spengler addresses the central problem of "rising expectations: frustrations." This problem is central for communication as well as for economics. For it is communication that has led the peoples of LDC to expect more of the good things of life than their poor economies can provide. Despite such epithets as "materialism" and "consumerism" invoked by the ideologues of traditional values, the imbalanced Want:Get Ratio that turns rising expectations into frustrations in LDC is a key problem in our contemporary world.

"The Multivalue Context" concludes with two chapters that go to the core of the present conflict between old and new values. Traditional societies evolved lifeways based largely upon *respect* for those in ascribed roles of social superiority, for example, elder males. Contemporary society stresses the values of *freedom* and *equality*, which provide opportunities for any and all (in principle) to rise to positions of achieved superiority. Killian analyzes the characteristics and consequences of this "respect revolution," primarily with respect to race relations. Rogow then traces the deep transformation of traditional values of "love and intimacy" as diffused through the mass media.

The second part of this volume surveys "The Multivariate Process" of world communication today by dealing with four main elements in the classic paradigm of communication research. Pool deals with content, Davison with channels, Martin with audiences, Schramm with effects. Goldhamer supplements these chapters with an analysis of a distinctively contemporary problem: the social effects of advanced communication technology.

The concluding part on "The Symbolic Instrument" looks back at recent trends as a source of some future prospects for communication. Rolle explores "the historic past of the unconscious" with an eye to present transformations of character and personality. Spengler considers "the hubris of social science" so



that awareness of past errors may help to improve future efforts. Inkeles outlines "the emerging social structure of the world" as the context for future communication. Lasswell then brings the work to a final focus on "the future of world communication and propaganda."

It remains for the editors to thank all those who have made contributions to this long and laborious effort. For us it has been a rich learning experience. We trust it will prove so for our readers as well.

*Postscript.* As this final volume goes to press, we pay tribute to our senior coeditor, the late Harold Dwight Lasswell. His passing is a great loss to all students of communication and to the world of scholarship in general. His memory and his legacy will enrich many generations yet to come.

D. L.  
H. S.

## THE MULTIVALUE CONTEXT

# 1

## MUST SCIENCE SERVE POLITICAL POWER?

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

At least one fundamental statement about our time arouses little disagreement: The science-based technology of Western European civilization is moving toward universality. Almost everything else is open to debate. For instance, is the man of knowledge taking over the seats of the powerful? Will he? Should he? Such questions give new vitality to talk of professional ethics, or the social responsibility of science, or the control of education and research.

That political power is affected by knowledge and that political power affects knowledge is no revelation. The interesting problem is the timing of two-way effects. Until recently it could be held that knowledge affected power more slowly than power affected knowledge. A substantial change in the map of knowledge would first alter many less comprehensive maps. Then technology changed, altering the composition and experience of groups. The resulting changes in the direction and intensity of demand affected public policy. Political decisions, in contrast, have often had immediate consequences for knowledge. If proposed appropriations are voted yes or no, everyone—researcher, teacher, or student—adapts as well as he can.

Today's timing is different because the structural position of science is different. The impact of new knowledge on public policy is almost instantaneous, thanks to the many institutions

that specialize in science or government, or mediate between the two. A huge communication network interconnects laboratories, observatories, field stations, and libraries in universities, industries, and governments. Revised matter-of-fact expectations, such as comprise the map of knowledge, promptly change expectations about the future of all concerned. As a result policies are modified: Scientists suddenly see new lines of research, technologists recognize promising lines of development, investors see new investment opportunities, officials perceive new ways of affecting national security (or insecurity). Given the position of science in American or Soviet society, the chain runs from innovations in the map of knowledge to projections of the future, to evaluations of alternative policy objectives and strategies, to demands for decision, to the making of decisions, to further changes in perspectives, behavioral operations, and aggregate structure.

### SCIENCE, MILITANCY, AND OLIGARCHY

Despite the remarkable, even explosive, expansion of knowledge, and its global diffusion, it must be conceded that, up to the present, *the aggregate impact of the scientific revolution has failed to revolutionize the basic structure of world politics.* The relations of the United States, Soviet Russia, and mainland China, to say nothing of the middle-sized and smaller powers, are constrained as usual by the expectation of violence. The expectation of violence contributes to, and is in turn sustained by, the division of the globe into apprehensive or threatening powers in an arms race of unexcelled magnitude and danger. This divided and militant structure of the world political arena preceded the era of science, and has succeeded thus far in subordinating the institutions of knowledge to its perpetuation.

We take note of another fact about the social consequences of science. It is often pointed out that *knowledge is more commonly used for the relative benefit of the few than for the benefit of all.* This is most obvious in the contrast between the suburban ghettos of the prosperous and the poverty-stricken ghettos of urban and rural slums.

How can we account for the historic subordination of knowledge to the institutions of war and oligarchy? Certainly there is no lack of hortatory rhetoric on the part of eminent con-

tributors to knowledge celebrating the latent universality of the fruits of knowledge for all mankind, or the fraternal unity of all who contribute to a verifiable map of nature, man, and society.

### PAROCHIALIZATION

Up to the present a root difficulty appears to be that *however universal the manifest content of scientific propositions, or the procedures by which they may be verified, they are parochially introduced*. Their diffusion or restriction is heavily dependent on the characteristics of the parochial environments in which they appear. The response of each environment depends on the expectations of advantage or disadvantage that would follow from expediting or interfering with the global spread or technological application of new knowledge. It is a matter of everyday experience that most individuals and organizations are not interested in the advancement of knowledge as an end in itself either for themselves individually or collectively. They are concerned not with enlightenment as a scope value but as a base for obtaining wealth, power, respect, health, and other valued outcomes. In a world divided by the institution of war the support for science depends in no small measure on the expectation that scientific knowledge will contribute to the power needed to throw off the domination of imperial states and to achieve a level of modernization that will prevent the reimposition of direct or indirect rule from outside. (Among the superpowers and the older industrial nation-states science is cultivated to provide the muscle that is presumably required to maintain freedom from enforced subordination to outside control.)

The institution of war is expressed and sustained by drawing scientists into a coalition with political leaders, military officers, administrative officials, factory managers, and other significant participants in the power process. In socialist-communist hierarchies the coalition mates are the top leaders and bureaucrats of the monopoly party (or political order), the political police, the army, the official departments and agencies. In bodies politic having more co-archic traditions and procedures, much more prominence is given to the leaders of private industry, competitive political parties, pressure groups, and mass media of communication. The military-industrial complex is no respecter of popular distinctions between forms of industrial society.

### **INNER STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTIONS**

Why science works for power can be better understood if we examine the inner structure of knowledge institutions themselves. We recognize that scientists differ from one another in the intensity of their commitment to fundamental theory. At one limit are those who specialize on the principal contours of the map of nature, man, and society; at the other are routinizers who fill in detail. The former are oriented toward enlightenment. Typically their skills include techniques of theory formation and procedures of primary observations directed to novel possibilities. Those who fill in detail are more characteristically equipped with skills adapted to purposes other than fundamental enlightenment. The implication is that as the pursuit of verifiable knowledge grows in importance in society and research institutions expand, the percentage of those who are mainly concerned with fundamental enlightenment diminishes (toward an unknown limit) in comparison with those who are satisfied to exercise their skill in the service of other purposes. As the knowledge institutions expand, they reach a level at which they recruit personnel from all save the most humble strata of society. Hence the personnel of science increasingly come from those who share the conventional culture, which means that knowledge is seen as instrumental to value outcomes other than the pursuit of enlightenment.

The consequence for the subserviency of science to political power, or to other "practical" values, is evident. Those who, in effect, "have skill, will move" make themselves understood and available to the demands of decision makers at every level. These are the mid-elite and rank and file of science and scholarship. From them are recruited the thousands who cement the interdependence of science and the established structure of society. In the aggregate they contribute more directly to the service of war and oligarchy than to world security and the welfare of the whole community.

It is true that from its broadly based supply of manpower the scientific establishment does succeed in developing a relatively small and highly respected elite whose members are oriented toward knowledge as an end in itself, or as an end that ought to

be employed for the benefit of the whole nation of man rather than its parochial subdivisions. Many members of this elite are specialized to operations whose working techniques are less than usually dependent on the empirical data collected by the individual investigator, or on immediate applications. Included are many mathematicians, logicians, linguists, and related theorists who are less firmly embedded than their colleagues in the constraints of a localized environment.

### **HIGHLY CAPITALIZED SCIENCE**

The dependence of science on the social environment is emphasized by the transformation from the early age of handicraft science to the present era of highly capitalized science. The flow of assets for research and education depends on sustaining a structure of expectation in the environment that "knowledge pays." Hence the internal structure of knowledge institutions changes in ways that enable them to draw upon the environment. In the subculture of science those most directly responsible for these expectations are those who mediate between the institutions of knowledge and other institutions. They include heads of laboratories, department chairmen, deans, presidents, popular professors, many trustees, public relations and development officers, alumni secretaries, and the officers and staffs of professional associations.

The participation by scientists in the decision processes of society goes much further than in representing the case for the support of science. The fact is that the decision processes of modern and modernizing powers are deeply permeated by men of knowledge. The proposition is true even when you eliminate the lawyers and theologians, and count only physicians, scientists (physical, biological, behavioral), and engineers, or those who have received college or professional training. It is true of many political leaders, government officials, and military officers in industrial and industrializing countries.

All this has happened, yet the institutions of war and oligarchy continue. Evidently, we can have scientists in government without having government for science or man. Along the path that leads from an early training in science toward political leadership or government service the individual learns the conditions of survival in the arenas of power. He learns to negotiate

behind the scenes and to propagandize in public places. The outcome is a present politician and an ex-scientist, a man who has learned to survive by coming to terms with the militant structure of world power and the typically oligarchical structure of internal politics.

### **VISIBILITY AND VULNERABILITY**

The bearing of this evolution on the future of science in society is far from trivial; for science has grown strong enough to acquire visibility, and therefore to become eligible as a potential scapegoat for whatever disenchantment there may be with the earlier promises of a science-based technology. Even today there is much articulate disenchantment that goes beyond the traditional resistance of feudal elites to industry and science-based technology. If the earlier dream was a rising tide of production, the later reality also includes the social costs of polluted air, water, and soil. If the earlier hope was the abolition of disease, the current reality includes the discovery of pharmacological side effects that threaten life and health. If the earlier dream was safety and security for all, the current reality is the augmented peril of nuclear or biological destruction. If the earlier dream was that latent capabilities would be identified and matured into socially useful skills, the present reality includes augmented public and private forces of organized militancy, criminality, and delinquency. If the earlier vision was that destructive limitation on the growth of love and dedication would be dissolved by knowledge-guided socialization, the current reality is a very considerable demand to dominate, or to withdraw, to nonparticipate, to self-segregate, to celebrate alienation from collective life. If the earlier promise was that knowledge would make men free, the contemporary reality seems to be that more men are manipulated without their consent for more purposes by more techniques by fewer men than at any time in history.

Are we, in fact, in another period in which the faiths, beliefs, and loyalties of a once-progressive evolution have so weakened the bonds of public and civic order that massive seizures of destructive rage at the humiliations imposed on human dignity will once more disrupt the nonviolent processes of change, and reinstate the turbulence of a time of trouble, a rebarbarization



of civilized centers, and another collapse of a discredited system of militancy and oligarchy? The verdict may be that whom the historical process would destroy it first must make strong enough to achieve a visibility sufficient to arouse false hopes, while remaining weak enough to acquiesce and connive in the frustration of their potential—thus for science and scientists.

### **CURRENT PROPOSALS**

It must not be supposed that all men of knowledge, and notably scientists, are happily reconciled to the contemporary situation. Many of them resent the degree to which their knowledge builds political power for others, or accumulates wealth for others, while leaving them to enjoy an advisory status quo and a fluctuating income from charitable gifts or bureaucratic salaries. In our society more specialists are taking steps to work for themselves rather than for others. They often use the corporate device of limited liability to set up profit or nonprofit companies in the hope of benefiting from entrepreneurial gains. Consultants and consulting firms often take their compensation in the form of stock, enabling them to share the appreciating assets of a successful enterprise.

Another and often closely connected source of dissatisfaction is the resentment among scientists of the degree to which they seem to be working for the benefit of an oligarchy instead of contributing directly to mankind. Many of them are searching for forms of scientist and user cooperatives that pool knowledge and technical know-how in laboratories that generate products and services for the general welfare.

These sentiments cut across the patochial lines of communist-socialist or liberal-capitalist economies and policies. Do we, in fact, stand at the beginning of a movement that could transform the role of science? What if every university or every professional specialty had exclusive claim to the discoveries and inventions of its members so that an increasing share of the applications of knowledge would flow to the man of knowledge? Would he work directly to spread the benefits from science to raise the aggregate level of regional and national welfare, to call a halt to the diseconomies of environmental loss, and especially to undermotivation for the use of human resources? In a word, would the scientist work more directly for man?

We are not without historical precedents of at least limited relevance. Some monasteries—Buddhist, Muslim, Christian—have sustained their rituals, their charities, and their scholars by marketing alcohol or other commodities. A modern university occasionally supplements its income from the proceeds of a patent or copyright pool. It is not inconceivable that associations of scholars might publish all the textbooks and reference works in their field, and design and manufacture educational (and hopefully interesting) games and school equipment. The school of architecture and planning might design cities.

More than this, associations of scientific planners might take the lead in developing a transnational chain of cooperatively organized cities intended to aid in the formation of a new world community within the framework of the old. Perhaps cities can be built on old or new islands or space platforms for people who “opt out,” as far as possible, from the arms race. Perhaps great enterprises for the development of resources can create nonsegregated communities in the present waste regions of the earth (the deserts, the polar lands). Once constituted, such centers could reach well beyond their nominal boundaries and provide educational, scientific, recreational, and medical facilities for many more people than they would accommodate as permanent residents.

### ***ARE SCIENTISTS LIKE EVERYBODY ELSE?***

It is not too difficult for us to identify some of the factors that explain why proposals of this kind have made relatively modest headway. For instance, there is fear of their implications for the internal policy process of professional associations and universities. Any multiplication of entrepreneurial functions would multiply administrative staffs and presumably alter the balance of impact on decision. It is feared that those who engage in the activities that bring in the most money would insist on increasing their weight in the decision process. Many are apprehensive that conflicts would both proliferate and intensify over the identity of acceptable outside contractors; the salaries and conditions of work of researchers, teachers, administrators, and students; the allocation of resources for expansion in the physical, biological, and cultural sciences. One can envisage interuniversity competition to attract the big money makers (as well as grant swingers), or to set up new splinter associations in order to

improve the "take" by the professional skill groups in relatively short supply. Also, it is not difficult to imagine competing horizontal unions appealing separately to younger, middle, or older faculty members, or to recent or older students, and confronting one another as collective bargainers. As the knowledge institutions extend transnationally it is not absurd to predict the accentuation of cleavages among rich and poor and according to traditional identities of tribe, language, race, or nation. In a word, the pessimistic expectation has been that a scientist or any other man of knowledge will act like everybody else, especially if he (or his spouse) thinks that he has a chance to get a bigger piece of pie somewhat nearer than the ever-receding sky.

Let us grant that this conventional wisdom has more than a grain of truth as a description of the past. Will it necessarily be true tomorrow? Is it to be asserted as beyond dispute that scientists and institutions of knowledge will continue to fail to identify and to serve common interests within the field of science and humanity?

### **COGNITIVE MAPS AND PROCEDURES**

Perhaps, as some colleagues suggest, the challenge actually calls for a basic reconsideration of the character of the cognitive map for which it is appropriate for science to take responsibility. The proposition is that the fragmented cultivation of skill for opportunistic purposes is not enough. It does not automatically trigger an invisible hand that redraws and improves the contours of the general map of knowledge. A truly comprehensive cognitive map would include the significant future as well as the salient past. The inclusive map becomes known, not only by the piecemeal splitting of the pebbles on the beach, but by identifying the changing contours of sea and shore. The proposition is that at any slice of time these aggregate contours are the principal realities of nature, life, and culture. They are also the entities that in the past we have been least successful in identifying, explaining, or managing. It may be that as we adopt methods appropriate to discovering the congregation of cycles that define the reality of the moment, we learn how to modify their future timing by feeding their symbolic representations back into the intelligence flow of the moving present.

If attention is to be directed to the relevant cognitive context, appropriate institutions must be invented or adapted to the

purpose. Luckily, we are not without guidance in this matter. For example, we are accustomed to the planetarium technique of providing a selective audiovisual experience of the past and future of the earth and its environment. We are capable of adapting the technique to the presentation of equally inclusive and selective maps of the past and prospective succession of biological forms. It is entirely possible to apply the planetarium technique to depictions of the past, prospective, and preferred sequences of value priorities and institutions in the social process of the earth, the hemisphere, the region, and the neighborhood.

It is not difficult to see how these contextual techniques can be adapted to the task of providing a regular means of giving consideration to the social consequences and the policy implications of knowledge. Such a function can be performed by a continuing seminar concerned with a provisional and changing map of the past, present, and future of science and man. Whatever the specialists represented, the practice of sharing, evaluating, and contributing to an inclusive map keeps alive the latent embers of concern for the knowledge enterprise as a whole.

Here is a means of examining the historical trends, conditioning factors, and future projections of the impact of knowledge on the use or abuse of human and environmental resources, on the institutions of war and peace, of production and distribution, of safety and health, of education and family life, of social caste and class, of ethical or religious responsibility, and of the future of science and scholarship themselves.

We recognize the possibility of feeding into a perfected network of interconnected seminars and planetaria the results obtained by the most sophisticated simulations of past and future (area by area, component by component).

Such changing cognitive maps can be used to initiate and guide the formation of research policy by identifying the zones of neglect or duplication. These presentations can release creative policy proposals for the future structure and functioning of universities, the professional associations, and communities at every level.

### **COMMON VERSUS SPECIAL INTERESTS**

Furthermore, these continuing seminars can be incorporated explicitly into the whole complex decision process of professional

associations, universities, and other knowledge institutions. These primary centers of cognitive orientation provide at least a partial answer to the challenge issued to men of knowledge by the conventional wisdom that the scientist and the scholar are as incapable as other men of discovering and pursuing enlightened common interests. You recognize the jibe: If men of knowledge cannot run themselves, how can they expect to continue to be taken seriously by the rest of the community as advisers or leaders? The argument is that if we cannot find criteria and procedures for discovering how, within the community of science and scholarship, common interests can overcome special interests, we cannot be trusted to clarify common interests in the wider community.

As indicated before, the possibility is not to be overlooked that the task of eliciting and evaluating the policy objectives and alternatives open to professional associations, universities, and other knowledge institutions will bring about a progressive improvement in fundamental cognitive maps and in the scientific process itself.

Furthermore, we can think in terms that include continuously expanding arenas of cognitive and policy operations. They may well begin inside knowledge institutions, and then proceed to the decision processes of mixed-knowledge and other institutions at national, subnational, and transnational levels. Certainly if political power is to be shaped and shared outside the limits of oligarchy, and if coercive authority is eventually to be supplanted by a voluntary civic order, it is fairly clear that the members of the body politic must have the means of keeping their cognitive maps adapted to the discovery of valid *common* interests, and of mobilizing dispositions to do what is necessary to overcome the dominance of *special* interests. In the circumstances of today's world, men of knowledge, especially men of science, can participate, as many of us are already doing, with the victims of urban blight and total neglect in a mutually illuminating search for the timing of the policy objectives and strategies that overcome these discriminations. Specialized men of knowledge, in cooperation with neighbors in the opulent suburbs, can search for the cues that release latent dispositions to overcome indifference to, or satisfaction in, the plight of others. In conjunction with the peoples affected, scientists can strive to identify the timing of the acts most likely to close the

frustration gap that separates the multitude in underdeveloped nations from their newly awakened hopes. Most challenging of all, perhaps, is the possibility of continuing efforts to discover the timing of options that tame and redirect the militantly competitive elites of the opulent and knowledgeable powers, and to integrate a system of world public order that serves, not merely the minimum requirement of security, but the optimum potentials of man and his resources.

Such techniques as the planetarium, the continuing seminar, and continuous planning and appraisal are capable of being adapted to the needs and interests of human beings, whether or not they are highly specialized in the conventional institutions of knowledge. These procedures can be institutionalized as we perfect our knowledge of timing to match motivation. These instruments can give realistic help in overcoming the sense of indignity and injustice that so permeates the lives of modern men. Men do not need to live as resentful pawns in a game that no one bothers to explain. It is feasible for everyone to achieve some understanding of the whole chessboard of nature, life, and culture; to acquire some awareness of the rules of the game; to see where he can win or lose by abiding by the rules; or how he can most effectively act to change the rules.

### **CAREER PATTERNS**

The discovery of how to navigate through the future calls for the perfecting of institutions of knowledge that are as yet poorly adapted to the knowledge of time or the timing of knowledge. The individual man of science may continue to devote himself mainly to the exercise of the competence for which he is trained; or he may complicate the pattern of his career by life plans that combine specialized activity with varying degrees of role playing in the decision processes of public and private institutions. In any case he can make these continuing policy judgments for himself, and in conjunction with others, with higher hopes of realism and relevance if he engages in recurring reappraisals of cognitive maps that display the social consequences of knowledge for the aggregate shaping and sharing of valued outcomes, and the readjustment of social institutions.

It is to be noted that cognitive maps are not restricted to representations of social, biological, and physical environments.



Many procedures have been invented by which the individual and hence each member of a group can reedit his cognitive map to include a more disciplined image of himself, of his value priorities, assets, and potential strategies for independent or collective policy formation and execution. The members of continuing seminars may include intervals of intense exposure to specific procedures designed to allow predispositions to come to the surface. The reference is to such procedures as depth interviewing, sensitivity training, aptitude and attitude testing, and pharmapsyche responses (to name a few).

### **CONCLUSION**

The conclusion is that science and scientists in the aggregate need not serve political power in the future as they have in the past. It is possible to weaken and eventually to overcome the parochialisms of perspective that have restricted the universalization of science and laid scientists open to the charge of giving disproportionate service to militancy and oligarchy. By working together inside the institutions of knowledge, and as participants in public associations, men of knowledge can assist in modifying the traditional reliance of society on coercive political power. They can do so in the course of discovering how to obsolesce the institutions of militancy and oligarchy and to cultivate institutions of civic order. In the civic order there is reliance on active consent to the common interest in cultivating knowledge as a major expression of man and as an instrument of service to the nation of man.

Yes, scientists can serve science and commonwealth—whether as scientists or ex-scientists. It can be done by perfecting the institutions by which the cognitive maps that refer to the future as well as the past are corrected by continual feedback about the content and timing of knowledge of nature, life, and culture.

## 2

# THE MARRIAGE OF SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT

JEROME B. WIESNER

Relationships between science and government are, at the moment, in a state of rapid change. We have arrived at today's situation without having planned the existing relationships, much less desired them, so that future developments also may well have the character of a "random walk"—partially dependent on historical accidents and to a considerable degree dependent on the nature of the political process. To imagine how these developments might evolve, it may be useful to review a bit of the recent history of science in the federal government.

Those of us who have been involved in the problems of the interaction of science and technology and the federal government believe that there are actually two sets of problems: those of the impact of science on policy, and those of the impact of policy on science. They may interact; for example, if the president is unhappy about what he perceives to be the scientist's attitude about a policy, it may affect his attitudes toward and policies for science. But, on the whole, the two are quite different problems.

From a broad perspective, it is clear that the most crucial problems are those of the impact of science (more precisely, science-based technology) on policy. In the modern world, technology is the most dynamic force at work, and it poses an ever-increasing number of problems not only for our govern-



ment but for every government. The most dramatic example, of course, is found in defense policy, but one sees the impact of technology also in most questions of international relations and in many domestic problems such as the energy problem and the urban crisis. So, in a sense, it is fair to say that nearly all governmental activity today is a response to technology and its impact on society.

This country came out of World War II having discovered that organized scientific efforts could have a tremendous impact on society. The radars of the Radiation Laboratory and the atomic bombs of the Los Alamos Laboratory were two prize examples of what science could accomplish. Of course, some of the industrial enterprises—like the Bell Telephone System and the General Electric Company—had discovered the power of organized research long before World War II, but there was not the general appreciation of the power of applied research that existed after the war. As the war ended, an effort was undertaken, first by interested persons in the Defense Department, later in other branches of the government, to provide support for research on the general assumption that good basic research would be good for the country, and particularly good for the national defense effort. The Office of Naval Research was created to sponsor such work, to be followed by the establishment of a whole series of other governmental institutions for supporting research (primarily through the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission). As the cold war became tense, there was little need for justification of the individual undertakings. At that time, the Defense Department was able to request support for research and development and get almost anything it wanted with very little need to justify its expenditures. It is a surprising thing that, given such permissiveness, so much of the work turned out to be very good. Of course, by today's standards the budgets were quite small.

If you put aside the moral question of association with the Defense Department, which has been the object of so much campus concern in recent years, then, from the point of view of a university administrator, the Defense Department was an almost ideal agency to deal with, as it left program direction and program choices entirely up to the university.

In contrast with that is the fact that, if you want to make a

modest change in the direction of a project sponsored by a civilian agency (for example, the National Institutes of Health), you would have to write to Washington for permission, and if you want to spend more than a limited amount of money on a piece of equipment, you likewise have to ask for permission. So, purely from the point of view of intellectual freedom and also freedom from red tape, the Defense Department has been an extremely good sponsor for scientists doing basic research. The Atomic Energy Commission was similarly skillful in its supervision of its external research activities.

Unfortunately, benign support of basic research was not the primary mission of the Department of Defense. Its primary technical mission was to develop a great technological capability to counter perceived Soviet threats. To counter Soviet bombers, we developed an air defense system, and then the Russians developed ballistic missiles. Then we had to develop both missiles and antimissile systems, and the Soviets responded to these with their own new programs. The result was that we had, speeding along in parallel on both sides, a growing and accelerating nightmare of interactions between the Soviet Union and the United States. This process—an endless arms race, going faster and faster, growing larger and larger, and becoming costlier and costlier—in the end generated some major problems for this country and for the world that we have not been able to deal with.

During the early part of this period (say, from 1946 to about 1952), there was little recognition among White House staff of what was happening, and particularly of the interactive nature of the problem. Most of the decision making was in the Defense Department, which was not much different from a typical university department in that it asked for support for everything that its members conceived of. The difference was that a university department received support for a number of years. This process was tolerated until expenditures reached the point where they undermined President Eisenhower's ability to balance the budget. More or less at the same time, President Eisenhower and some of his aides began to realize that the more money they spent on defense, the more dangerous the world seemed to become. For a while, this was thought to be just a consequence of incompetence in the Pentagon. So, beginning

in 1954, there was developed a series of studies associated with the White House (in which I took part) to find out how better to manage Pentagon technical programs.

Unfortunately, enough incompetence was found to disguise the real problem. We found that there was a lack of hard technical assessment on which to base judgments about weapon systems, and we developed a conviction that the Defense Department was scattering its efforts much too widely. We concluded, at that time, that good management might in fact make it possible to achieve a substantial degree of security based on real military superiority.

We failed to catch on then to the fact that, at least in part, we were running an arms race with ourselves. The United States is a country in which we publish everything almost as fast as we do it. It is a necessary part of our system. (In fact, in the military field we usually publish our intention before the fact in order to get money from the Congress.) We were, therefore, actually giving the Soviet Union an enormous amount of technical guidance. This is not generally recognized, but I think it was a very important fact in the period I am discussing.

This no doubt still is the case: the Soviet Union now is working hard to reproduce our Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV), and we are moving into high-accuracy counterforce weapons that no doubt they also will want—at least they will after Pentagon officials have touted such weapons for a few more years. At any rate, after two or three years of trying to apply the cure of better technical management, which we thought would improve the Defense Department programs, the situation seemed to get only worse.

During this period, however, President Eisenhower began to recognize that there was value in independent scientific advice. To provide him with such advice, a committee was set up under the director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. This committee was the predecessor to the president's Science Advisory Committee. (It is clear that science here meant mostly defense technology.) In 1957, the president asked this group to take an in-depth look at some of the major defense problems troubling him, particularly the problems of civil defense and active defense for the country. I became deeply involved in this effort. In the course of these studies many of us came to recognize what

was articulated to us by the president himself, when we talked to him at the end of our year-long study, as the futility of the arms race. "This is all kind of foolish," said the president. "You can't have that war. You can't make a strong enough defense to protect the people, and there won't be enough bulldozers to scrape the bodies off the streets. You have to see whether you can't find a way to stop the arms race. You fellows are working on the wrong problems."

We reminded him that we were working for him and that his question to us had been quite explicitly, "Can you build a defense system for the country that would protect us in the event of a nuclear war?" Our reply was, "We don't think so, at least not all of the people." By spending a lot of money you could protect some of the people, but, if you were unwilling to accept 20 or 30 or maybe even 70 million casualties after you had spent an enormous sum like \$100 billion for defense, then there could be no defense.

"Why don't you work on the problem of disarmament? Nobody in the government wants to help me with disarmament," the president asked, in a poignant plea. "The AEC has their thing, and the Defense Department has their thing, why don't you fellows worry about this problem?" We said we would.

All this took place in August 1957, just before the first flight of Sputnik. While we were still reeling from having spent a year "working on the wrong problem," the Russians launched their satellite. Once again, the president turned first to the agencies that had the responsibility for the problem, to the National Science Foundation and to the navy, which together were responsible for something called Vanguard. He asked them to explain what had happened and what was its significance. But he soon recognized that he was not getting explanations, just defenses. At that point he remembered there was a group called the president's Science Advisory Committee. I do not think it had met with him during the previous two years, except to discuss the defense studies I mentioned, but he called the group in and asked us whether we could explain Sputnik and its significance.

His experiences, as I stated above, led President Eisenhower to realize that he was a captive of the operating agencies, and

that he needed a continuing independent source of information about science, its impact on the government, and what his choices were if he were to have any hope of controlling the government.

In November 1957, he asked James R. Killian, president of M.I.T., to be the full-time special assistant for science and technology as a means of dealing with this problem. At the same time, the Science Advisory Committee was reconstituted and made directly responsive to the president. As the new entity operated and gained experience, it became a self-starting operation in the sense that it no longer waited for presidential directives (although it was responsive to them), but looked around for problems and then suggested to the president areas of study and investigation.

This new activity represented a true watershed in the relationship between scientists and the political process, particularly at the presidential level, for it brought a continuing scientific voice and concern into the highest level of the government. In contrast, I recall having an occasion to see Oliver Buckley, one-time president of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, who was a science adviser in the Truman administration. Buckley had an office in a corner room in the Executive Office Building (an office that later was mine for a while), which surveyed the big White House lawn. "Oliver," I asked him, "what do you do here?"

"I see the president every day," he replied.

"You do?" I responded, somewhat surprised.

"Yes," he said, pointing to the lawn. "Mr. Truman takes a walk out there."

He went on to explain that, in fact, he did not do very much. "If you're an adviser," he declared, "you don't give advice unless you're asked."

This attitude changed under President Eisenhower. Dr. Killian and the Science Advisory Committee became an active force, seeking out problems, trying to identify in advance areas where something that was being done or not being done, inside the government, or was emerging in science or technology, would pose a serious policy question for the government.

The two major areas, at the start, obviously were space (which had been the cause of all the embarrassment to the country) and

defense. Sputnik represented a double-edged threat. The public still may not appreciate the full extent of the shock Sputnik created in inner circles. It was an obvious political embarrassment, which made most uninformed people (including a very large segment of our own population) think that the Russians suddenly had become much stronger technologically and militarily than the United States and that we faced an immediate threat. It also upset the predictions that informed people had made concerning the time when the Soviets were likely to possess ballistic missiles, because it was obvious that they could not have launched Sputnik without a truly powerful rocket.

The reaction was, therefore, a double one. First, how to get a more effective space program; second, how to close the so-called missile gap. On the basis of the best intelligence estimates we had at that time and the schedules of our own rocket programs, it was believed by almost everyone that by 1959 or thereabouts the Soviet Union would have a large ballistic missile force, whereas we would have none. Hence, there would be a missile gap. This would have made the U.S. strategic air force and air defense systems extremely vulnerable. Consequently, we put a very high priority on trying to accelerate our missile and space programs. The Science Advisory Committee worked hard on those programs for several years, to the neglect of the problem that the president had asked us to work on—the disarmament issue.

On the subject of disarmament, the Science Advisory Committee was able to deal with only two major issues during this period. In the spring of 1958, we began to work on the technical facts concerning a nuclear test ban, and shortly thereafter, following some correspondence between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev, we were asked to consider the question of what might be done to reduce the dangers of surprise attack. In the process of examining these two issues, we discovered that the federal government, with the exception of the State Department, was monolithically opposed, just as the president had said, to all disarmament efforts. Officials always posed the problem in terms of the threat to national survival; by coincidence it also tended to be a threat to the bureaucratic health of the agencies involved. So the Science Advisory Committee was forced to develop its own competence (in terms of consultants



and staff experts) in the disarmament field, and, for a number of years (roughly, 1958 through 1961), it was *the* expert technical and policy group advising the president on disarmament matters. During this period it had by all odds the most comprehensive understanding of disarmament problems that existed within the government. The committee was involved in every discussion of whether the United States could afford to indulge in test-ban treaties, weapons limitations, inspections, and the like.

Through these experiences, those of us who were involved began to recognize that something was deeply wrong with the organization of the federal government and some of its agencies, such as the Defense Department. Why, for example, should one have to deal in the White House, as we were forced to do, with the basic technical questions that determined whether the United States should build a nuclear-powered aircraft? On most defense and nuclear issues the president could not count on getting a sensible policy position out of any part of the government other than the White House staff, that is, the Bureau of the Budget or the Science Advisory Committee. To correct this, a new technical office called the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering was created in the Defense Department, and, until it became swamped by the Vietnam War, the D.D.R. & E. succeeded in doing much of the analysis of military-technical problems that previously had been done by the White House staff.

The establishment of the D.D.R. & E. within the Pentagon created a responsible group of policy makers who could rise above the old interservice rivalry problems. Under the old system, we always could predict exactly what the three services were going to say in any given situation; for example, the air force on nuclear-powered submarines. The air force would say exactly what you would expect it to say, given its commitment to maximizing air force programs. The two services that said you should not do something were more right than wrong. But because the system consistently worked that way, there was not much useful information for the president in any Joint Chiefs' recommendation. The navy always was for nuclear-powered submarines; the air force always was for nuclear-powered aircraft; the army always was for portable nuclear power plants that

could run in the Arctic. There always would be a two-to-one vote against any of these, or almost any other, proposals. We did not realize how favorable a situation this was. It gave the secretary of defense and the president a great amount of latitude to make their own decisions. After Secretary McNamara succeeded in reorganizing the Pentagon, the three members of the Joint Chiefs realized that unless they voted together they would not get anything. Suddenly there were three-to-nothing votes in favor of everything! This did not convey much information, either, and it was much tougher to deal with.

Up to this point, I have concentrated on military matters because they presented the overriding issues for the president during the period when I was involved. But other agencies presented similar problems. For example, the water quality program of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare required a considerable White House effort during my term as special assistant.

The role of the Science Advisory Committee thus evolved into a kind of counterbalance to other government agencies. President Kennedy once suggested to a newspaperman that although the Science Advisory Committee seemed to be an anomaly, in that it cut across many agencies, its value was that it kept the government from going all one way. It was the only body that had this effect. It played this role in a great variety of fields besides defense and space; it did so particularly in education, and, after Sputnik, especially in scientific and technical education.

At any rate, this system worked well as long as three conditions existed: (1) we knew—or thought we did—that our task was to work primarily with national security problems; (2) the cost of research was tolerable, so that those who were involved did not worry too much about costs; and (3) the arrangement had the confidence of the president. These conditions changed with time, however. First, as the Soviet Union began to open up a little bit, and we began to explore many of the issues that separated us, we began to be less fearful of the threat the Soviets posed. Many of us became convinced that the USSR was not singlemindedly devoting all its efforts to preparing for an attack on the United States so that it could dominate the world. Second, it became clear that, even if Russia decided to attempt



such an attack, it did not have the capability to succeed; and it appeared that Russia would not be able to acquire such a capability, no matter how hard it tried.

Thus, the Science Advisory Committee's concern with defense problems became less acute, and it was able to spend more and more time trying to find alternative forms of ensuring our national security. This involved a closer examination of what the Pentagon was doing and how its large sums of money were being used. A number of other national problems began to be recognized, as the almost paranoid preoccupation with national security waned. In retrospect, we see that it had caused our leaders to overlook a number of growing social problems for so long that they had become almost unmanageable. Among these problems were the deterioration of the cities; the problems of our minorities; failures in the educational system; and environmental problems.

Unfortunately, we did not know how to respond to these problems, for we had not been working on them; we had not done the experimentation necessary to be prepared to tackle them. Also, many people in the Congress had come to regard research and development (R&D) funds—spent in some areas of the country, particularly the east and west coasts—as sure sources of economic input. A serious pork barrel problem developed. The Pentagon and other agencies had been free to spend the money where and in any way they pleased, because of the national security aspect of their work. When that consideration did not exist, members of the Congress began to insist upon wider geographic distribution of R&D money more than, or at least as much as, upon the achievement of technical goals. Given the power balances that regulate our federal government, it was possible for interested persons in Congress to push through a number of programs designed to achieve a more uniform distribution of R&D activities around the country.

One of these programs was designed to create "centers of excellence" in parts of the country where none existed. The concept was a workable one as long as the nation was committed to a budget for R&D that was able to grow at a rate of 10 to 15 percent per year. With such growth, as new institutions developed there were adequate funds to support them. But, just as this new program was indeed getting under way, the costs of the

Vietnam War and the financial demands of urban and other domestic needs began to rise steeply. At the same time, campus protest against the Vietnam War and against defense research in the universities appeared and congressional enthusiasm for support of university research began to decline. Thus, the growth pattern that had existed up to this point changed. At the same time there developed both a levelling off in support for existing programs and a need for more support for a whole series of new institutions that had just been created. This development exacerbated what in any case would have been a serious financial problem, so that today many research projects are badly underfunded.

Many of the present difficulties in science-government relationships exist because up to this point, we did not adequately think through science management mechanisms. During Killian's, Kistiakowsky's, and my own regimes as science adviser, we thought about the question of how to establish priorities, if they should be needed, among scientific activities. But we all resisted setting priorities, except implicitly. I took the position that I could not do so because I did not know how. For example, I felt I was unable to judge the priorities between molecular biology and high-energy physics, at least in any dollar terms. I was unwilling to do this, although we did try to understand how one would if it became necessary.

The country probably is now at the stage where it is necessary to establish at least some priorities. We are going to be forced to face up to priorities between some programs and some institutions. In one sense, we have already done so, although not very effectively, by budget restraints, and this is one of the reasons we are in trouble. Fortunately, despite all of the rhetoric to the contrary, there does remain in this country a belief that knowledge based upon education and research is essential to the solution of most of our major problems. There is an intuitive belief, a feeling that perhaps research similar to that which helped so much in the defense area will help with our serious social problems. But in fact we do not know how to go about relating the research to the problems. In the health field, for example, for quite a long time we have funded a vast amount of basic research in biology and medicine. Yet now there is a general feeling in the Congress and in the top levels of the administration

(among the people who are being asked to continue this support) that the investment has not paid off. Here is, I think, one of our communication failures, for the people who are beginning to doubt the wisdom of large-scale fundamental research in the life sciences do not understand how basic knowledge is put to work. Frequently it must first permeate the information base of scientific workers, and only then does it contribute to the solution of specific problems. Government officials tend to expect a payoff on a short time scale, and though this sometimes occurs, it is the exception not the rule. The payoff more often comes from the painstakingly built broad base of understanding. Beyond this—and I think that it is the key problem—these officials do not adequately understand the interrelationship between basic research, that is, the creation of new knowledge, and its utilization. In most of the social areas the link between new knowledge and its employment is inadequate and the processes by which the government tries to stimulate it do not seem to work. In fact, I am convinced that we do not know how to put new knowledge to work except through the medium of the industrial firm. That is why our efforts otherwise to stimulate civilian technology have been so unsatisfactory.

The public, as well as most of our political decision makers, seems to believe that if you discover something, it will automatically be put to work. Now, this is not true even in those fields where it is easy for private enterprise to pick up a new idea and exploit it, for the time constants for the exploitation of a new idea are long and the costs of industrial development and marketing are great. In fields where there is no process through which ideas are picked up and rushed through the development and production stages, and then put to work, the situation is much more unsatisfactory, chaotic, and haphazard. In particular, in the health field, whether a scientific discovery becomes used often depends on the chance that some individual will be greatly interested in a problem to which the discovery is relevant. Until very recently, for example, a serious imbalance existed between the amount of fundamental biological research being done and the work under way to try to apply that knowledge to the prevention or cure of cancer. One can say the same thing about a number of other diseases. The response should be not to stop the basic research, which was the Nixon administra-

tion's response, but rather to try to do something about the important transitional step that is missing. Although there is some effort along this line, I think it is far from adequate.

The same is true in the field of education as well as in urban affairs, housing, and most of the other social problem areas. Researchers are just beginning to recognize that in these fields the practical tasks are far more complex than the problems involved in designing and building a radar or a computer. These tasks involve interactions between people; they also involve a kind of moving target. If an engineer working on a radar gets to a certain point and decides to go home that night, when he comes back the next morning the problem is just where he left it. With any complicated social problem, one is racing against a continuously changing set of relationships in an infinitely complex world. One can never be sure that any data collected, any experiment made at one place at one time, has any relevance to the next set of problems, or possibly even to the same problem at a later time.

Thus, while theories are desirable, much more common sense, that is, educated intuitional common sense, is desperately needed here. To some degree this applies in all those fields that we want to work in now: how to understand the impact of science and technology on society; how to make the world a more decent place; how to ensure that we are not going to suffocate from the air we breathe or die from the water we drink, or that we won't be blown up by the huge stockpiles of plutonium that the nuclear energy program will create.

We also face the problem of scale. I can think of no major social problem which a civilian agency has tackled with resources or a time perspective that matched the scale of the problem in the same way that the Pentagon tends to match the resources to the task at hand. Despite all the concern about the cities, no one has faced such basic questions as: What will it actually take to meet our urban needs? What kinds of research teams? How long will it take? How much money? Rather, research has been undertaken in response to individual, and usually small, research proposals from investigators in many separate institutes and universities. This approach does generate knowledge, but it is not a program and it may never meet the need!

The same is true of our R&D efforts in most other domestic areas. Programs are the aggregate of many individual studies directed and integrated by a program officer in Washington who cannot bring about a truly interactive, creative relationship between the individual investigators. These officials fail to recognize that the informational short circuit they create eliminates the possibility of interaction among the working scientists; the result is that true programs fail to develop. As applied programs in the areas of the environment, energy, medical care, productivity, materials, transportation, and the urban setting generally become more urgent, it will be recognized that the grant system of supporting individual investigators, so ideal for supporting basic research, is totally inadequate for solving major problems.

These problems are built into the way we now run our civilian research programs and explain, at least in part, why we are not now able to mount effective programs. We will not be able to do so until the agencies are prepared to support a few major centers to bring together the many aspects of a problem.

The Congress presents yet another problem with regard to coordinated technical programs: its structure makes coordination difficult. The Congress operates through committees, usually one for each department of the executive branch (Defense; Health, Education, and Welfare; Interior; and so on) plus some general committees such as the Ways and Means Committee and the Appropriations Committee. These committees decide what they are willing to support within the agencies for which they are responsible. So, whenever a broad problem arises that spans several departments, it is more or less impossible to create a unified program in the executive branch and then to get support for it in the Congress. This is another of the difficulties in most of the domestic fields where several agencies are involved; it has been impossible to create a coherent set of programs to deal with them. There is another problem from the point of view of the welfare of science: some of the most important agencies are the responsibility of committees that are relatively uninterested in research. Congressional committees not surprisingly span a spectrum of competences and motivations; at one extreme are those who are quite perfunctory in their behavior. If they have any motivating principles, these stem pri-

marily from budgetary considerations, that is, how to save money. At the other extreme there is the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which regards itself as the sponsor and protector-advocate of governmental atomic energy programs for both military and peaceful uses. In the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which I believe is the only joint committee that has responsibility for an agency of the government, the House and Senate team up to sponsor programs, so the committee itself becomes an extremely powerful lobby. In fact, on occasion it has essentially run the Atomic Energy Commission.

In contrast, in a sense, the National Science Foundation reports to a group called the Independent Offices Committee. This is more or less a housekeeping agency for all the independent offices. It is hard to be the advocate for a widely diverse group of activities, so all the committee shows any enthusiasm for is saving money. Year after year, the president requests, for the National Science Foundation, more money than the Congress grants, because NSF has no strong congressional constituency.

In more general terms, one could go so far as to say there is no broad constituency in the Congress for general technological programs, for health research, or for educational research. In any event, the Congress is not properly organized to deal with these problems and, despite all the efforts that have been made in recent years to set up oversight committees that could interrelate programs, little progress has been made in this regard. When space was "*the thing*," a new committee, called the Science and Astronautics Committee, was created in the House. Science was put in as something of an afterthought, but, as space became less exciting to the country and the Congress, the committee began to take the science half of its charter more seriously. In particular, Representative Emilio Z. Daddario (formerly Democratic representative from Connecticut) thought that he could use the committee as an integrating and correlating device for science programs. When no one else cared, he got permission to form a subcommittee (called Science, Research, and Development) on science policy, enlisted some of his more receptive colleagues, commissioned several reports, quietly ran through a series of hearings, and built up an understanding of what was wrong with the way in which the Congress deals



with science problems. Under Daddario, that subcommittee assumed leadership in dealing with the problems of research and development. Daddario gave up his seat to run (unsuccessfully) for governor of Connecticut in 1970, but until then, the subcommittee had hoped to evolve into something of an R&D authorization committee, like the committees for specific programs such as defense. Although that is not likely to occur, the subcommittee has been allowed to do much general good for science.

There is an analogous situation in the Senate, which has no authorization committee for R&D. There, the staff of the Labor and Welfare Committee, to which the National Science Foundation reports, has persuaded Senator Edward Kennedy to try to create an authorization committee for NSF. This effort has been reasonably successful. Nonetheless, in neither house of Congress is there yet a mechanism for integrating science affairs. At the moment, the situation is unpredictable; it depends on the whims of individuals and on the relationships of people in the agencies with the committees. (This material was prepared before the new Office of Technological Assessment was created by the Congress. This new office may, to some extent, be able to help the Congress coordinate science and technology programs, though that is not its purpose.)

My final point concerns the problem of relating research to practical problems, whatever the field: health, defense, urban affairs, or any other. There is, at the moment, no single place in the government, except the White House, where the programs can be brought together, and they are not in fact brought together effectively there.

White House coordination occurs in the annual budget decision process, in the year-round activities of the Office of Management and Budget, and, for technical matters, through the efforts of the Office of Science and Technology. For a long time, the Office of Management and Budget (called the Bureau of the Budget until 1970) was the one place in Washington where people worried about interactions and interrelationships of programs. Only in the budget process are serious efforts made to bring things together. Unfortunately, that process is so rapid and conducted under so much pressure that it is impossible to be thoughtful or careful about the results: even if you do

not have the necessary facts, you have to make decisions. When I was working in the White House, the budget had a firm deadline of 20 December at which time it went to the printer. In preparation, the budget went through a number of cycles. The agencies would begin working on the budget fourteen months earlier. The process would start in the Bureau of the Budget, whose director would provide the president with an estimate of revenues and foreseeable expenditures (most of the federal budget is controllable and predictable) and with suggestions regarding the adjustable requests from the agencies.

Together the bureau and the agencies would make tentative assignments, including funds for whatever new programs the president wanted. They would try to hold the existing agencies to their previous year's budgets, plus inflation, and try to put into new programs whatever increases in revenues were anticipated. I never realized until I worked in the White House how little free maneuverable money the president actually has at his disposal. At that time, the national budget was about \$100 billion. (Today it is more than double that sum.) When one added up all the fixed costs—such as for agricultural support programs, veterans' benefits and interest payments, and manpower—the total came to more than \$60 billion. The programs that the president had some possibility of influencing—though obviously he could not greatly influence them—totaled about \$40 billion. The research and development budget that I was concerned with accounted for approximately \$16 billion of that. Although \$16 billion does not seem very large as compared with the total of \$100 billion, it was a large portion of the \$40 billion that could be maneuvered. This explains, of course, why even small items in the budget receive so much scrutiny.

In any event, the guidelines would go out in October, and in March the White House would expect to receive the proposed budgets from the agencies. Most agencies would send back a requirements budget about 40 percent higher than the president's guidelines. The Bureau of the Budget and my office then would go to work on each budget, to understand the pieces of it; and, in the process, we would negotiate away some of the 40 percent over guidelines. This process took most of the spring and summer. In the end the two groups, the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Science and Technology together, worked



on the technical programs of particularly recalcitrant agencies such as the Defense Department. We did this by a series of discussions with the agency heads and their senior officers regarding specific budget proposals, in an effort to get them to cut back their requests to the proposed levels. Up to a point, it was just a matter of how extravagantly the agency wanted to live, but frequently, the difficult problems turned out to be ones that required resolution of basic policy. Thus, finally, there would emerge some unresolvable issues that were taken to the president for decisions. For example, the cancellation of the Skybolt missile required major changes in the U.S. policy with regard to supplying the United Kingdom and France with assistance in the construction of Polaris-armed submarines and missiles.

Another example, and perhaps the most difficult issue I faced during my term as special assistant, related to the fallout shelter program. In 1962, the Pentagon was strongly in favor of a large-scale shelter program, whereas my office and the Bureau of the Budget were equally committed against one. This program involved a number of serious policy questions, including large expenditures, the need to convince the public of an immediate danger that was not apparent, and housing policy. We argued about the shelter question for many months. Finally, in the fall, as the budget was being finished, we went to Cape Cod for several days and spent the entire time, morning till night, going through the budget issues one at a time with the president until he understood each one and made a decision. After a day of discussing the massive shelter program, President Kennedy decided against it.

Because these issues were brought up in the context of the budget, however, many important questions were never asked, much less answered. These questions, relating to the context in which the things fit, frequently were more important than the budget question. Several health programs, for example, which were started because they were felt to be desirable, were handled as budget problems. Nobody ever asked whether there were enough doctors or hospitals to meet the commitments that were being made, because no one had studied the questions adequately enough to know that the question mattered. This whole area of predicting or forecasting the consequences of new

programs, particularly those involving new technology, has not been dealt with adequately in the past, and the government still is not prepared to deal with such issues properly. There is now an effort in Congress, initiated by Representative Daddario, to establish a technological forecasting capability for the Congress.

The Technological Assessment Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-484) established an Office of Technological Assessment (OTA) for the Congress as an aid in identification and consideration of existing and probable impacts of technological applications, and to develop other coordinate information to assist the Congress. To carry out the assigned functions of OTA, the legislation specified eight specific activities:

1. Identify existing or probable impacts of technology or technological programs;
2. Where possible, ascertain cause-and-effect relationships;
3. Identify alternative technological methods of implementing specific programs;
4. Identify alternative programs for achieving requisite goals;
5. Make estimates and comparisons of the impacts of alternative programs;
6. Present findings of completed analyses to the appropriate legislative authorities;
7. Identify areas where additional research or data collection is required to provide adequate support for the assessments and estimates described above;
8. Undertake such additional associated activities as the appropriate authorities specified . . . may direct.

The OTA consists of a Congressional Board; a director, a deputy director, and other employees; and a Citizens' Advisory Council. The board consists of six senators and six representatives and the director as a nonvoting member. The Advisory Council consists of ten private citizens and, in addition, the director of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and the comptroller general of the United States. The office began to function in the spring of 1974 when Congress provided funds for its operation. Congressman Daddario, having previously retired from the House, was named director and Senator Edward Kennedy became chairman of the board. The OTA staff has undertaken a number of studies requested by the

Congress and is hard at work on efforts to define the scope and limits of its assignment as well as to develop adequate processes and methodology for its operation.

During the initial period of OTA's existence it has been swamped by requests for studies ranging over the full spectrum of congressional activities, many of them much broader than technological assessments and some involving technology only in the most tangential sense. On the other hand, some requests are for purely technical studies not involving assessment of the application of a development. For example, the OTA's first study, now completed, was on the bioequivalence of certain types of drugs. The report that resulted discussed in great detail the many scientific questions involved but did not examine the deeper issues that grow out of the study: that is, could the government, in its payment for drugs, insist on the least costly product that qualified chemically and, if so, what would be the consequences to the drug industry? Such questions, which must be faced, are perhaps best resolved in the context of a congressional hearing rather than by means of a study. The OTA study provided the technical foundation for a sound congressional airing of the question. Perhaps this will always be OTA's most important function.

When I was special assistant to the president for science and technology, I tried to present the president with the broadest range of possibilities to maximize his freedom of choice. Doing so sometimes meant opening up options that the departments involved preferred to rule out. This was a continuation of the mode of operation that developed under President Eisenhower's leadership and was particularly important in the national security area, as I indicated above.

The Congress has always been a leader in such domestic areas as health and welfare, where information was available. But it has been extremely hesitant to challenge or lead in highly technical fields such as defense or arms control, where its members felt they were inadequately informed. Perhaps as the competence of OTA increases, Congress will develop truly independent leadership in those important areas as well.

I hope that the OTA will persuade organizations like the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering as well as university groups to study specific prob-

lems for the OTA (for example, the supersonic transport). As yet, we do not have the ability to make good forecasts or even to bring up all the various questions that ought to be reviewed. The development of capability for technology assessment is one of the most important steps we can take for the better management of our society.

As defense technology comes to be regarded as less overriding and civilian technology is given higher priority, we see that the government is increasingly unable to cope with the urgent problems. With the demise of the special assistant for science and technology and of the president's Science Advisory Committee, the president has little or no help in recognizing or understanding the problems in which science and/or technology play a key role. So, these problems are neglected or at best are handled in a piecemeal fashion. The limping energy research and the diffuse health care system are but two examples of such matters. It is hoped that with the coming of a new president and administration this serious gap can be eliminated. The House Science and Astronautics Committee is preparing legislation that would establish a new presidential-level science organization. If passed by the Congress and accepted by the president, this would create the opportunity for dealing with society's complex technological problems.

Even with a presidential-level mechanism, many of our problems will be difficult to manage, for they are complex and involve technical, social, and political issues that have no simple answers. The answers depend, in fact, on our social goals and objectives, which are hardly simple or ever defined. Nonetheless, we have little choice; our future welfare depends upon the aggressive development of appropriate technologies in a wide range of fields, many of them dependent upon wise leadership and support from the society at large.

### 3

## RISING EXPECTATIONS: FRUSTRATIONS

JOSEPH J. SPENGLER

As he is happiest whom very little contents, so the great and ambitious are most miserable—their happiness demands a vast accumulation of blessings.

La Rochefoucauld

At the rate of progress since 1800, every American who lived in the year 2000 would know how to control unlimited power.

Henry Adams

2,000 Dollar Monthly Retirement Is Eyed

*Durham Morning Herald*, 25 June 1972

The higher the human intellect rises in the discovery . . . of aims, the more obvious it becomes that the final aim is beyond its reach.

Tolstoy, *War and Peace*

This chapter deals with the interrelations of rising expectations in the realm of human affairs and frustrations associated with unsatisfied or disappointed demand flowing out of these expectations. Although confidence in the realization of expectations may be conditioned by the state of the physical world environing an individual, this confidence is necessarily less strong than that attached to the belief that so-called physical laws will rule in the future as in the past. The first three of the following sections are devoted to the analytical framework employed, and later sections to past, present, and prospective circumstances affecting expectations, the degree of their realization, and possible sources of frustration. It will become apparent that the subject of this chapter is of quite modern vintage in that it could

command little attention so long as men assumed, much as did Plato, that each generation would live amid conditions essentially the same as those governing the lives of their fathers.<sup>1</sup>

Two quotations, one from T. R. Malthus's *Essay on Population*, formulated nearly 175 years ago, and the other from a recent study, reflect the issue here under analysis and the changes in its character. Wrote Malthus, by no means an optimist:

This habit of expecting too much, and the irritation occasioned by disappointment continually give a wrong direction to their efforts in favour of liberty and constantly tend to defeat the accomplishment of those gradual reforms in government and that slow melioration of the condition of the lower classes of society which are really attainable.<sup>2</sup>

Malthus's notion of expectations was congruent with reality,<sup>3</sup> departure from which gives rise to dilemmas. An example is described by Aaron Wildavsky. He has in view a dilemma facing today's so-called elites, sprung largely from classes emerging since Malthus wrote, and now, as Hofstadter suggests, reflecting disappointment at the political legacy of the past:

Dissemination of the idea that man has to be creative at a time when so many have been exposed to higher education gives rise to expectations that cannot be met. New creations can only become the property of the few; if all are "original," none are. There is an immense contradiction between the pressures on the educated to find new forms of expression, and the common perception of originality as something rare and unusual. The result is widespread anger at a system that denies special status to its system of aspiring elites.<sup>4</sup>

The treatment of expectations, together with reactions to them, may be organized in terms of the paradigm underlying the work of which this chapter is a small part: (1) The economic expectations under consideration have their origin in the examples of others, in environmental situations, in individual experience, and in a variety of visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli that denote, connote, or suggest objects of desire; they are reinforced by opinion makers and propagators, today more than in the past when means of communication were inferior, information was less, affected populations were much smaller, and societies probably were less "other-directed."<sup>5</sup> (2) The content of



relevant information flowing from the points of origin to the subjects destined to be influenced ranges from the very general to the quite specific, from what is designed to influence individuals to that which, however influential, is an unintended by-product of other activities. (3) Those exposed to the information and stimuli consist of individuals and categories of individuals, only some of whom are deliberately selected to receive information and stimuli individually or en masse. Most of the information and stimuli are incident, much as is rain, on anonymous "addressees." (4) Only "information" originating with advertisers and others engaged in "selling" may be described as policy-oriented. (5) Changes in expectations are influenced (pace McLuhan) in only a minor degree by techniques designed for this purpose; the changes flow rather from the general socioeconomic environment to which consumers are exposed. (6) Expectations generate feedbacks; while these may reinforce the trend in expectations, they can end in frustrations not easily resolved, with the result that the generation of expectations must be brought into equilibrium with realities.

Rising expectations, it will be shown, constitute an essentially modern phenomenon, one destined, however, to persist for several decades. Throughout most of man's history, expectations were in equilibrium with realities, held there in part by a widespread opinion, articulated in proverb, verse, and philosophical dictum to the effect that for most men this-worldly prospects were slim. Moreover, most individuals in comparison with today's Americans resembled pre-Green Revolution grain as compared with today's; insensibility to stimuli was high, serving to cushion the impact of recurring adversity even as does today's "culture of poverty" and (as William James observed) as did yesterday's poverty.

It is not clear what determinants of rising expectations were most significant, at least initially. Our information is limited and, as Barbara Tuchman remarked in another connection, a great change sometimes is less noticeable to the eyewitness than to history. Three determinants seem, however, to have played a major role in shaping the course of expectations; namely, improvement in channels and means of communication, increase in social and geographical mobility, and the direction and rate of invention and innovation (especially since "invention of the method of invention" in the nineteenth century).<sup>6</sup> In the pres-

ent century, World Wars I and II and their corollaries have contributed greatly by destroying power- and class-structures the world over and thereby undermining constraints upon the forces of the twentieth century. Impending on the horizon is mind-management through widespread directed use of drugs as well as through control of mass media.<sup>7</sup>

### **DEMAND; FRUSTRATION**

We use here concepts defined with sufficient rigor to facilitate discourse, but not with so great specificity that much of what is of concern is excluded by definition. After all, insofar as man's affairs and responses are fuzzy, somewhat fuzzy terminology may be indicated.<sup>8</sup>

We conceive of economic demand in a somewhat different sense from that signified by an individual or a group (*à la* Marshall) function, or from that represented by a macroeconomic demand function. Frustration is conceived of as an individual manifestation; it can, however, assume a quasi-group or mob form when many individuals, who, qua individuals, are subject to frustration, become aware that other individuals are experiencing similar feelings. Then each individual's attitudes tend to be reinforced as he becomes aware that others share his attitude. Accordingly, aggregate frustration will tend to exceed that associated with a group of individuals, each of whom remains unaware of his neighbor's feelings.<sup>9</sup> Bandwagon-like shifts in public attitude may be associated with a general becoming aware by many an individual of his neighbor's attitude.

Of special concern here is the tendency for the frustration that an individual may associate with unsatisfied economic demand to exceed in amount or intensity that which is strictly related to his *economic* demand functions. An individual is a member of a number of subsystems, as Parsons, Pareto, and others have pointed out.<sup>10</sup> He does not, nor is he likely to be able to, distinguish sharply between frustration of purely economic origin and much frustration of noneconomic origin. Wants or demands originating in any one subsystem (say, economic) spill over into other subsystems, with the result that frustration associated with unsatisfied economic demand usually is of multisystem origin and impact. It is theoretically possible, of course, to transform any one kind of demand into other



kinds—not linearly and without limit, but curvilinearly and within a definite range. Indeed, every mode of conduct-determining and hence variable demand, economic or otherwise, reflects, or is in response to, some form of scarcity, that is, a state in which less is available at zero "price" than is wanted at that price. Scarcity may consist in that of goods and services or in that of power—indeed, in that of whatever men find desirable as well as divisible, transferable, and utilizable by an individual.

In view of what has been said, it is advisable, when dealing with frustration of economic demand, that demand be defined rather broadly, since those experiencing frustration are likely, though they implicitly define it broadly, to view it in economic terms. Indeed, for purposes of the present chapter, the object of demand may be viewed as reflecting an individual's welfare function, that is, as representing the collection of diverse goods, services, and satisfactions which he seeks and considers to be within reach.

In keeping with this view, most if not all social sciences, or modes of social inquiry, are derivatives of forms of scarcity, and social science in general is a derivative of the scarcity of that which men want. Each social science is concerned with the response of the individual, reacting individually or in temporary or permanent association with others, to some form of scarcity. For example, economics deals with man's response to the scarcity (that is, nonsuperabundance) of goods and services; political science, with his response to inequality in the interpersonal distribution of power; and so on. The "immediate objects of law are the creation and protection of legal rights," derivatives of scarcity, whereas the concern of jurisprudence is the means by which law subserves its purposes.<sup>11</sup> The current widespread interest in exchange reflects increasing recognition of the fact that concern with scarcity underlies social science and that exchange is man's principal utility-increasing and hence scarcity-reducing mechanism.<sup>12</sup> Not only can exchange increase utility and diminish consciousness of scarcity within one subsystem (for example, the economy); it may also, if it is extended to inter-subsystem relations, facilitate intersubsystem substitution that further augments utility and eases overall consciousness of scarcity.

### EXPECTATIONS; RISING EXPECTATIONS

Here, only economically oriented expectations are under consideration, even though these are not independent of non-economic change. Indeed, since expectations relate to options in the future and since options are conditional as well as inter-related,<sup>13</sup> it may be said that at any time an individual's behavior is conditioned by a somewhat unstable set of expectations, some of which are economically oriented and in a measure dependent upon particular members of this set. Accordingly, complete explicitness of denotation is difficult if not impossible to achieve.

Individual aspirations (or changes in taste), issuing as they do from a variety of sources, generate activity suited to their realization if this appears to be in reach. Welfare then is conditioned by the individual's ability to realize his aspirations<sup>14</sup> as well as by his environment, which governs the number, kind, interrelation, and cost of the things to which he aspires.

In what follows we are concerned with the expectations of communities of men rather than with those of the individual as such, and with the longer run rather than the immediate chain of aspiration  $\rightarrow$  incentive  $\rightarrow$  satisfaction (or frustration). Accordingly, we shall treat economically oriented expectations,  $e$ , as functionally related to average income,  $y$ , and to other relevant variables,  $V_i$ . For the level of income  $y$  not only reflects man's past ability to realize expectations and conditions his current ability to do so; it also gives release to what were latent or suppressed expectations. Although  $e$  relates to the future and hence is most closely associated with anticipated future values of  $y$ , we may make  $e = f(y, V_i)$  on the supposition that  $y$  will be expected to continue to grow as in the recent past. We may then suppose that  $e' = f(y', V_i)$ , where  $e'$  and  $y'$  denote the rates of growth of  $e$  and  $y$ . We may also write  $E = e'/y'$ , where  $E$  denotes elasticity of expectations. Then  $E \cong 1$ , and expectations may be defined as elastic, inelastic, or *rising* accordingly as the value of  $E$  exceeds, falls short of, or equals 1. Here the term *rising* is arbitrarily restricted to situations in which  $E = 1$ . Presumably, changes in  $V_i$  will account in the main for deviations in the value of  $E$  from 1.

As noted above, we shall usually treat  $e$ ,  $e'$ ,  $y$ ,  $y'$ , and  $V_i$  as

descriptive of the behavior of a community of individuals, each of whom is reacting to his own  $y$ ,  $y'$ , and  $V_i$ . Accordingly,  $E$  is likely to be affected if there is change in the variance about the average values descriptive of the community, or in the distribution either of overall income or of the impact of conditions included under  $V_i$ .  $E$  will increase also if a belief develops that in the future  $y'$  will increase, for then the current value of  $e'$  will rise more than the immediately anticipated value of  $y'$ . A change in the composition of expectations may also modify  $E$ . Thus if, as in the nineteenth century, expectations consist more largely of goods highly elastic in supply,  $E$  may rise. The converse also holds; thus when incomes rise beyond a certain level, much greater stress may be put upon wants that draw on resources very limited in supply (for example, suitably situated space) and/or give rise to diseconomies of consumption and adverse externalities.

Rising expectations in the sense of aspirations to continuing improvement, or to anticipation of it, do not constitute a novel phenomenon. Over the centuries small segments of the populations of nations have been motivated by the prospect of improved economic circumstances.<sup>15</sup> But rising expectations in the sense of a widely held and essentially mass outlook constitute a modern phenomenon, mainly of nineteenth-century origin and twentieth-century fruition, a concomitant of the acceleration of material change, of change sometimes at a rate that not only divides generations but also separates the late from the early periods of the life of the individual.<sup>16</sup>

Expectations are subjective phenomena, though largely of social origin. They are readily converted into effective demand as long as those with new perspectives derived from their social environment have disposable funds or their equivalent.<sup>17</sup> They were never so inelastic, therefore, as was assumed by many pre-1700 and some later writers who sought thereby to justify holding down wages. There may, of course, be a "revolution of declining expectations," as well as the now overpublicized one of "rising expectations"; such reversals attended disappointment at the (expected) failure of the "UN Development Decade."<sup>18</sup>

Indeed, because expectations are subjective and hence flexible, they can fairly easily be modified in the face of frustration

consequent upon nonrealization of aspirations and adjusted downward in keeping with realities.

Expectations, being subjective in character, are also somewhat free of constraints imposed by such conditions as underlie "probability" defined in terms of "frequency theory." Expectation denotes a subjective attitude toward the future, especially toward particular segments of the future with which anticipated events or streams of events are associated. One may form particular opinions respecting the likelihood that some event or stream of events will emerge within a designated time interval. At issue, however, is the rational belief one may attach to the coefficient of certainty that is associated with this opinion. Such belief varies with individuals, for they differ in respect of knowledge, constitution of the mind, and so on. "What we know and what probability we can attribute to our rational beliefs is, therefore, subjective in the sense of being relative to the individual."<sup>19</sup> Man acts on the basis of the probable, though he may, as Adam Smith observed, overestimate what is probable, given the "natural confidence which every man has more or less, not only in his own abilities, but in his own good fortune."<sup>20</sup> Such seeming overestimates can at times prove self-confirming,<sup>21</sup> or eventuate in income and wealth differences that reflect not "acts of God" but differences in the tastes of individuals for risk;<sup>22</sup> they also give rise to misfortune and disappointed hopes.

Even if we define expectations in economic terms, we must allow for the dependence of economic expectations upon the past and prospective course of noneconomic as well as of economic events. For example, in Athens prior to Plato's ascendancy, there was some belief in progress, past and prospective, according to plays of Euripides and Sophocles.<sup>23</sup> When a society is static, encased in fixed social dimensions subject only to irregular short-run variation, earthly expectations will remain correspondingly static and unchanging, particularly if other-worldly concerns predominate as they did in Europe until (after 1300) the Renaissance weakened their hold and subsequently (after 1500) the ideal of material happiness became ascendant.<sup>24</sup> Illustrative of a static society in microcosm is the village, a social system of which the nineteenth-century Indian village—traditional, self-sufficing, self-perpetuating, unchanging—was a

prototype.<sup>25</sup> Destruction of this homeostatic social organism reinforced changes in man's expectations respecting the future. The forces that undermined the village served also to destabilize other formerly static social structures. Societal metabolism, formerly conducive to social heterogeneity, now made for social homogeneity. That spirit of egalitarianism which eventually pervaded pluralistic societies and accentuated intergroup conflict did not emerge until later, however.

The impact of specific changes upon expectations is not always easy to assess, in part because they may produce several effects. Since expectations are subjective in character, they reflect not events as such but man's perceptions of events. Moreover, changes must be great enough and continuous enough to impress these qualities upon man's perceptions. As almost invariably there are in a community levels or thresholds of sensitivity, below which insensitivity rules, new stimuli must be powerful enough to transcend such thresholds if they are to reorient man's behavior and view of the future.

Illustrative of diverse effects are those associated with changes in life expectancy. On the one hand, life expectancy did not greatly depress potential productive power per capita, even though before 1800 it generally was not more than 30–35 years at birth. Since heavy mortality was concentrated among the young, adults dominated populations. Given a male life expectancy at birth of only 25.3 years, life expectancy at ages 25, 30, and 60, respectively, would approximate 27.7, 25, and 10 years; with male life expectancy at birth around 30 years, the corresponding expectancies would approximate 30, 27, and 10.8 years. Given a male life expectancy at birth of 25 years and a male stable population growing at 5 per 1,000, about 51 per cent of the males would fall in the age group 20–65. This percentage would become about 52, with life expectancy at birth near 30 years. Normally, therefore, there was not a "shortage" of manpower unless parasitical use was made of it, a use fostered by modes of conducting war and government.<sup>26</sup>

On the other hand, low life expectancy at birth entailed omnipresence of death and perhaps of morbidity as well. For, with life expectancy at birth at 25–30 years, male deaths in a stationary population would run 40–33 per 1,000 and surround the living with two to three or more times as many deaths as that to

which we today are accustomed. About half of those born would have died by the close of their tenth year, and 50–60 or less out of 100 reaching age 20 would attain age 60. This high mortality, together with considerable illness and recurring pestilence, war, and food shortage, did make for depressed states of affairs.<sup>27</sup> At the same time high mortality, by offsetting natality, made for a very low rate of population growth, and this in turn was favorable to continuation of a hierarchial form of society, a form unfavorable to rising expectations when population grows very little. This state of affairs was reinforced by the shortness of the time horizon animating human decisions when the probability of death, especially among the young, was high and not easily counterbalanced by institutional arrangements.

Though expectations are subjective and hence may, in individual instances, tend to become inflated, there was little basis for widespread rising expectations prior to the nineteenth century. Chiefly responsible for their absence was the failure of incomes to rise regularly and enough from year to year to make many persons sufficiently conscious of an improvement in economic conditions to infer that such improvement would continue. That not much was expected from growth is suggested by the inclination of authors of Utopias to stress redistribution rather than growth. There was little or no basis, therefore, for pre-1800 writers or individuals to assume much increase or accelerating increase in the income of individuals. It is doubtful whether, in a world generally short of public information relating to price and income behavior, the typical individual would be sensible of a 0.25-percent-per-year increase in average income in *addition* to such small increase as was associated with his acquisition of seniority and experience in his line of activity.<sup>28</sup> After all, an increase of 0.25 percent per unit per year increases income only slightly more than 10 percent in forty years. Even so, had such an increase persisted over the seven-hundred-year interval between A.D. 1000 and 1700, average income would have been nearly six times as high in 1700 as it was in the year 1000, when presumably average income in Western Europe was in the neighborhood of subsistence or not much above it. Yet in 1700, average income in advanced countries probably was not much more than double or treble subsistence, if that. In England and Wales, increase per decade in real output per head



between 1700 and 1785 averaged out at only 2.5 percent though this rate rose to about 9 percent in the next fifteen years.<sup>29</sup> Had the latter rate persisted, it might have generated a state of rising if not accelerating expectations.

It is true, as a rule, that tastes, aspirations, and expectations common in the upper or middle reaches of somewhat pyramidal societies tend to influence some individuals situated in the lower reaches of such societies. It can happen, of course, that tastes flow from the lower reaches of a society, from the proletariat, to the upper reaches, sometimes with the ultimate result that the power of the latter is undermined.<sup>30</sup> The former movement is the more probable. It underlies what Duesenberry has called "demonstration effect." He observes that "the consumption pattern of the moment is conceived of not as part of the way of life, but only as a temporary adjustment to circumstances. We expect to take the first available chance to change." This makes it easy to increase consumption as income increases, but does not explain why, with income fixed and a balance having been reached between consumption and saving and then undergirded by habit, this "habit pattern can be broken without a change in income or prices." The stimulus that breaks the habit pattern consists in "contact with superior goods," usually repeated contact that produces invidious comparisons and a "feeling of dissatisfaction" with one's own goods.<sup>31</sup> This demonstration effect, together with dynamic technology and improved remuneration of labor, in turn helps to define the norms of poverty and hence its extent, norms that not only move upward but can significantly affect social policy.<sup>32</sup>

The explanation just put forward depends not only upon the state of the means of communication, but also upon change in the average income of at least one category of the population; for such change typically is a prelude to the acquisition of goods, the "sight" of which in turn motivates their consumption by those whose income has not risen. For the production of new types of goods usually is a concomitant of increase in income, at least in the sense of the derivation of greater utility or service than formerly out of given sets of inputs. In the absence of such increase in income, consumption patterns become stable in the several categories composing a population, and these patterns in turn form an equilibrium no longer very susceptible

of modification. Under such circumstances expectations become virtually stationary. As a rule, a dynamic source of change is essential to the elevation of the level of expectations. Even then the social structure must be somewhat open, allowing a degree of upward mobility; barriers to mobility tend to stifle expectation of improvement in the population thereby affected.

Parallel to the case just described is that involving the transmission of tastes from one country to another and the generation there of demands whose satisfaction is seldom realizable. Let  $R$  designate a rich country and  $P$  a poor country. Modern means of communication serve to acquaint many people living in  $P$  with the mode of living and tastes characteristic of many inhabitants of  $R$ . The transmission of tastes in question may be reinforced by occasional experience on the part of inhabitants of  $P$  with manifestations of these tastes by inhabitants of  $R$  who are in contact with inhabitants of  $P$  who reside in  $P$  or in  $R$ . In general, however, inhabitants of  $P$  lack the means wherewith to satisfy demands originating in  $R$  and hence tend to experience dissatisfaction.

Returning to the impact of rising income upon expectations, it is to be noted that rising income may prove a necessary though not a sufficient condition for the generation of rising expectations. Recall our earlier formulations  $e' = f(y', V_i)$  and  $E = e'/y'$ , and let  $y'$  arbitrarily designate the rate of increase in both  $y$  and average output. Suppose that the value of  $E$  begins to fall after having been in the neighborhood of 1.0; this could reflect the state of  $V_i$  or a change in  $V_i$ . Thus, a fall in  $E$  may reflect a failure in the composition of output to change as required, a failure in output to grow in variety as well as quantity; for with  $V_i$  constant, failure of composition of output to change makes the utility of output less than it otherwise would have been.

What has been said may be illustrated. Suppose that a community produces and consumes only one product,  $A$ , and that average output of this product increases until everyone's desired daily requirement is realized with two hours of work per day. Then, as no more  $A$  is wanted, average income expressed in terms of  $A$  is stationary and nonaugmentable, and so is aggregate output in the absence of population growth, though increasing output of  $A$  per man-hour does increase income in terms of  $A$  plus leisure. If, however, a new product,  $B$ , not sub-



stitutable or only partly substitutable for *A*, is introduced, the level of average satisfaction will rise even though leisure per day is reduced, through substitution of leisure time for *B*. While the economy is adapting to the introduction of *B*, average income will be rising and expectations may rise also among those who do not initially share in the availability of *B* but expect to do so. Eventually, everyone's daily requirement of *A* and *B* will be met, and the balance of the community's time will be devoted to nonwork or leisure. It is possible, therefore, in the absence of population growth and of sufficient variety in the goods and services susceptible of production, that the growth of aggregate product in terms of *A*, *B*, and so on, will come to a halt, limited by lack of demand as a result of the nonsubstitutability at the margin of leisure for product.

Continuation of rising expectations, of  $E = 1$ , thus may depend upon continuation of increase in the variety of output as well as upon increase in output per head, upon a sufficiency of new-product-producing rather than of labor-displacing inventions and innovations. Usually, of course, increases in variety and of output per head take place together, since innovation gives rise to each. Indeed, in the absence of invention and innovation, increase in average output could come to a halt, as then it might be possible to increase and use "capital," that is, agents complementary to labor, up to the point where no more could profitably be used jointly with labor.<sup>33</sup> The decision to produce or not to produce more turns also, of course, upon the demand for leisure and the economic conditions under which recreation is available.<sup>34</sup> We shall touch later upon leisure, time-cost, and other factors.

Innovation is the main source of new products. Schumpeter rightly observed:

We will, throughout, act on the assumption that consumers' initiative in changing their tastes—i.e., in changing that set of our data which general theory comprises in the concepts of "utility functions" or "indifference varieties"—is negligible and that all change in consumers' tastes is incident to, and brought about by, producers' action.

He went on to argue that while some changes could be produced in tastes by leaders of fashion and by demand creators (for example, advertisers) as well as by increase in population

and producers' goods, these changes would be relatively unimportant. Whence invention and innovation constituted the principal source of new products and changes in tastes.<sup>35</sup>

Expectations may cease to rise for reasons relating to demand as well as to supply. Should the economy assume the form of a circular flow society, or stationary state,<sup>36</sup> expectation would cease to rise and would become constant. Expectations may also become constant, even though the limits of production have not been reached, if the physical and time-consuming costs of consuming goods and services exhaust the capacity of individuals to augment their rate of consumption.

### EXPECTATIONS AND FRUSTRATION

Frustration, as has been implied, may be generated in one of two main ways. First, it may prove impossible to satisfy growing demand for particular goods or services. Second, what was supposed to be demand may be satisfied formally but not substantively because that which seems to match the requirements of expressed demand fails to do so. To these sources a pre-1800 writer might add a source that we ignore, namely, complete satiety.

Frustration of the first sort may develop in both advanced and underdeveloped countries. In an advanced country, with  $e' = f(y', V_i)$  and  $E = e' / y'$ , change in  $V_i$  may increase  $E$ , with the result that the now inflated expectations cannot be satisfied so long as  $y'$  remains at its current level. Again, the value of  $e$  may be governed by the current and hence prospective rate of growth,  $y'$ , of average personal income,  $y$ , whereas the capacity of the individual to satisfy his expectations is roughly fixed by the rate of growth of posttax or *disposable* income. Accordingly, if the ratio of *disposable* to *personal* income continues to fall and expectations are not adjusted to this fall,<sup>37</sup> frustration develops. For what the government supplies is an imperfect substitute for what most consumers prefer. A partial parallel to this situation is that characteristic of the underlying population of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Here overall average output continues to rise much faster than permissible consumption, demand for which rises both with output and with stimuli from the West.

The first type of frustration is destined to grow in intensity in

underdeveloped countries except insofar as the sense of frustration produces an antidotal feedback, a response more limited in an underdeveloped than in a developed country by an individual's lack of economic autonomy.<sup>38</sup> There changes in  $y$  and  $y'$  are not so likely to match increases in  $e$  and  $e'$  associated with changes in conditions included under  $V_i$ . For, while the economic distance separating underdeveloped from advanced countries is very great and very unlikely to be eliminated, the corresponding communications distance is much shorter and hence surmountable in large measure. Modern means of communication transmit the tastes and life-styles in one country to the inhabitants of another, with the result that many of these inhabitants aspire to live as do those in advanced countries. This is not possible, however, for many of those residing in underdeveloped countries. A hypothetical example makes this clear. Suppose that average income in advanced country  $A$  is ten times that in underdeveloped country  $U$ . Suppose further that income grows 2 percent per year in  $U$  and only 1 percent per year in  $A$ . Then, as the following hypothetical data suggest, much more than a century must pass before  $U$  closes in on  $A$ . Although the relative spread between  $A$  and  $U$  diminishes, the absolute spread is destined long to increase. Whence expectations in  $U$  tend to rise relatively rapidly, fed both by internal progress and by external stimuli. Meanwhile capacity to match expectations lags, with the result that frustration increases.

Year	Comparative growth		Difference
	$A$	$U$	
0	10.0	1.0	9.0
50	16.4	2.9	13.5
100	27.0	7.2	19.8
200	72.9	52.4	20.5

The second type of frustration may prove characteristic of developed countries. In these countries, we may suppose, expectations do not outstrip income and may even expand less rapidly than income because of physical and temporal constraints on consumption and hence on the growth of demand. Meanwhile, many persons may find that, even though their incomes have increased more rapidly than their expectations, attainment of demand-satisfaction proves disappointing in that they fail to

realize the degree of satisfaction or euphoria upon which they had counted. For in wealthy societies only a small fraction of that which is acquired or consumed produces Pavlovian quiescence; most products may be described as enveloped in subjective states of mind that are prone to change as anticipation of their attainment is succeeded by their acquisition—to change ranging from reinforcement to dissipation of the state associated with anticipation.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, this tendency to disappointment may be intensified if many members of a community experiencing somewhat parallel disappointments become cognizant of one another's experience, as, for example, have overly indulged upper-middle-class youth.<sup>40</sup>

Fixity of supply may strongly reinforce both causes of frustration and give rise to interclass conflict, as it will impinge most heavily upon lower-income groups. For goods and services are divisible into two categories, those sufficiently augmentable to surfeit man's want of them, at least in the absence of population growth, and those whose supply finally cannot be made to keep pace with demand. The latter category is subdivisible into two subcategories. The first includes those made up in relatively large measure of not very augmentable agents, such as recreation based upon seashore, park areas, suitably situated space, and so on. Demand for these rises as man's income rises, but, as supply cannot grow at the same rate, price must rise and preserve balance between what is wanted and what is available. Accordingly, many will find their wants increasingly unsatisfied. Second, as Keynes argued,<sup>41</sup> humans have need for whatever makes them feel superior to their fellows, and this need is insatiable "for the higher the general level, the higher still are they." In sum, as incomes rise and the first category of wants is more completely satisfied, increments in productivity and buying power are directed to the second category. Yet demand for neither of these subcategories can be satisfied. Accordingly, frustration rises, market allocation fails to satisfy, class struggle is intensified, and some sort of rationing or collective allocation becomes necessary.

### **LOOKING BACKWARD**

Having roughly conceptualized and illustrated the subject of this chapter, we may now look at the past, then at the "modern

period" running from, say, the onset of the Industrial Revolution to the present, and finally at what may be in prospect. Our information bearing upon conditions obtaining prior to the eighteenth century is limited in amount and largely literary in origin. It reflects the fact that though man's real history has long been largely one of hunger and misery, his history as prepared by historians was long confined in the main to the affairs of the ruling circles.<sup>42</sup> Yet, had more of the ancient and premodern authors been acquainted with poverty, as was Hesiod, earliest Greek economist, they might have been pressed by scarcity, as was this eighth-century-B.C. farmer, to recognize resulting problems of choice and resource-allocation and to discuss the impact upon man's expectations of his passage out of a mythical Golden Age.<sup>43</sup>

As has been suggested above, conditions compatible with the emergence of rising expectations did not come generally into existence until the nineteenth century. It may be said, however, that the Age of Discovery lifted men's horizons and helped give release to output-increasing change. It should be noted, of course, that concern with the future, though a necessary condition, is not a sufficient basis for rising expectations. For such concern may be transcendently or spiritually rather than materially oriented; desire for escape from the present may, as Toynbee has shown, assume a number of forms other than the rising material standard stressed by present-day futurologists.<sup>44</sup>

Prior to the modern era a number of conditions were inimical to rising expectations: (1) attitudes toward nature and environment; (2) degree to which economic activity is Faustian; (3) rigidity of social structure; (4) very low rate of population growth; (5) unawareness of economic change and absence of belief in progress and of inclination to foment it; and (6) poor means of communication.

1. So long as nature is looked upon as essentially immutable and hence as constituting a fixed environment to which man must adjust, as he cannot modify it to his advantage, so long will man's expectations in general tend to be stationary except as they occasionally may be influenced by variability or declension of his social or physical environment.<sup>45</sup> Such an essentially pessimistic outlook seems to have been common in premodern times, in part on philosophical grounds and in part because in a

world largely rural, nature predominated over man's social environment. Philosophical and related conditions also may have had a bearing.<sup>46</sup> It is the approach of the engineer that is best suited to make nature subservient to man's needs, even when potentially relevant scientific findings originate with nonengineers. Though it is true that man has been able over the centuries to produce considerable change in his physical environment, only within the past century has he come to take it for granted that his physical environment usually can be bent to his service.<sup>47</sup>

2. Those engaged in agricultural activities long believed themselves possessed of very limited capacity to improve the performance of nature. This outlook, though gradually weakened even before the Age of Discovery, must have been partially dissipated by the discovery of America and its doubling of "the potential vegetable sources of the known world."<sup>48</sup> It gave way to a progressive outlook with the "grass revolution" and the transformation of European agriculture in and after the eighteenth century.<sup>49</sup> Land long remained, much as in the ancient world,<sup>50</sup> the main form and object of investment. The smaller number engaged in various other undertakings seem in time to have found themselves in more Faustian milieux, exposed to challenges and problems associated with differences in practices, culture, and customs, and hence sensible of the need to be flexible in their operations.<sup>51</sup> For, as Sorokin observed in a different connection, the persons and groups earliest and most exposed to new cultural values, practices, and so on are the most congenial to change, at least initially. Representative of these persons and groups are merchants, missionaries, scholars, scientists, adventurers, and so on.<sup>52</sup> Accordingly, as commerce increased and with it the number of potential bearers of novel values and practices, outlooks became more dynamic and more oriented to what the future might have in store.<sup>53</sup>

3. Other conditions given, a relatively rigid social class structure conduces to constant expectations unless forces are at work that, so to speak, continually lift the social pyramid to ever-higher welfare levels. Rigidity of class structure varied somewhat with country and with the degree of political stability. Though ancient Athens may not have been typical, with only one person in seven unfree and with a corresponding theory of government,



it was more representative of the earlier Mediterranean world than of that in the days of Imperial Rome after the ancient world had, in Clark's terms, "crossed the threshold which separates the free man from the serf, commercial economy from the 'natural economy,' contract from status."<sup>54</sup> Typical of a rigid scheme of social organization was the medieval conception of "the body social."<sup>55</sup> Representative of this conception is the commonwealth, described by twelfth-century John of Salisbury as analogous to the human body. Corresponding to the head of this body is the prince, who is subject only to God, and who is assisted in governance by a variety of personnel (senate, governors, judges, officials, and financial officers) who correspond to various organs of the body and who, along with the prince, are supported by "the husbandmen [who] correspond to the feet, which always cleave to the soil, and need the more especially the care and foresight of the head. . . . The higher members shield the lower, and the lower respond faithfully and fully in like measure to the just demands of the superiors. . . . [In this] sort of reciprocity . . . each regards his own interest as best served by that which he knows to be most advantageous for the others." Of workers he wrote:

Those are called the feet who discharge the humbler offices, and by whose services the members of the whole commonwealth walk upon solid earth. Among these are to be counted the husbandmen, who always cleave to the soil, busied about their plough-lands or vineyards or pastures or flower-gardens. To these must be added the many species of cloth-making, and the mechanic arts, which work in wood, iron, bronze, and the different metals; also the menial occupations, and the manifold forms of getting a livelihood and sustaining life, or increasing household property, all of which, while they do not pertain to the authority of the governing power, are yet in the highest degree useful and profitable to the corporate whole of the commonwealth. All these different occupations are so numerous that the commonwealth in the number of its feet exceeds not only the eight-footed crab but even the centipede, and because of their very multitude they cannot be enumerated; for while they are not infinite by nature, they are yet of so many different varieties that no writer on the subject of offices or duties has ever laid down particular precepts for each special variety. But it applies generally



to each and all of them that in their exercise they should not transgress the limits of the law, and should in all things observe constant reference to the public utility. For inferiors owe it to their superiors to provide them with service, just as the superiors in their turn owe it to their inferiors to provide them with all things needful for their protection and succour.<sup>56</sup>

This conception of order was in keeping with the philosophy of St. Augustine and its emphasis upon order directed against anarchy and the allegedly irrational behavior of history and intended to support progress toward Christian good.<sup>57</sup> It probably implies, as St. Augustine held, that virtues not be made the servants of bodily pleasure.<sup>58</sup>

The medieval conception of order continued to find expression even in the Elizabethan world, for, though it was being undermined by growing trade and commercialism, it lent intellectual support to the ruling circles and, given their disregard of the medieval principle of reciprocity, to the police-state despotism of the Tudors.<sup>59</sup> The social position of the mercantile class, especially that of large-scale traders, was somewhat better than it had been in the medieval period, especially in Italy, while that of the working class was no better.<sup>60</sup> Only as the social structure declined in rigidity, and as status relationships gave place to contractual ones, was there enough opportunity open to the less privileged to allow some to anticipate improvement in their situations.

Although the actual social order resembled the models described by political philosophers, the allocation of social stations in keeping with such models was not wholly acquiesced in. There were many internal disturbances, in which peasants and workers occasionally participated, some triggered by economic dissatisfaction, reinforced always, Sorokin concluded, by an unsettling of the social or cultural system.<sup>61</sup> Even so, the continual presence of an image of a quite fixed social order bearing the imprint of approval of the dominant classes served to stifle expectations that otherwise might have come to life.

4. Population growth may or may not significantly affect expectations; it is likely to do so, however, if it affects the rate of increase of per capita income, or if it contributes to the destruction of a social structure that makes for virtually stationary ex-

pectations. Until the advent of modern times, social structures often were quite fixed and allowed little social mobility when sociopolitical conditions were stable and numbers and technological conditions changed very little; then socioeconomic conditions approximated those characteristic of a stationary state and the number of persons newly entering a socioeconomic category amounted to replacements of those removed by death, disability, or withdrawal. When, on the contrary, population grows significantly and place-seekers exceed place-vacaters, pressure is put upon the social structure to expand and absorb this excess. In consequence, the social structure will have to be reorganized, or, as Plato proposed, introduced elsewhere by colonists from the community suffering population pressure.

The slowness with which population grew when it grew at all indicates both a lack of demographic pressure upon rigid social structures and a failure of the food supply to increase notably and carry numbers to higher levels at which they might remain virtually stationary (for example, in China). This slowness is suggested both by available empirical evidence and by inference from hypothetical data and information relating to epidemic disease and famine. At the beginning of the Christian Era the world's population numbered 210–250 million, with something like 34 million in Europe, at least 138 million in Asia, perhaps 30 million in Africa, and additional numbers in the Americas and Oceania; it was not much larger a thousand years later, totaling perhaps 275 million. Numbers began to grow after A.D. 1000, especially in Europe where they increased slightly more than 1.75 percent per decade from 1000 to 1300 compared with slightly more than one percent in the world as a whole. Following the Black Death, which reduced Europe's population by about three-eighths in the fourteenth century, world population resumed its former rate of growth, increasing slightly more than 1 percent per decade from 1450 to 1650, between 3 and 4 percent per decade from 1650 to 1750, and somewhat more than 4 percent from 1750 to 1850. The rate was higher in Europe than in Asia in the nineteenth century, but lower in the present century; it has been much higher in the Western Hemisphere than in the world as a whole.<sup>62</sup>

Turning to hypothetical data characteristic of a stable population, we find that, even given a life expectancy of only 25 years

at birth, a birth rate of a little more than 40 (that is, a Gross Reproduction Rate of roughly 2.8-3.0) will yield a surplus of births over deaths, and that with life expectancy of 30 years, a birth rate of about 38 will increase numbers about 0.5 percent per year. Upon the ascent of life expectancy to 35 years, a birth rate of slightly more than 29 (that is, a G.R.R. of slightly more than 2.0) will yield a surplus over deaths.<sup>63</sup> Accordingly, in the absence of unusual adverse events, populations would grow markedly in time even at low annual rates of increase—for example, about 30 percent per century if population increased about 0.25 percent per year. That numbers did not grow as much as 2.5 percent per decade over long periods of time must have been largely the result of recurring excessive mortality associated not only with epidemic disease but also with famine, usually local in incidence but easily resulting if yields of produce were quite low even when times were good.<sup>64</sup> Death, as Fourastié has pointed out, was at the center of life even as the churchyard was at the center of the village.<sup>65</sup> What he said of the eighteenth century was applicable in medieval and ancient times as well; thus in ancient Attica as in Carthage, males fortunate enough to survive to age 20 suffered a uniformly high death rate, with the result that by age 60 only about one-fifth of those reaching 20 still survived, a figure below that suggested by current hypothetical life tables.<sup>66</sup>

It should be noted, of course, that fertility often, if not as a rule, fell short of its practical maximum, which we may put at, say, a Gross Reproduction Rate of around 3.5. Institutional, class-structural, mortality, and health conditions were mainly responsible.<sup>67</sup> In Europe, J. C. Russell concludes, loss of control over population, theretofore held within the confines of subsistence, came in the wake of the Black Death, which caused a loss of a third or more of the population in the lands afflicted.<sup>68</sup> Removal of institutional controls on fertility made possible a higher rate of natural increase than would have resulted under favorable conditions, given institutional controls over marriage, and so forth.<sup>69</sup>

5. If technological conditions begin to change, an initially stable social structure may change even if, as is unlikely, population changes very little.<sup>70</sup> For expectations may rise as technological conditions and socioeconomic options improve.

Rising expectations presuppose the presence of a well-founded belief in man's improvability and improvement, a belief nourished by awareness of technological change. Even though there be as yet too little favorable change to inspire in men belief in continuing change, it is possible to lay a theoretical groundwork for rising expectations. The theory of cumulative progress constituted such groundwork, for it ran counter to theories of cyclical change or continuing retrogression and rested belief in continuing improvement upon a regularly operating law.<sup>71</sup> This theory took belief-shaping and conduct-determining form in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially in France, where, as in England, confidence in science was growing. Not only was there taking place what Whitehead in another connection called a mating of professionalism with progress.<sup>72</sup> A rational rather than a merely empirical underpinning also was being given to the belief in progress.<sup>73</sup> Illustrative is Adam Smith's dynamic theory of the division of labor, theretofore mainly a limited model of specialization. Malthus's emphasis upon the finiteness of man's economic universe prompted inquiry on the part of his critics into theoretical factors countervailing finiteness and thus indirectly stimulated concern with "progress."

It is not surprising, in view of what has been said, that the expectations of most men manifested little tendency to rise above a stationary level before the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century. For, even though scattered individuals, members of ruling or trading circles, might sense prospective improvement of their affairs, their outlooks did not influence others. At times, of course, cults remindful of the "cargo cult" may have generated hopes of improvement, but these occultish hopes could not persist.<sup>74</sup> In contrast, prophecies usually embody forecasts of deteriorating conditions.

6. An epidemiological model could be employed to represent the role of communications media in the generation of rising expectations. One requires sources of infection with new tastes and rising expectations and vectors to carry the infection to those who are uninfected but not immune to infection. The function of vector is performed by means of communication—by infected migrants, the press (especially the penny press when incomes are relatively low),<sup>75</sup> radio, television, and so on. Since

the capacity of vectors to overcome distance remained small until the present century, vectors could function effectively only in areas where population was concentrated, mainly in larger towns and cities, and these in general did not environ large fractions of the population of countries until the nineteenth century.<sup>76</sup> One may infer that the impact of a "demonstration effect" could not become powerful until in the nineteenth century even though noninfected populations were marked by little immunity to new tastes.<sup>77</sup>

Perhaps most important of the socioeconomic complexes unfavorable to the emergence of rising expectations was the very low rate of technical progress, the low rate of improvement in economic output, and the prevalence of aspiration-depressing and essentially hopeless poverty. Turning first to poverty, counterpart to wasteful consumption by the wealthy, two of Finley's observations regarding the ancient world retain considerable validity.

The ancient world was very unambiguous about wealth. Wealth was a good thing, a necessary condition for the good life, and that was all there was to it. There was no nonsense about wealth as a trust, no unconscious guilt feelings, no death-bed restitutions of usury. . . . There was never the slightest danger in antiquity that the lower classes would be anything but poor, and it did not matter much if some of them, notably the citizens of the capital cities, were industrious or not. They provided neither the products nor the profits. These came from peasants and from dependent labour, and their industriousness was secured by ways which had nothing to do with wages or technology.<sup>78</sup>

Under these circumstances, it was observed long before modern scholars began to write of a "culture of poverty" that the poor were without aspiration for more than immediate satisfaction of elementary needs.<sup>79</sup> That the surfeit of the few was at the expense of the many, though in varying degree from one country to another, probably continued to hold until modern times. About 1370, William Langland wrote: "Some laboured at ploughing and sowing, with no time for pleasure, sweating to produce food for the gluttons to waste."<sup>80</sup> Four centuries later, Adam Smith wrote: "All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile

maxim of the masters of mankind."<sup>81</sup> Under the feudal system of his day, Langland implies, cultivators could not benefit from an abundance of uncultivated land.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, as Alfred Marshall implied in another connection, the common man could hardly aspire until a system of contract had replaced the system of status.<sup>83</sup>

Until considerable economic power had passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie, those possessed of politico-economic power were animated, as a rule, by values and concerns unfavorable to technological progress and the productive use of capital. Hence, though capital was potentially available, even in antiquity and the Middle Ages,<sup>84</sup> technological progress received little stimulus from those with means, nor did the latter invest their considerable actual or potential surplus in productivity-increasing instruments, preferring instead to expend their incomes upon retainers and upon unproductive durables.<sup>85</sup> Indeed, only as the bourgeoisie increased in relative number, initially in Italian cities, did the propensity to save and invest *productively* become ascendant, and thus indirectly increase economic opportunity open to cultivators and casual workers. The growth of the bourgeoisie in number was associated with the growth of towns and cities, for the impact of a bourgeois business-like approach to agriculture was associated with investment in land on the part of those with urban business experience.<sup>86</sup> The gradual improvement in economic conditions, though subject to fluctuation, was associated with increase in the number of bourgeoisie, bearers of a material or "sensate" culture, as Sorokin observed.<sup>87</sup> His findings also suggest that the number of technological as well as related scientific discoveries steadily grew after the early sixteenth century.<sup>88</sup> Preconditions to the emergence of rising expectations were slowly taking shape.<sup>89</sup> There was no basis, however, for rising expectations before the late eighteenth century, or for a widely held way of life based upon confidence in the steady improvement of man's economic lot, before the nineteenth century.

### **EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER**

England's economic and political development in and after the eighteenth century exemplifies the gradual emergence of rising expectations as incomes began to rise and society became more



open and mobile. In the relation of this emergence both to earlier changes and to the progress of that transformation labeled the Industrial Revolution, England's experience illustrates this slow gestation of growing expectations. By 1750 average English income, somewhat above the 1700 level, approximated £70 with 1950 purchasing power; this figure in 1950 was nearly 3 times that then realized in India, about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times that attained in Nigeria, and only  $\frac{1}{3}$  below that of Brazil. The English average, in 1750 as in 1700, approximated the Dutch average and appreciably exceeded the French average. Even though the 1750 average exceeded the 1700 average, Phyllis Deane concludes that "it is fair to say that before the second half of the eighteenth century people had no reason to *expect* growth." Such growth as took place was "painfully slow or spasmodic" and "readily reversible."<sup>90</sup>

Deane and Cole found little basis for "much improvement in average English standards of living" between the fifteenth century and the close of the seventeenth century when Gregory King made his well-known estimates. "King lived in a world in which economic change, outside the cataclysms produced by famines and epidemics, was generally small, slow and easily reversed."<sup>91</sup>

The beginnings of sustained economic growth can be traced to the middle of the eighteenth century when the overall rate of growth seems to have risen to near 1 percent per annum from probably not more than 0.3 percent per annum. At this stage, however, the expansion of the economy was apparently swamped by the growth of population which also dates from slightly before mid-century. There is little evidence of an appreciable acceleration in the long-term rate of growth of real incomes per head until the last two decades of the eighteenth century, when the average rate of growth seems to have approached 1 percent per annum. The acceleration which then took place was significant . . . it marked the beginning of a more or less continuous upward trend. The rate of growth continued to accelerate into the nineteenth century, slackened in mid-century, recovered to record heights and then slackened again at the beginning of the twentieth century."<sup>92</sup>

Although the Industrial Revolution eventually transformed the economy and society of Britain, it was the product of a com-



plex of complementary changes continuing over a sustained period of time. It may be described as evolving in keeping with Adam Smith's view of economic progress as associated with continuing division of labor and the circumstances conducive to this change. Not only was Smith sanguine about the future, even to the extent of anticipating (at least metaphorically) a "sort of wagon-way through the air";<sup>93</sup> he also drew attention to progress in the past.<sup>94</sup> He found the limit to economic expansion in the finiteness of available agricultural land, as did the classical school and its successors, underestimating, as did many of his successors, man's capacity to press back the limits of environment through recourse to direct or indirect replacement of scarce elements in this environment.

After presenting a summary of the leading theories put forward to account for the Industrial Revolution, R. M. Hartwell concludes:

The various "forces making for growth" in the eighteenth century were not autonomous variables, but rather manifestations of growth itself; this seems to have been particularly true of capital formation, innovation and population growth. Does this mean that changing human attitudes, in particular the development of a rational ethic about wealth, and the emergence of business enterprises motivated by profit-making (and, thus, the willingness to take risks), were the promoters of the industrial revolution? We cannot say; but, again, it is reasonable to argue that because the profit-motive depended on the possibility of making profits, this possibility was created by the economic changes of the eighteenth-century. . . . Could [the industrial revolution] not be the culmination of a most unspectacular process, the consequence of a long period of slow growth?<sup>95</sup>

The forces that transformed the structure of Britain's economy between the early eighteenth and mid- or late- nineteenth century became operative on the Continent as well; some were of indigenous and some of external origin. There, as in England, the transformation proceeded slowly, initially in France and then elsewhere.<sup>96</sup> As it progressed, however, and the economic structure changed, the rate of growth of average income rose to levels much above those obtaining at the start.<sup>97</sup> The aggregate rate of growth fluctuated, of course, sometimes slowing down notably, as in late Victorian Britain; a result,

some have held, of a failure of demand to expand rapidly enough, and, others have held, of an insufficiently elastic supply of resources.<sup>98</sup>

In the nineteenth century, expectations eventually began to grow faster than income.<sup>99</sup> Various forces, besides increase in income and wages, sustained when they did not accelerate living standards. Growth of population probably increased the pressure on many individuals to consume,<sup>100</sup> a pressure intensified by the increasing concentration of the population.<sup>101</sup> Innovation and invention increased output per head and augmented the number and variety of products, making many available at prices well within the reach of wage earners. Moreover, some inventions increased man's physical mobility (steam and electric railways, motor cars, air carriers) and gave him ready access to ever-larger areas of supply (for example, motor and rail transport), or made him aware of how others lived (for example, newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, radio, television).<sup>102</sup> In the United States in particular, the impact of income levels, high already by 1860,<sup>103</sup> was accentuated by forces more powerful than elsewhere. Most Americans believed "in the power of the individual to alter his lot" and move up the economic ladder. The country's culture was thing-oriented and much influenced by women who associated prestige as well as utility with consumables and who were increasingly interested in entering the labor force. Work became less burdensome, with the result that the pain cost of products fell. The aspiration to consume therefore grew in strength as the opportunity to satisfy it improved for women as well as for men.<sup>104</sup>

In the past, multiplication of wants came in the wake of augmentation of average output and income, together with multiplication of contemporary contacts and increase in the flow of stimuli from ever more diverse means of communication. Even though resources increasingly were devoted to want stimulation, the line of causation ran, and was believed to run, from supply to demand, with the result that the value of  $E = e'/y'$  tended to remain in the neighborhood of 1.0. Today, by contrast, considerable support is commanded by the belief that the line of causation runs strongly also from demand to supply. This belief derives support from the growing importance of *discretionary income* and time, and from the increasing emphasis

being placed upon the alleged responsibility of the state for the generation of demand both by financing more and more wants and by subsidizing markets on employment-creating grounds. Expectations are likely to be affected accordingly, with the result that  $E > 1$  either because changes in  $V_i$  as well as  $y'$  affect  $e'$ , or because heavy taxation reduces the ratio of disposable to personal income and thereby limits the purchasing power and hence the capacity of many persons to satisfy their expectations.

The steady growth of consumption in quantity and variety has interacted with a continuing devolution and diffusion of political power. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have witnessed a redistribution of power, from those with property and the control of decisions to those with relatively limited means and little power of decision, from the once dominant male element to the female element, and from those in the middle and upper age groups to the young and often the quite young.<sup>105</sup> This power has become reassembled in new bodies, mainly in worker organizations, now bent upon wage increases far in excess of productivity, with the result that inflation is proceeding at unprecedented rates and the discipline of the market has been undermined, destined to be reinforced or replaced by collective controls.

Many factors have contributed to this devolution. Currently, and in recent times, the emergence of professional specialization and institutional compartmentalization, together with professional and sectoral autonomy, has weakened when it has not destroyed the bonds that formerly gave societies a sense of unity and totality, meanwhile dissipating institutional controls and elevating emotionalism.<sup>106</sup> Earlier the Industrial Revolution as well as the development of mass armies adapted to mass slaughter<sup>107</sup> greatly augmented the utility of the common man. In time, also, the spread of education, together with increase in both the requirements of many employments and the incomes of the underlying population, strengthened the common man's economic and social position. Important, too, has been a steady increase in the number of intellectuals, many of whom, as J. A. Schumpeter has emphasized, are hostile to the current political and economic power structure. "Unlike any other type of society, capitalism inevitably and by virtue of the very logic of its civilization creates, educates and subsidizes a vested interest in so-

cial unrest."<sup>108</sup> As a result, the capacity of modern democratic societies to support political and economic order has been undermined.

The devolution of power proceeded at varying pace in America, in Britain, and on the Continent. The stick was slow to be replaced by the carrot, even in Europe.<sup>109</sup> Writing in the 1850s, Nassau Senior, probably the father of the economy-promoting expenditure tax, observed: "A tranquil, unadvancing, indolent, but frugal and contented poverty, with little to hope, but still less to fear, is the state of the great mass of the inhabitants of continental Europe." Far less frugal were the English. "When wages are high, they work fewer hours and inhabit better houses" and spend prodigally any remaining "superfluity." "When wages fall" they work harder and economize. "When their earnings become insufficient for a maintenance, they throw themselves on the parish."<sup>110</sup> Senior's successors were more disturbed than he at the lack of participation of the common man in economic progress under the dominance of what Barbara Tuchman has called "the patricians."<sup>111</sup> Britain's common man, often poor in an age of accelerating change,<sup>112</sup> was "with almost no effective access to government."<sup>113</sup> Writing in 1909, G. F. G. Masterman indicated that four-fifths of Britain's population were "more or less effectively excluded from the British political community of which they were nominally members." Eleven years later, after the First Modern Peloponnesian War, J. M. Keynes described Britain's laboring classes as "accepting a situation in which they could call their own very little of the cake that they and Nature and the capitalists were cooperating to produce."<sup>114</sup> Under the corroding impact of this war, writes Tuchman, "illusions and enthusiasms possible up to 1914 slowly sank beneath a sea of massive disillusionment," with "humanity's major gain" consisting in "a painful view of its own limitations"—limitations of which Rudyard Kipling had warned Britain in 1897 in his prescient "Recessional."<sup>115</sup>

One outcome was increase in the momentum toward democracy, slowly growing since its origin early in the nineteenth century. "The poor have become less poor, more articulate, more politically active, their demands in Britain (as elsewhere) have risen steadily and steeply, along with those of nearly all classes of society."<sup>116</sup> Eventually, though poverty still persisted, pretax

income inequality began to decline.<sup>117</sup> A trend seemed to have set in that foreshadowed J. M. Keynes's optimistic forecast of the Englishman's prospective lot.<sup>118</sup>

Democracy, as has been suggested, was embedded early and deeply in the culture of America, far more than elsewhere, and there it continued to grow, in a social atmosphere rendered congenial by abundance of land, scarcity of manpower, reverence for religion, and the absence of a dominating elite, though endangered, De Tocqueville believed, should a tyrannical majority emerge.<sup>119</sup> In consequence the common man shared more equitably in economic improvement, except in occupations crowded with immigrants or adversely affected by cultural residues of a slave economy. Indeed, it probably was comparison of America with Europe that led Simon Nelson Patten to infer that a "pleasure" economy had replaced a "pain" economy.<sup>120</sup> Far less optimistic, of course, was Matthew Arnold, disturbed at what he thought he saw in Britain and America, namely, the disintegration of modern society "into its component classes, each of which presumes to consider its interests of paramount importance, and to act as though it were 'a center of authority.'"<sup>121</sup> Aversion of anarchy therefore called for a unifying "culture."<sup>122</sup> Arnold's reaction to the changes under way, though unique in form, had a variety of parallels, such as the reaction of John Ruskin.

### **CURRENT SITUATION**

The situation depicted in earlier sections has been projected into the future by Alvin Toffler, in his account of accelerating change and the replacement of "permanence" by "transience," "novelty," "diversity," and taxation of the limits to man's adaptability, with the result that "strategies for survival" become essential.<sup>123</sup> Earlier it was indicated that frustration arises (1) if  $E > 1$ , that is if expectations continue to grow more rapidly than capacity to satisfy them; or (2) if man becomes disenchanted with components of demand,  $D$ , because they fail to yield anticipated services and satisfaction, given the resource, physical, and time costs involved.<sup>124</sup>

For purposes of exposition, we may write  $D = I + C + G$ , where  $D$  denotes aggregate demand,  $I$  denotes investment required to maintain  $C$  and  $G$ ,  $C$  denotes goods and services ab-

sorbed by consumers, and  $G$  those absorbed by governments in the form of consumer-oriented goods and services,  $G_c$ , and non-consumer-oriented products,  $G_n$ . Then the rate  $D'$  at which  $D$  can grow is fixed by the rate  $S'$  at which  $S$  grows, where  $S$  denotes the flow of inputs, of goods and services, available for transformation into  $C$  and  $G$  and hence over time also into  $I$ , the requirement of which derives from the volume and rate of growth of  $C$  and  $G$ . We may also let  $D'_e$  designate the rate of increase in  $D_e$ , when  $D_e$  denotes aggregate demand as implied by a community's conduct-determining expectations. So long as  $E = 1$ ,  $D_e$  and  $D'_e$  will not deviate greatly from  $D$  and  $D'$ , which in turn must approximate  $S$  and  $S'$ . Then, though the wants of men generally will exceed what they have, the pace of their growth will correspond quite closely to the pace at which men increase their power to supply wants. Frustration, while always present in some degree, will not grow at a pace making for socioeconomic disturbance.

Prior to 1914,  $D_e$  tended to grow as did  $S$ , since causation ran predominantly from supply and availability to demand. Should  $D_e$  increase, this increase could be met out of the normal increase in  $S$ , product of past increase in  $I$  and in human capital, invention, and so on. If  $\Delta D$  began to exceed  $\Delta S$ , as in time of war,  $C$  would be reduced through taxation or inflation. As a rule, increase in  $G$  would be associated mainly with increase in  $G_n$ ; for so long as social philosophy and the limitedness of the common man's political power remained unfavorable to increase in  $G_c$ , it did not increase notably. Over the past half century, especially after World War II, however, causation began to flow increasingly from demand to supply, with both  $G_n$  and  $G_c$  subject to more rapid increase than  $S$ . This presented no problem in times of underuse of capacity, as in prosperous 1929 when  $S$  was still susceptible of considerable increase,<sup>125</sup> but it constituted a threat to the growth of  $C$  and a potential source of conflict between recipients of  $G_n$  and  $G_c$  and between recipients of components of  $G_c$ .

The pressure to increase  $C$  has been rising faster than the disposable income available for  $C$ , though associated in part with the rate of increase in total income. Increase in  $C$  is not likely to be retarded by dissatisfaction with the results of not very well informed expenditure of *discretionary* income upon products



novel to the purchaser, nor by the irregular development of leisure-favoring innovations, nor as yet by the increasing degree to which the products of American industry prove defective and impose unanticipated time and physical costs on consumers.<sup>126</sup> Reorganization of American society in ways allowing much more outdoor and participatorial recreation and activity will increase the demand for leisure and leisure-oriented resources, many of which will prove inelastic in supply. In general, for a variety of reasons, some historical, aspirations continue to rise, feeding on themselves and on persisting optimism regarding the course of prospective income, especially in Europe and the United States,<sup>127</sup> and contributing to unprecedented inflation.

It is, however, the severing of the constraints that formerly subordinated the rate of growth  $D'$  and  $D'_c$  to the rate of growth  $S'$  of  $S$  that constitutes a major source of unsatisfied demand and consequent frustration. Increases in both  $G_n$  and  $G_c$  have pressed  $G$  upward. Developed countries, especially the United States, have assumed large military defense and related (for example, space, foreign aid) burdens. Even if, as Britain's experience portends, dissatisfaction with the results of international expenditure may prompt its limitation,<sup>128</sup> other categories of  $G_n$  are destined to grow rapidly. Among these are the cleaning up of an increasingly polluted environment; law enforcement; large expenditure for rehabilitation of urban structures rendered obsolete and unviable by technological change, neglect of finance and transport, the dissolution of racial, ethnic, and similar barriers, and the growing breakdown of urban government and order; rehabilitation of the nation's habitat; and so on. H. and M. Sprout conclude: "We doubt that any political community, even the most productive and affluent, can evade or avoid these issues that are everywhere implicit in the dilemma of insufficient resources to cover rising and proliferating demands and commitments."<sup>129</sup>

Elsewhere they observe: "There appear to be grounds for querying whether any society . . . can long pay the price of competition for global political and military primacy without progressively eroding and eventually destroying the material and moral supports upon which national power and influence ultimately depend."<sup>130</sup>

Growth of pressure to increase  $G_c$  expenditures is likely even



though taxation for this purpose may be resisted. Such pressure has many sources. It will arise from the efforts of weak local governments to placate public employees ever ready to strike and interrupt essential services. It will continue to flow, in populist societies, from governmental efforts to elevate expenditure on the part of those in lower-income groups,<sup>131</sup> from efforts to relieve "intractable poverty in the midst of affluence." Pressure to spend will be sustained by measures dealing with environmental rehabilitation, "urban decay, suburban sprawl, disorder in the schools, crime in the streets, vocational displacement, and other evidences of a society in deep trouble." Politicians may, of course, hesitate to impose heavier taxes for fear of running counter to the American dream of "endlessly expanding affluence." But they will be confronted not only by the demands described but also by the inflexibility of governmental budgets at every level, with built-in and growing commitments (for example, social security, veterans' benefits, retirement pensions, and grants for public assistance) destined to absorb ever larger revenues.<sup>132</sup> The conditions described vary in perceived intensity by country; in general, welfare aspirations of countries, as reflected in poverty norms, are correlated with per capita income levels by country but in differing degree.<sup>133</sup>

Should the Congress (or other national legislature) hesitate to increase tax revenue in keeping with growing expenditures, it will have to fall back upon deficit financing. Indeed, this is inevitable, for, as Von Justi implied in 1766 and Colin Clark and others have insisted, there is a limit to the fraction of national income that a democratic state can appropriate in peacetime without generating inflation and accentuating intergroup conflict associated with attempts to increase  $G$  and hence  $D$  faster than  $S$ . Illustrative is conflict between those under, say, age 60 who pay the rising monetary bill and those over age 60 who are beneficiaries of various, ever more costly security and welfare programs.

Pressure to increase  $G_c$  and, in some measure, to elevate minimum wages above levels commensurate with the economic employment of less productive workers, is accentuated by the growing belief that, despite the persistence of marked income inequality and the inference that income structures are not very modifiable,<sup>134</sup> poverty can be abolished through governmental

measures. This belief tends to be strong in societies made up of a plurality of groups with diverse incomes and planes of living and yet permeated by an ideology of egalitarianism; it tends to flourish as well in democracies large enough to permit concentration of considerable power in the hands of those animated by egalitarian sentiments. In general, "awareness of rapid economic progress increases the dissatisfaction of those who do not participate in it," among them the poor who "feel discriminated against and alienated" and hence "demand and press for immediate change in their situation."<sup>135</sup> Increasing the *absolute* content of lower-level incomes and of "poverty"-level benchmarks does not dissipate the influence of "demonstration effects" in societies largely emancipated from a deadening "culture of poverty."

Pressure to increase  $G$  may give rise to a paradox. On the one hand, economists and others recognize that the efficiency with which an economy embodying a price system, free competition, and contract can function depends upon the state's ensuring order and compliance with essential rules and thereby preventing destructive conflict among those with diverse interests.<sup>136</sup> Such action by the state is essential also to preservation of confident expectations that political and related essential forms of stability will persist.<sup>137</sup> On the other hand, if control of a state, initially powerful enough to sustain the hegemony of price, competition, and contract, passes into the hands of those bent upon accentuating the growth of  $G$ , this passage can produce disorder that weakens *gemeinschaftliche*, or communal ties, essential to the stability of *gesellschaftliche*, or purely economic relationships.<sup>138</sup>

When  $D$  threatens to exceed  $S$ , initially at the expense of  $I$  and in favor of  $G$ , the need to ration output will arise if the price system is prevented from restoring equilibrium between  $D$  and  $S$ . Competition among groups for greater shares in  $G$  unaccompanied by offsetting decreases in  $C$  also produces intergroup conflict and weakens ties that bind individuals together in a community. This outcome is likely in large states in which interindividual points of contact and sources of potential conflict are numerous.<sup>139</sup> Such conflict may result from a people's unwillingness to accept rationing solutions achievable either through price competition or under workable rules prescribed

by agencies of the state. Though this type of conflict tends to be horizontal in character, it may be accentuated by vertical conflict associated with rapid rates of technical and other progress differentially incident on the age and occupational categories composing a population.

Illustrative of vertical conflict is that associated with the so-called generation gap. The socioeconomic status of a member of the labor force may be determined by his fund of experience or by his fund of recently developed and hence novel knowledge. Whereas experience tends to be correlated with age, novel knowledge tends to be associated with youth. Accordingly, in a relatively static society, considerable advantage lies with age whereas in a society subject to a high rate of technological and related change, considerable advantage lies with younger cadres. The resulting redistribution of power and influence can produce conflict, for instance, when increase in  $G_c$  for the benefit of older persons (for example, social security) is concomitant with  $D' > S'$ . The resulting impact may be expressed in terms of sets. Let  $g_1$  designate the set of values, concerns, and so forth of Generation 1, and  $g_{15}$  the set of those of Generation 15. Then the set formed by the intersection of sets  $g_1$  and  $g_{15}$  and hence representing values and concerns common to generations  $G_1$  and  $G_{15}$ , may be relatively large or small. In a society subject to a slow rate of change the area lying within the intersection will be very large relative to that lying in  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  but outside the intersection. If, however, the rate of change is high and if in addition there is conflict arising out of scarcity, the area within the intersection will be relatively small. Moreover, if this area is unduly small, ties of reciprocity will be reduced in number and the community will be weak, too weak perhaps to resolve conflicts easily.

Preservation of balance between  $D'$  and  $S'$  is prevented by current monetary policy flowing from an initial disparity between  $D$  and  $S$ . Balance results automatically when an economy is completely competitive, monetary policy consists in measures allowing the stock of money to grow at about the same rate as output,<sup>140</sup> and governmental undertakings are not financed through resort to inflation-generating means. Today, however, pressure upon  $G$ , especially upon  $G_c$ , together with changes accentuating rise in aspirations,<sup>141</sup> makes for imbalance and in-

crease in frustration. For the governmental apparatus has lost the will to confine  $D'$  within bounds set by  $S'$ , and there currently exist no other forces strong enough to bring about balance. Dissatisfaction associated with the lag of  $S'$  behind  $D'$  is accentuated, of course, by a growing awareness of deterioration in the quality of  $S$ , together with increase in the time and physical cost of consumption, a cost reinforced by shoddiness of output in a malfunctioning economy.<sup>142</sup> Inquiry into the future therefore entails inquiry into the mechanisms that can bring  $S'$  and  $D'$  into balance, into the forces making for convergence and divergence of  $S$  and  $D$ , and the probable behavior of each of these sets of forces.

### THE FUTURE

There are two limits to the growth of  $S$ : (1) man's external environment, and (2) the morphology of the society he creates to facilitate the growth of  $S$ , presumably to satisfy  $D$ .

1. No society or its economy, be it national or metanational, is a closed, self-sustaining system;<sup>143</sup> each is parasitic on the physical world environing it and imposing constraints that optimistic futurologists neglect. In short, the homosphere (including man's economic universe) is finite, resting as it does both on elements that are fixed in amount and on elements that are subject to increasing entropy and decline in actual or potential usefulness. Accordingly, man's capacity to increase output per head depends ultimately upon the degree to which the rate of population growth can be reduced to the zero level and more abundant components of man's physical environment can be substituted for less abundant and hence limiting components. It is now recognized not only that continued exponential growth is impossible but also that environmental limits are closing in on man and compelling him to reassess his future options and prospect.<sup>144</sup> It is also recognized that technological offsets to the limitedness of some utilizable elements, together with economic growth, give rise to costs that have been neglected in the past.<sup>145</sup>

2. How a society and its economy are organized conditions the rate of growth of  $S$  and sets limits to  $S'$ . Furthermore, whether this organization be optimum or suboptimum, frustration and conflict arising out of failure of  $S$  to keep pace with  $D$

may reduce the rate of growth of  $S$  and thus intensify frustration, at least in the short run.

Although all constraints of the sort included under limit 1 retard growth of  $S$  in general, some of these constraints become conspicuous in advanced countries. For as incomes rise and *discretionary* time or leisure per head increases, the desired rate of consumption of some of the elements especially limited in availability will increase rapidly (for example, various forms of recreational and other suitably situated space). Consciousness of scarcity will grow, therefore, with increase in the relative and absolute number of people who, as they become satiated with goods and services in very elastic supply, turn for additional satisfaction to goods and services in quite inelastic if not fixed or diminishing supply. Frustration at inability to satisfy demand for such goods and services will probably become most pronounced among those lacking property in the sources of these products.

Because this inelasticity of supply is encountered in many countries, conflict in the wake of this scarcity is experienced at the international level as well as at the domestic level. Within countries it will originate in the uneven incidence of the scarcity of goods and services in inelastic supply and in disagreement regarding the impact of pollution and related controls upon the growth of average income. At the international level corresponding conflict will arise, for here as within countries, dependence upon the price system to ration what is scarce will be resisted, as will stringent controls upon pollutants and environmental deterioration.

One may argue that, as a rule and in the longer run, equilibrium tends to emerge and persist in a closed society—in the present case, that which we have called  $S$  and  $D$  tend to move into equilibrium, in terms of both the aggregate quantity and the composition of  $S$  and  $D$ . For example,  $D$  and  $D'$  may adjust downward in keeping with  $S'$  because of change in  $V_i$ , essentially a collection of intervening variables, or because disappointment at the content of  $S$  when actually realized makes for that downward adjustment of expectations. Frustration will then abate insofar as it is associated with inability to realize expectations of the sort here under discussion.

When societies are open to the inflow of stimuli from other

societies, the tendency to equilibrium is weakened, though not necessarily eliminated. Then  $D'_e$  is governed by external as well as internal forces, whereas  $S'$  depends in the main upon internal conditions. Even so, those residing in relatively low-income countries and hence resembling members of relatively low-income classes in advanced countries are quite aware of the smallness of the probability that any one individual can realize inflated expectations. They may change their perceptions of what is possible as a result, even though the international income structure may no longer continue to diverge as in the past century.<sup>146</sup> For even then it is not likely to be expected to converge rapidly enough to warrant hope in the realization of anything like international economic equality.

As has already been suggested, adjustments reducing disparity between  $D'$  and  $S'$  and thereby abating frustration are of both accidental and designed origin. For example, changes in consumption patterns may serve to decelerate the rate of increase in expectations. An individual may be viewed as endowed with a budget made up of a fixed quantity of time convertible into work or nonwork, together with physical energy and perhaps some purchasing power in addition to that for which he can exchange some of his time. This endowment of time, energy, and unearned purchasing power he may allocate in any one of a large number of ways, some of which are insensitive to the forces producing rising expectations and/or frustration. Widespread reorientation of consumption patterns can, therefore, greatly weaken the sources of rising expectations and frustration, even as many philosophers have contended or urged. It is unlikely, of course, that the condition of the typical individual will approximate that of the wantless Abyssinian prince described in Samuel Johnson's *Rasselas*: "That I want nothing, or that I know not what I want, is the cause of my complaint."<sup>147</sup>

Changes in consumption patterns may affect  $S'$  and thus make for increase or decrease in disparity between  $D'$  and  $S'$ . For example, such changes may shift inputs to sectors in which output per head grows less rapidly; a case in point seems to be the service sector, which by 1980 is expected to engage at least two-thirds of the labor force compared with about half in 1947. It is possible that increasing separation of ownership, together



with top- and lower-level management, from the underlying work force in both goods and service industries may increase alienation of workers from employers,<sup>148</sup> reduce the concern of workers to perform well, and thus increase malfunction in production and products. Today "consumerism" and self-service constitute responses to products of alienation. Indeed, the four-day week is defended on the ground that, on the other three days, the consumer can function as Mr. Fixit and repair the shoddy products of a malfunctioning economy.

Increase in the value attached to time, whether as leisure or as a complement to consumption, also may reduce the rate of growth both of commercial output per worker per year and of the demand for that output. It is to be expected that an ever-larger fraction of the increase in his productivity per hour will be "consumed" in the form of time devoted to purposes other than employment for pay. Not only does the demand for leisure increase with rise in income and decline in the cost of commercial recreation;<sup>149</sup> it also increases as the pattern of consumption becomes more oriented to goods and services to which time is highly complementary and as the pattern of living increasingly entails planned use of scarce time.<sup>150</sup> Increase in the physical cost of consuming commercial products also will decrease the rate of growth of demand for them.

The course of  $E$  is conditioned not only by the degree to which  $S'$  keeps pace with  $D'$  but also by variation in the want-satisfying power of  $S$ , components of which may differ notably in respect of their want-satisfying power. The want-satisfying power of  $\Delta S$  depends in large part upon the extent to which  $\Delta S$  is transformed into  $\Delta C$  of such composition as matches the composition of the increment in wants associated with the increase in purchasing power accompanying the transformation of  $\Delta S$  into  $\Delta C$ . As a rule, the relative want-satisfying power associated with an increment in  $\Delta S$  will correspond to  $\Delta C/(\Delta C + \Delta G)$  and hence tend to diminish with increase in  $\Delta G/(\Delta G + \Delta C)$ . Moreover, since  $G_c$  tends to be more substitutable for  $C$  than is  $G_n$ , increase in the ratio  $G_n/G$  will further depress the want-satisfying power of  $\Delta S$ , some of which is transformed into  $G_n$  and/or  $G_c$ . In view of what has been said, it is inferable that  $E$  is more likely to approximate 1.0, or, given appropriate changes in  $V_i$ , fall short of 1.0, if the ratio  $\Delta C/(\Delta C + \Delta G)$  approximates 1.0.



If, on the contrary, this ratio falls quite short of 1.0,  $E$  will tend to fall, since the capacity of the economy to produce want-satisfaction will not keep pace with  $e$  and  $y$ . The magnitude and the significance of  $C/(C + G)$  will be conditioned by the order of values insofar as consumer sovereignty and freedom of choice rule.

It has been argued that though expectations may rise at an accelerating rate, equilibrating forces usually keep the rise in line with the economy's capacity to support it. Converging forces swamp those conducive to divergence. It is always possible, of course, that in the short run, departures from equilibrium will provoke not a compensatory response but a yet further movement from equilibrium and thus possibly set in motion a cumulatively disequilibrating process.<sup>151</sup> In the end, however, though after a long and system-changing time, the forces making for convergence will become ascendant, since persistence of divergence-producing forces eventually must destroy the community or social body within which they have escaped control. Then restoration of order becomes a primary objective and this presupposes as a precondition the return of balance between expectations and capacity to satisfy them.

Whether such a destructive process is under way in the United States and other Western democracies is uncertain. Overloading economies is already leading to inflation; for, although satisfaction of aspirations, moral<sup>152</sup> and nonmoral, absorbs excessive inputs, politicians increasingly are engaged in bribing the electorate<sup>153</sup> with such satisfaction, at the expense of all elements vulnerable to plucking. The destructive process is fed—sometimes through deification of the lawyers' *adversary* principle—by growth of specialization of all sorts and hence increase in the number of contact points at which the economic network is subject to threat of disruption, especially after much of the power to exercise duress or force has passed from the state to special-interest groups (for example, trade unions, professional and business associations). Moreover, populations are splitting up into groups after the manner of a collapsing assembly of units constituting what had been a functioning empire, with each group bent upon seeking differential advantage or support of its already acquired advantage, even as Hobbes foresaw and to the same effect.<sup>154</sup> Dissolution of what had been a

network of reciprocity knit together by exchange and other mechanisms is hastened with the gradual passage of the apparatus of state under the partial control of the inept, the parasitical, the lumpen intelligentsia, and with the accompanying dissipation both of community-preserving social-psychological ties and of security-conserving forces. To such process there is little general alertness<sup>155</sup> until division and polarization have reached a critical point. Then an order-promising movement may come into being and, with military assistance, seize control of the apparatus of state and dislodge those who, as Socrates warned, define as good that which the populace momentarily seems to want.

What the future holds in store is hidden. For futurologists' forecasts of the future tend to neglect both the social orders and limitations arising from man's physical and internal environments. If we assume, with MacIver and Page, that there are three social orders, "the order of values or the cultural order, the order of means or the utilitarian order, and the order of nature on which man's valuations and man's devices alike depend,"<sup>156</sup> then it is change in the first of these orders that is most difficult to project. Yet it is this order that in the long run determines the selection of objectives for whose realization the utilitarian order supplies the means. As a rule, therefore, given environmental limitations, it will be within the order of values that correctives for imbalance between expectations and the means to their satisfaction will originate, whether in the form of increase in  $S$  and the degree of equality with which it is distributed, or in the form of downward revision of  $D'_e$ . That adjustment is most likely to originate in the order of values is inferable also from the fact that this order is susceptible of greater, more varied, and more rapid change than are the other two orders; for the order of values is subjective and hence relatively free of constraints encountered in the other two orders. For this reason also the order of values is less susceptible of successful computerization, simulation, and projection than are the other two orders.

### CONCLUSION

Rising expectations and frustration are modern phenomena, hardly two centuries old. Disparity between expectations and capacity to satisfy them has tended to become pronounced only

in the present century, with the weakening if not the complete destruction of the link running *from* growth in capacity to growth of expectations. This weakening has been associated with growth of the political power of the underlying population and the steady increase in the economic and the social role of the populist or democratic state—a state with too much capacity to promise and distribute but with too little capacity to preserve the hegemony of the market and the price system. More generally, this weakening has been associated with reduction in the role of homeostasis-producing agents and their replacement by arbitrary, uncoordinated, interest-group-dominated instrumentalities that now threaten the continuity of truly democratic forms.

Solution consists in increasing the role of homeostasis-producing agencies and in limiting the role of interventionist agencies to dissolution of concentrations of laboristic and industrial-commercial power not conducive to economies of scale and to the performance of functions that clearly lie outside the capacity of the private sector and of lesser jurisdictional components of the polity.

#### NOTES

1. See, for example, A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), chap. 6, esp. pp. 116–118. Cf. J. M. Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1932), pp. 360–361.

2. T. R. Malthus, *Essay on Population*, Everyman Ed. (New York: Dutton, n.d.), pp. 194–195.

3. Congruence with reality entails "conformity with general natural laws" and with existence of "a discernible path by which the expected state of affairs, labelled with a future date, could, without breach of these laws, be attained from the existing situation within 'the available time.'" See G. L. S. Shackle, *The Nature of Economic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 78.

4. Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York, Knopf, 1948). The following quotation is from Aaron Wildavsky, *The Revolt Against the Masses* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 45; see also p. 44 on the conflict between the wants of the masses and the wants of the environmentalist elite.

5. David Riesman's "other-directedness" is more prevalent in "achieving" than in other societies, D. C. McClelland suggests in *The Achieving Society* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1961), pp. 190–203.

6. This phrase is A. N. Whitehead's, in his *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 141.

7. See, for example, H. J. Schiller, "Mind Management: Mass Media in the Advanced Industrial State," *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business* 11 (1971):39-52. A number of pieces on the possible future role of drugs have appeared in *The Futurist* in recent years.

8. Cf. Alfred Marshall's approaches in his *Principles of Economics* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1961); this is a variorum edition with annotations by C. W. Guillebaud.

9. Cf. N. S. Timashef's analysis of "power structure" in his *An Introduction to the Sociology of Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), pp. 184-187. Reinforcing transpersonal links increase as  $[(n-1)(n-2)/2]$  where  $n$  denotes the number of members of a group each of whom initially experiences frustration.

10. See, for example, Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, *Economy and Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956); V. Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935).

11. T. E. Holland, *The Elements of Jurisprudence*, 12th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1917), p. 80; see also Timashef, *Introduction to the Sociology of Law*, esp. pt. 1.

12. See Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964); also my "Allocation and Development, Economic and Political," in Ralph Braibanti, ed., *Political and Administration Development* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969), pp. 588-637, esp. 632-637.

13. Exercise of an option always imposes choice and cost in the sense of alternative options foregone.

14. See, for example, R. S. Weckstein, "Welfare Criteria and Changing Tastes," *American Economic Review* 52 (March 1962):133-153; also W. P. Strassmann, "Optimum Consumption Patterns in High-Income Nations," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 28 (August 1962):364-372.

15. For example, even before the medieval urban renaissance, Christian merchants found "an almost limitless source of recruitment" in the agricultural population whence "there emerged everywhere individuals driven to seek a livelihood, and even wealth, by their enterprising spirit and by their shrewd ability to profit by circumstances." See H. van Wierocke's account of the rise of towns in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), vol. 3, chap. 1, p. 11.

16. Somewhat indicative is Henry Adams's account of his life in relation to changing times in *The Education of Henry Adams*, (New York: Random House, 1931); also Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 282, and Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion*, pp. 360-361, 364-370.

17. See Maurice Halbwachs, *L'évolution des besoins dans les classes ouvrières* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1933), pp. 150-151.

18. Keith Irvine, "Revolution of Declining Expectations," *The New Leader*, 20 November 1967, pp. 13-14. See also Philippe de Seynes, "Prospects for a Future World," *International Organization* 26 (Winter 1972):1-17.

19. J. M. Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1921), p. 18, also chaps. 2, 26. On expectation and subjective belief, see Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, *Analytical Economics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), chap. 6, esp. pp. 258-263.

20. Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 107.

21. A. O. Hirschman, "The Principle of the Hiding Hand," *Development Projects Observed* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), chaps. 1, 2.

22. See Milton Friedman, "Choice, Chance and the Personal Distribution of Income," *Journal of Political Economy* 61 (August 1953):277-290.

23. E. A. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Politics* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1957), chap. 3, also p. 405 and chap. 13. See also St. Augustine's *The City of God* (New York: Random House, 1950), bk. 22, chap. 24.

24. J. U. Nef, *The Conquest Of The Material World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 67-69, and 215-239 on the impact of the Reformation. See also G. Le Bras's account of medieval conceptions of economy and society in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), vol. 3, chap. 8.

25. See Karl Marx and F. Engels, *The First Indian War of Independence 1857-1859* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1959), pp. 18-19; G. G. Coulton, *Medieval Village, Manor, and Monastery* (New York: Harper, 1961); G. Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (New York: Random House, 1968), chaps. 22, 23.

26. See, for example, M. I. Finley, "Technical Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient World," *Economic History Review* 18 (August 1965): 43-44; A. E. R. Boak, *Manpower Shortage and the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

27. Sylvia Thrupp describes the period from 1349 to the 1470s in England as "the golden age of bacteria." See "The Problem of Replacement Rates in Late Medieval English Population," *Economic History Review* 18 (August 1965):118. K. F. Helleiner describes the unfavorable economic impact of the Black Death and its sequelae in his "Population Movement and Agrarian Depression in the Later Middle Ages," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 15 (August 1949): 368-372. See also Helleiner's chapter in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), vol. 4, pp. 1-95.

28. On the role of threshold in choice, see Georgescu-Roegen, *Analytical Economics*, p. 151 and passim.

29. Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, *British Economic Growth 1688-1959* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 80. Average income was, however, more than double subsistence.

30. For historical instances, see Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), vol. 5, pp. 459–489. See also R. S. Berman, *America in the Sixties: An Intellectual History* (New York: Free Press, 1968).

31. J. S. Duesenberry, *Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 26–28. See also Weckstein, "Welfare Criteria," pp. 137–143.

32. Koji Taira, "Consumer Preferences, Poverty Norms, and Extent of Poverty," *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business* 9 (1969):31–44, esp. 32–34, 40–41, 44.

33. See my "Product-Adding versus Product-Replacing Innovations," *Kyklos* 10 (1957):249–277.

34. See, for example, J. D. Owen, "The Demand for Leisure," *Journal of Political Economy* 79 (1971):56–76; S. B. Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). See also Georgescu-Roegen, *Analytical Economics*, pp. 343, 352, 377, 387–390, and *The Entropy Law and the Economic Process* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 285, 288–291.

35. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Business Cycles* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), vol. 1, chap. 3, esp. pp. 72–75.

36. Cf. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), chap. 1. on "the circular flow of economic life."

37. In the United States the ratio of *disposable* to *personal* income fell from 0.97 in 1929 to 0.91 in 1951 and 0.87 in 1971.

38. Within limits, frustration when tolerable facilitates learning. See "Healthy Frustration," *Time*, June 5, 1972, p. 61.

39. As Charles Dickens observed in his novel *Great Expectations*: "Probably every new and eagerly expected garment ever put on since clothes came in, fell a trifle short of the wearer's expectation" (chap. 19). In life it is often the hunt rather than catching the quarry that is the more pleasurable.

40. See note 9 and text above.

41. Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion*, pp. 365–368.

42. See my "World Hunger: Past, Present, Prospective," *World Review of Nutrition and Dietetics* 9 (1968):1–31, esp. 1–4. We know the kings, statesmen, writers, thinkers, etc., "and yet we do not know whether all our ancestors had enough to eat." So writes Peter Laslett in *The World We Lost* (London: Methuen & Co., 1965), p. 127.

43. B. J. Gordon, "Aristotle and Hesiod: The Economic Problem In Greek Thought," *Review of Social Economy* 21 (1963):147–156.

44. See Toynbee, *Study of History*, vol. 6, *passim*.

45. That man's physical environment was subject to decline was a common belief, one held by Plato (*Timaeus*, 23–25, *Critias*, 108–121) and Cicero (in "The Dream of Scipio"), among others.



46. See, for example, P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York: American Book Co., 1937), vol. 2, chap. 3, and vol. 4 (1941), pp. 221–222; Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: Knopf, 1939), vol. 2, pp. 89–92, 96, 449n., 504–505.

47. See, for example J. S. Berliner, "The Feet of the Natives Are Large," *Current Anthropology* 3 (February 1962):47–62.

48. *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), vol. 4, chap. 5.

49. *Ibid.*, vol. 6, chap. 6; V. G. Simpkhovitch, *Toward the Understanding of Jesus* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 140–165; C. P. Timmer, "The Turnip, the New Husbandry, and the English Agricultural Revolution," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 83 (1969):375–395; E. L. Jones, "The Condition of English Agriculture, 1500–1640," *Economic History Review* 21 (1968):614–619.

50. Finley, "Technical Innovation and Progress," pp. 29–45, esp. 36–39.

51. Oswald Spengler contrasts what he calls the Faustian outlook with alternative outlooks in *Decline of the West*, esp. in vol. 1, chap. 6, and vol. 2, chap. 14.

52. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, chap. 5, esp. pp. 227–234. Oswald Spengler, writing in 1914–1917, identified "the entrepreneur, the engineer, and the factory-worker" as the fountains of the "economy of the machine industry" (*Decline of the West*, chap. 2, p. 504.)

53. As early as 1525, 2–3 million of western Europe's 60–70 million people were engaged in industry, and others in trade. Nef, *Conquest of the Material World*, p. 69.

54. Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1957), pp. 652–684, esp. p. 684. On democratic Athens, see A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), chap. 4, esp. pp. 76–81.

55. See, for example, R. W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (London: Hutchinson, 1956), chap. 2.

56. From *Politicatus*, trans. J. Dickinson (New York: Appleton, 1927).

57. C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 242, 245, 483–484; St. Augustine, *City of God* (New York: Random House, 1950), bk. 14, chap. 13, pp. 690–693.

58. St. Augustine, bk. 5, chap. 20. St. Augustine would have approved J. K. Mehta's suggestion that "nobler and superior" wants be "employed to kill the baser and inferior wants," and thus facilitate "elimination of wants" by arousing or creating "superior wants." *A Philosophical Interpretation of Economics* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), pp. 66–67.

59. See E. M. W. Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture* (New York: Random House, n.d.), chaps. 2, 7; D. L. Stevenson, ed., *The Elizabethan Age* (New York: Fawcett, 1967), pp. 15–20, 58–91.

60. Stevenson, *Elizabethan Age*, pp. 44–48.



61. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. 3, chap. 14, esp. pp. 198–506, also chap. 13 for a statistical summary of internal disturbances in Europe. On peasant revolts, see Coulton, *Medieval Village*, chaps. 11, 16, 23–25, app. 37.

62. For estimates of population, see W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), pp. 33–34; M. K. Bennett, *The World's Food* (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 9; J. D. Durand, "The Modern Expansion of World Population," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 111 (1967):136–159; United Nations, *The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends*, ST/SOA/Ser. A/17 (New York: United Nations, 1953), chap. 2, esp. p. 11; C. Cipolla, *The Economic History of World Population* (London: Pelican Books, 1962). Colin Clark puts world population at 256, 280, 384 and 427 millions as of A.D. 14, 1000, 1200, and 1500, respectively; see his *Population Growth and Land Use* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1967), chap. 3.

63. Based on tables in A. J. Coale and Paul Demeny, *Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). Colin Clark puts at 0.3 percent per annum "the rate of natural increase of an agricultural community under medieval conditions" (*Population Growth*, p. 83).

64. For brief accounts, see the articles on "Black Death," "Communicable Diseases, Control of," "Epidemic," and "Famine" in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1930–1931), vols. 2, 4–6. See also K. F. Helleiner's splendid account of Europe's population from the Black Death to the eve of the "vital revolution," in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), chap. 1.

65. J. Fourastié, "De la vie traditionnelle à la vie tertiaire," *Population* 14 (1959):417–132.

66. Jones, *Athenian Democracy*, pp. 82–83. According to hypothetical life tables prepared by A. J. Coale and Paul Demeny, the Western Model suggests that of 100 males reaching age 20, 39 reach age 60 when life expectancy at birth is 30.08 years, and 33 when it is 25.26 years. The Southern Model suggests 42 survivors when life expectancy at birth is 24.66 years, and 48 when it is 29.33 years. Computed from Coale and Demeny, pp. 4, 6, 658, 660.

67. See, for example, Clark, *Population Growth*, chaps. 1, 2.

68. J. C. Russell, "The First Loss of Control over Population in Europe," paper presented at the meeting of the Population Association of America, Toronto, April 1972. See also his *Medieval Regions and Cities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972).

69. Colin Clark's estimates suggest that increase per decade of Europe's population approximated 3.6 percent in 1200–1340, 2 percent in 1500–1600, and 2.4 percent in 1600–1700. *Population Growth*, p. 97.

70. Technological change in times past made for increase in population capacity and hence in numbers.

71. See G. H. Hildebrand's introduction to *The Idea of Progress: A Collection of Readings*, selected by F. J. Teggert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), chap. 8; and J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (New York: Dover, 1955).

72. "In the past, professionals have formed unprogressive castes. The point is that professionalism has now been mated with progress." See Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 294-295.

73. The rational-empirical problem was discussed by A. B. Wolfe in "Is There a Biological Law of Population Growth?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 41 (August 1927):557-594.

74. See Weston La Barre's interesting "Materials for a History of Studies of Crisis Cults: A Bibliographic Essay," *Current Anthropology* 12 (February 1971):3-44.

75. See, for example, N. E. Himes, *Medical History of Contraception* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1936), chap. 10, on "democratization by publicity." Somewhat pertinent is my "Notes on the International Transmission of Economic Ideas," *History of Political Economy* 2 (1970):133-151.

76. See, for example, Deane and Cole, *British Economic Growth*, pp. 7-11; A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Macmillan, 1899).

77. Methodologically relevant is A. R. Omran, "The Epidemiologic Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 49 (1971):509-538.

78. Finley, "Technical Innovation and Economic Progress," pp. 31-32, 43. Cf. A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India* (New York: Grove Press, 1954), p. 215, on early Indian dread of poverty and the desirability of wealth, a point of view encountered in the Middle East as well.

79. See, for example, my *Indian Economic Thought: A Preface to Its History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971), pp. 42-46. On the "culture of poverty," see Oscar Lewis, "The Children of Sanchez, Pedro Martinez, and La Vida," together with comments on Lewis's work, in *Current Anthropology*, 8 (December 1967):480-500. See also Simon Nelson Patten, *The Development of English Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1899), pp. 6-10, 23-25, and *Essays in Economic Theory*, ed. R. G. Tugwell (New York: Knopf, 1924), pp. 337-338.

80. William Langland, *Piers the Ploughman* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970), p. 25. Shakespeare wrote in similar vein when he had a poor citizen exclaim in *Coriolanus*: "What authority surfeits on would relieve us . . . the leanness that afflicts us, the object of our misery, is as an inventory to particularize their abundance; our sufferance is a gain to them" (act 1, sc. 1).

81. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, pp. 388-389.

82. He observed that the plague had greatly reduced the income of parish priests, but he said nothing of the availability of untilled land and a consequent improvement in the lot of cultivators who were poverty-ridden in comparison with those who "chose to live by trade" or with lawyers "pleading their cases for as much money as they could get. Never once did they open their mouths out of love for our Lord." Langland, *Piers the Ploughman*, pp. 26, 27, 31, also p. 26 on the "greed" of "Doctors of Divinity." See also Southern, *Making of the Middle Ages*, chap. 2; a serf "did not know today what he would have to do tomorrow" (p. 107).

83. "Hope and ambition, and some scope for the play of free competition, are conditions—necessary conditions so far as we can tell—of human progress." A. C. Pigou, ed., *Memorials of Alfred Marshall* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1925), p. 238, also 82–83.

84. Finley, "Technical Innovation and Economic Progress," pp. 32–41, also p. 45 on the degree of progress, and pp. 44–45 on the unfavorable impact of the servile or slave status of labor upon artisanry. Cf. Pigou, *Memorials*, pp. 82–83. On waste of potential capital in the Middle Ages, see G. C. Coulton, *Medieval Panorama* (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), pp. 493, 511–512, 654–655, 759–760. Presumably, even with a very low average income, 5 percent might assume the form of capital and increase average output perhaps 0.25–0.5 percent per year, enough to increase average output 30 or more percent per century, perhaps enough to quadruple average output in five centuries. On capital formation in England in the late seventeenth century see Deane and Cole, *British Economic Growth*, chap. 8.

85. As Milton Friedman has noted, "Savings may well have been at least as large a fraction of income in the Middle Ages as in major part, took the form of cathedrals, which, however productive of ultimate satisfaction and of social security in more than one sense of that term, were not productive of worldly goods. . . . Perhaps the crucial role that has been assigned instead to the factors determining the form in which wealth is accumulated." *A Theory of the Consumption Function* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 236.

86. On the development of urban classes in and after the late Middle Ages, see *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 3, chaps. 1, 3, 6. Cf. Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, bk. 3, chap. 4.

87. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. 3, chap. 8.

88. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, chap. 3, esp. pp. 134–140, 150.

89. On the concept of preconditions, see W. W. Rostow, ed., *The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963).

90. Phyllis Deane, *The First Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 5–7, 10–11. Cf. Simon Kuznets, *Economic Growth and Structure* (New York: Norton, 1965), pp. 176–194.

91. Deane and Cole, *British Economic Growth*, p. 38.

92. Ibid., p. 285. Except for the two World War periods, the annual rate of growth per head, though fluctuating, generally exceeded 1 percent after the end of the eighteenth century. Uncertainty attends estimates of population change in eighteenth-century England and Wales, though not enough to modify the findings. See Larry Neal, "Deane and Cole on Industrialization and Population Change in the Eighteenth Century," *Economic History Review* 24 (1971):643-647; and Cole's rejoinder, *ibid.*, pp. 648-652.

93. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, p. 305.

94. Ibid., pp. 70, 73-74, 89-90, 200, 202, 205-206, 327-329. See my "Adam Smith's Theory of Economic Growth," *Southern Economic Journal* 25 (1959):397-415; 26 (1959):1-12.

95. R. M. Hartwell, "The Causes of the Industrial Revolution: An Essay in Methodology," *Economic History Review* 18 (August 1965):180. Under the heading of "forces making for growth" are included improved organization and technology, expanding resources and population, invention and its diffusion, growing demand, changes in society and its values, but "no great acceleration in capital formation." On the interaction of the Industrial Revolution and population growth, see J. R. Hicks, *Value and Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), p. 302.

96. See *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 6 (1966), esp. chap. 1; William Woodruff, *Impact of Western Man* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967).

97. Simon Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), esp. pp. 64-65, 352-353; and *The Economic Growth of Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), esp. p. 24. On underdeveloped countries see Kuznets, "Problems in Comparing Recent Growth Rates for Developed and Less Developed Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 20 (1972):185-209.

98. D. N. McCloskey, "Did Victorian Britain Fail?" *Economic History Review* 23 (1970):446-459. On annual average income and the decline in its rate of increase after the 1880s, see Deane and Cole, *British Economic Growth*, pp. 329-331, also 282-284. The role of demand is stressed by Angus Maddison in *Economic Growth In The West* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1964).

99. On changes in family living, see Faith M. Williams and C. C. Zimmerman, *Studies of Family Living in the United States and Other Countries*, U.S. Department of Agriculture Miscellaneous Publication no. 223 (Washington, D.C.: 1935); C. C. Zimmerman, *Consumption and Standards of Living* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1936), esp. chaps. 12-19; Hazel Kyrk, *A Theory of Consumption* (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1923), chaps. 8-10, on the origin of living standards. See also J. F. Dewhurst et al., *America's Needs and Resources* (1955) and *Europe's Needs and Resources* (1961), both published by the Twentieth Century Fund, New York.

100. The populations of North America and of Europe and the Soviet Union increased, respectively, about 75 and 230 millions between 1800 and 1900 and about 147 and 282 millions between 1900 and 1970.

101. In 1920 about 30 percent of the population in the developed world lived in places of 20,000 or more inhabitants; in 1960, 46 percent. The corresponding percentages for the underdeveloped world are 7 and 17. These figures and those in the preceding footnote are from United Nations publications. On the growth of cities, see also W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production*, chap. 4. In 1800, 3 percent of Europe's, 6.1 percent of Asia's, and 1.3 percent of the world's population lived in cities of 100,000 or more; the corresponding figures in 1930 were 29, 6, and 11 (*ibid.*, p. 118).

102. On some of the forces at work, see D. E. Robinson, "The Importance of Fashions in Taste to Business History: An Introductory Essay," *Business History Review* 38 (1963):5-36, and "Fashion Theory and Product Design," *Harvard Business Review* 36 (1958):126-138; Leo Moutin, "The Sociology of Gastronomy," *European Community*, November 1967, pp. 10-13.

103. See E. W. Martin, *The Standard of Living in 1860* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

104. The factors mentioned are discussed by Ruth Mack in "Trends in American Consumption and the Aspiration To Consume," *American Economic Review* 46 (May 1956):55-68; see also Robert Ferber's comments in the same issue, pp. 84-86. Cf. W. L. O'Neill, *Women at Work* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972).

105. See, for example, Herbert Moller, "Youth as a Force in the Modern World," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10 (1967-1968): 237-260.

106. See A. C. Zijderveld, "Rationality And Irrationality In Pluralistic Society," *Social Research* 37 (1970):23-47; also R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963). See also, on the effects of decline in size of community, J. B. Quandt, *From the Small Town to the Great Community* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970).

107. See E. M. Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), chaps. 3-5. Today, by contrast, civilians seem destined for mass slaughter by remotely controlled vehicles of destruction.

108. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1942), p. 146, also pp. 143-155 and chap. 11.

109. More reliance was placed on the stick in Asia than in Europe. "The bamboo is the great moral panacea of China" observed an anonymous author in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1810; see vol. 16 (August 1810):488.

110. Nassau Senior, *Industrial Efficiency And Social Economy*, ed. S. L. Levy (New York: Holt, 1928), vol. 2, pp. 190-191, also p. 222 on tax. On p.

272 he said of the English: "The millions whom we have crowded into densely-peopled districts, are accustomed not merely to prosperity, but to constantly advancing prosperity." More symbolic of the situation of the common man in Senior's day is an account of his friend, financier Bingham Baring, who was struck on the hat with a stick by a nineteen-year-old ploughboy, for which offence the latter was hanged shortly thereafter. See S. L. Levy, *Nassau W. Senior, the Prophet of Modern Capitalism* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1943), p. 137.

111. See Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Proud Tower* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), esp. chap. 1; J. E. Cairnes, *Some Leading Principles of Political Economy Newly Expounded* (New York: Harper, 1874), pt. 2, chap. 5, secs. 6-9; G. Wallas, *The Great Society* (London, 1914), chap. 1; S. G. Checkland, *The Rise of Industrial Society in England, 1815-1885* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1965), and "Growth and Progress: The Nineteenth-Century View in Britain," *Economic History Review* 12 (August 1959):49-62; also G. W. Young, *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

112. Barbara Tuchman describes 1890-1914 as "the culmination of a century of the most accelerated rate of change in man's record" (*Proud Tower*, p. xiv). Henry Adams observed in 1904 that there was in effect a "law of acceleration" that within a generation "would require a new social mind," one that "would need to jump" (*Education of Henry Adams*, chap. 24, p. 498).

113. Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources," *World Politics* 20 (1968):664-693, 672.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 673. The Sprouts cite many works, among them G. F. G. Masterman's *The Condition of England* (London, 1909) and Keynes's *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York, 1920).

115. Tuchman, *Proud Tower*, p. 463. Confirmation of Kipling's pessimistic forecast is found in Joel H. Wiener, ed., *Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire*, 4 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), covering 1689-1971 and with an introduction by J. H. Plumb.

116. H. and M. Sprout, "Dilemma."

117. "The relative distribution of income, as measured by annual income incidence in rather broad classes, has been moving toward equality, with these trends particularly noticeable since the 1920s but beginning perhaps in the period before World War I." See Kuznets, *Economic Growth and Structure*, p. 260, also p. 275; also Clark, *Conditions*, chap. 12.

118. J. M. Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1932), pp. 358-374. "Assuming no important wars and no important increase in population, the economic problem may be solved, or at least be within reach of solution, within a hundred years. This means that the economic problem is not—if we look into the future—the permanent problem of the human race" (p. 366).



119. See Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve (London: Saunders and Ottey, 1836), passim; J. S. Schapiro, "Alexis de Tocqueville, Pioneer of Democratic Liberalism in France," *Political Science Quarterly* 57 (1942):545-563. On the development of American theory and practice of democracy, see, besides the many works of Richard Hofstadter, C. A. Beard and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), chaps. 16, 22, and passim; and V. L. Parrington's literary history, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930).

120. S. N. Patten, *Development of English Thought*, pp. 6-10, 23-25; and *Essays in Economic Theory*, ed. R. G. Tugwell (New York: Knopf, 1924), pp. 337-338.

121. W. S. Knickerbocker, in his introduction to Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* [1869] (New York: Macmillan, 1938), p. xix. See especially chaps. 2-3.

122. *Ibid.*, chaps. 4-6 and conclusion.

123. Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Random House, 1970).

124. Parallel is what Lionel Trilling calls "the disenchantment of our culture with culture itself," manifest in the hostility of much literature to modern civilization. See his *Beyond Culture* (New York: Viking, 1965), p. 3. Cf. also R. S. Berman, *America in the Sixties*; and J. L. Dillard, *Black English* (New York: Random House, 1972).

125. See, for example, H. G. Moulton, *Income and Economic Progress* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1935); this was the last of a series of studies of America's capacity to produce and consume in 1929.

126. "Only an innovation in supply, such as the automobile, the radio, TV, or fractional horsepower motor could stimulate sufficient demand to shift the average propensity to consume leisure to significantly higher levels." So concluded George Fisk in *Leisure Spending-Behavior* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 194. See also G. Katona, B. Strumfel, and E. Zahn, *Aspirations and Affluence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 10, 60-62, 65-68, 217 on discretionary buying, pp. 107, 109-112 on leisure and spending, and chap. 9 on the degree to which leisure in the form of early retirement is based on retirees' optimistic notions of what their incomes will be in retirement.

127. Katona et al., *Aspirations and Influence*, passim.

128. "The British Empire was maintained as long as lowly folk in the United Kingdom and in the colonies could be controlled and kept working at relatively low cost in money and violence. The British Empire became progressively insupportable as rising demands within Britain and resistance to imperial rule in the colonies coincided with escalating costs of maintaining Britain's historic role in international politics." H. and M. Sprout, "Dilemma," p. 692. See also Wiener, *Great Britain*.



129. H. and M. Sprout, "Dilemma," p. 693.

130. Harold and Margaret Sprout, "National Priorities: Demands, Resources, Dilemmas," *World Politics* 24 (1972):317.

131. Around 1960, the fifth of the population ranking lowest in income received only about 4 percent of pretax income in developed countries; the lowest two-fifths, 15 percent. See Kuznets, *Economic Growth and Structure*, p. 289. In 1970, about one person in eight lived below the "poverty level" in the United States. U.S. Bureau of Census, *Current Population Reports*, series P-60, no. 81, November 1971, p. 2.

132. See H. and M. Sprout, "National Priorities," pp. 305-309, 315.

133. Taira, "Consumer Preferences," pp. 37-38, 42-44. In Western Europe, declared family needs vary with international differences in income by country, but not in quite the same degree. See the Gallup Survey reported in *European Community*, April 1972, p. 10. On American aspirations, see A. H. Cantril and C. W. Roll, Jr., *Hopes and Fears of the American People* (New York: Universe Books, 1971).

134. See, for example, V. Pareto, *Cours d'économie politique* (Lausanne, 1896-1897), pp. 957-962, 994, 1008, 1012. In advanced countries the average income of the highest fifth of income receivers is about twelve times that of the lowest fifth. Kuznets, *Economic Growth and Structure*, p. 289.

135. Katona et al., *Aspirations and Affluence*, p. 14, also pp. 22-23, 196-200.

136. See Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), esp. pp. 89 ff., 151-152, 165, 235-241, 314-316, 337, 402, 718, 767-768.

137. Cf. Talcott Parsons, *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 15, 187-188.

138. See Parsons, *Structure*, pp. 686-694.

139. See note 9 above.

140. See, for example, Milton Friedman, "Monetary Policy," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 116 (June 1972):183-196.

141. See, for example, Katona et al., *Aspirations and Influence*, pp. 11-13, 41-73, 165-201.

142. On time cost, see S. B. Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), chaps. 1-3 on time and 4-5 on services. Complaint about the quality of life in the United States is reported in the Institute for Social Science *Newsletter* (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), spring 1972, p. 3.

143. See, for example, Georgescu-Roegen, *Entropy Law*, chap. 10.

144. For example, D. H. Meadows and associates, *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe Books, 1972). On limiting factors, see also Georgescu-Roegen, *Analytical Economics*, chap. 10; Bentley Glass, *The Timely and The Timeless* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 67-75.

145. See, for example, E. J. Mishan, *The Costs of Economic Growth* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

146. See L. J. Zimmerman, *Poor Lands, Rich Lands: The Widening Gap* (New York: Random House, 1965), chap. 2.

147. F. Y. Edgeworth suggested that some individuals have "greater capacity for happiness" than others. *Mathematical Psychics* (London: Kegan Paul, 1881), pp. 56-82.

148. It is now proposed to utilize drugs to induce "bliss" and do away with alienation. W. O. Evans, "Mind-Altering Drugs and the Future," *The Futurist* 5 (June 1971): 101-104.

149. Owen, "Demand for Leisure."

150. See, for example, Linder, *Harried Leisure Class*.

151. See, for example, A. J. Lotka, *Elements of Physical Biology* (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1925), chaps. 21-22. See also Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. 4, chap. 14.

152. M. Polanyi has noted that "our age overflows with inordinate moral aspirations." *Personal Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 142.

153. See, for example, Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 68. Cf. Socrates' observation in *Gorgias*, 502.

154. See my "Return to Thomas Hobbes?" *South Atlantic Quarterly* 68 (1969): 443-453. Cf. J. G. Gurley, "The Future of American Capitalism," *Economics and Business* 12 (1972): 7-18.

155. It is doubtful that Kipling, at the time he wrote his ominous "Recessional" in 1897, really anticipated advent of the sunset of Britain's empire within a half century. A prescient Henry Adams did not foresee 1939 and the final collapse of West European world hegemony.

156. R. M. MacIver and C. H. Page, *Society* (New York: Rinehart, 1949); R. M. MacIver, *Social Causation* (New York: Ginn, 1942).

## 4

### THE RESPECT REVOLUTION: FREEDOM AND EQUALITY

LEWIS M. KILLIAN

The themes of freedom and equality have been easy to discern in revolutions around the world for at least three centuries. These themes have had diverse referents. "Freedom" or "liberty" has meant liberation from feudal or monarchic despotism; from the rule of alien dynasties; from the despotism of economically powerful classes; and, more recently, from colonialism. It has signified freedom for nationalities, as in the case of the Poles and the Vietnamese; for ethnic, class, or sexual categories—black slaves, exploited workers, and oppressed women; and for individuals without regard to group identity, as the historic concept of "civil rights" implies. "Equality" has included among its referents equal participation in the political process; equitable treatment before the bar of justice; equal opportunity for access to education, work, medical services, public accommodations, and, broadly, to all the resources that make for material welfare. Freedom usually is weighted with political connotations, and equality, particularly since the elaboration of socialistic doctrines, with economic ones.

Liberty and equality are the best remembered, most often repeated parts of the great slogan of the French Revolution of 1789. The rallying cry in its totality was triadic, however: "Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité." The third term of this revolutionary formula may be taken to connote a social and psycho-

logical dimension that complements the political and economic ones. In the French Revolution itself the notion of "fraternity" was related to the concept of "the people," which, in turn, was integral to the novel, emerging spirit of nationalism. In conjunction with liberty and equality it implied not only the redistribution of political power and economic wealth but also a new source of pride, dignity, and respect: the "people-state," in which the "subject" became the "citizen."<sup>1</sup>

Thus even long-finished revolutions that may be viewed, in the broad sweep of history, as primarily political or economic had their social and psychological aspects. It is difficult to study the history of any revolution without concluding that, however much they might have emphasized their demands for political democracy or economic relief, the participants were also seeking *respect* for themselves and for the group in which they found their identity. In the revolutionary movements of the latter half of the twentieth century, the theme of respect has become the dominant one, in comparison with liberty and equality. It is inescapably evident that there is a spirit of revolution among the affluent, not just among the hungry. Yet even where revolutions are still closely related to economic deprivation, the theme of respect receives primacy in the ideology. Thus Adolf Gilly, an ideologist of revolutions in modern underdeveloped countries, declares, "The essence of revolution is not the struggle for bread, it is the struggle for human dignity."<sup>2</sup> The theme of respect, dignity, or pride plays a prominent part in both the rhetoric and the dynamics of such diverse movements as anticolonial movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; French Canadian nationalism; the Black Power movement ("Black is beautiful"); the defensive mobilization in the United States of ethnic groups that had seemed well along the road to assimilation; the rebellion of young people in what they often designate a "search for identity"; and the Women's Liberation movement.

Obviously this psychological dimension was present in revolutions of the past. It is equally evident that political power and economic welfare have not disappeared as important goals in modern revolutions. But the quest for identity and pride has achieved a new and greater importance in the motivation of

modern revolutionaries and in the ideologies through which they justify their movements. Furthermore, the rise to prominence of this theme has its roots in both the successes and the failures of earlier revolutions, which gave rise to such phenomena as representative government, the doctrine of human rights, individualism, nationalism, egalitarianism, monopoly capitalism, socialism, imperialism, and racialism. Finally, the meaning of dignity as a revolutionary motive has undergone significant transformation in a world in which nationalism is no longer the wave of the future, as it was in the eighteenth century, and is viewed by many thinkers as a legacy of the past.

### **REVOLUTIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE**

The concept *revolution* has been used loosely up to this point, encompassing a wide variety of social movements. Some are easily recognized, in retrospect, as political revolutions; others would be classified by various analysts as reform movements or even social trends. Political scientists and historians who focus on political rather than social history endeavor to trace the careers of revolutions as specific historical episodes that culminate in the creation of a new political system through illegal means. Many include violence as an essential ingredient of their definition. Scholars who attempt to identify the revolutions they study in terms of temporally delimited political struggles recognize, however, that far-reaching, fundamental changes in social structure, in the economic system, and in dominant values usually accompany revolutionary transfers of political power. Moreover, they are constantly plagued by the difficulty of specifying the time when a revolution begins. Often the people who are making a revolution are not aware of what they are about, at least until their movement reaches the stage of irreconcilable confrontation with the established government. Just when any specific revolution "began" is always an elusive question.

Since specific revolutions are so often like the highly visible centers of vast social storms that are long in forming and extensive in their consequences, it is not surprising that "revolution" continues to be used to characterize profound but broad and sweeping social trends. This usage, while violating the criteria by which political revolutions are defined, is congenial to many

social scientists and social historians. The Industrial Revolution is as well established in the conventions of historical analysis as are such political events as the French, American, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. The Cuban, Egyptian, and Algerian revolutions are modern instances of political revolutions but, in 1964, "a meeting of 32 noted social critics produced a policy statement entitled 'The Triple Revolution' . . . to call attention to changes in our society which were so revolutionary in magnitude that the society's current response to them was proving totally inadequate."<sup>3</sup> The composers of this statement identified three contemporary revolutions, in warfare, cybernation, and human rights. These technological, economic, legal, and value changes obviously are related to the social problems, the social discontent, and the social unrest that manifest themselves in multifarious ways not only in the United States but around the world. Comparable changes during earlier eras have been the soil out of which new human aspirations, collective strivings, and demands for structural changes in societies have grown. It seems that social changes that are collectively defined as generating social problems and social unrest are likely to be characterized by the term "revolution."

The concept of *social unrest* as elaborated by Herbert Blumer offers a means for reconciling the inconsistency between divergent uses of the concept "revolutionary," and between "revolutions" and "revolution." Blumer proposes that social unrest "signifies a rejection of the authoritative character of some portion of the social order and hence a reaching out for a new social arrangement."<sup>4</sup> Its primary significance lies in the fact that "it is a process by which people redefine or recast their world and so prepare themselves to act toward the world." He observes, "In the intricate interplay of factors in the formation of social unrest people come to revise the way in which they see given social objects and values, social practices, institutional arrangements, systems of authority, authoritative figures, and the social order itself. Parallel to such redefinitions people form new conceptions of themselves."<sup>5</sup>

Blumer argues that social unrest may eventuate in any of five lines of resolution: (1) an accommodated acceptance of established social arrangements; (2) a flight from these arrangements; (3) the creation of a transcendental world of belief that

overshadows the existing order; (4) a resort to a life of hedonistic satisfaction within this order; or (5) collective and aggressive protest against established social relations.<sup>6</sup> Obviously, political revolutions constitute a subtype of only the last of these "lines of resolution." Hence, while specific, political revolutions may grow out of antecedent periods of social unrest, revolution as a condition analogous to social unrest is far more frequent and widespread than are revolutions as forms of resolution. The content and form of social unrest in a given society during a particular era do not dictate that it will eventuate in collective, aggressive protest, but this is always a possibility. To the extent that the definitions developed through social unrest in different societies are similar, some conclusions about the "spirit of revolution" in a given era may be derived despite differences in the lines of resolution. In short, we are not forced to await the verdict of history that a political revolution did occur before identifying the social-psychological beginnings that might lead to such a denouement. Ideas may be revolutionary without leading to revolutions. In both accomplished revolutions and in early stirrings of unrest, the way in which people are recasting their image of the world and their relationship to it may be discerned. Analysis of the themes of political revolutions that confront the governments of some nation-states may sensitize us to potentially revolutionary themes in other societies in which the threat of revolution appears remote.

### **THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT**

The Age of Enlightenment was also an Age of Revolution. The philosophical abstractions of Hume, Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, Jefferson, and Paine were translated, however imperfectly, into action in the French and American revolutions. During the eighteenth century, even before modern developments in rapid communication, ideas flowed back and forth across continental frontiers, the English Channel, and the broad Atlantic Ocean. In the next century the spirit of nationalism helped inspire a virtual epidemic of revolutions in Europe and Latin America. In the twentieth century the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and, later, Mao, Che Guevara, and Frantz Fanon have been quoted by revolutionaries around the world. Although in ancient and medieval times movements that might be identified as revolutions



may have been isolated from each other both geographically and ideologically, developments in science and technology brought an end to this isolation of revolutions. As early as the eighteenth century, diverse revolutions began to be marked by a kindred revolutionary spirit. The extent to which the world of the discontented has been made yet smaller is epitomized by the fact that the works of an otherwise obscure black psychiatrist and Algerian revolutionist, Frantz Fanon, translated from the French, have become "must" reading for poor blacks in the inner cities of the United States.<sup>7</sup> In the age of television, not only battles between national armies but the violence of revolutionary commandos and urban insurrectionists may be brought into the living rooms of millions of people.

If indeed there is a revolutionary spirit that is reflected in both political revolutions and social unrest in the waning years of the twentieth century, it is the aspiration for respect. As has been suggested above, this social-psychological dimension of liberty and freedom was coupled with the political and economic dimensions in earlier revolutions. It is a new revolutionary spirit, however, insofar as it has come to overshadow the political and economic dimensions both as one of the causes of social unrest and as a justification for collective protest.

It must be emphasized that what is being identified here as the revolutionary "spirit" or "theme" is not to be taken as signifying the *cause* of revolution. Social discontent, social unrest, and collective protest reflect dissatisfaction with many features of the existing social order. Revolutionary manifestos usually include a catalogue of specific grievances. The overreaching theme of the movement constitutes a collective definition of the nature of the general problem. It denotes a conception of the character of the opposition as distinguished from its specific misdeeds. It also implies, however vaguely, the nature of the solution. The revolutionary spirit is typically expressed in slogans, which are not only shouted by rioters in the streets but are also manipulated by intellectuals as they construct the ideology of the movement.

The revolutionary spirit, not springing directly and automatically from specific grievances but emerging in a process of communication, is susceptible to communications from other social situations that may appear quite discrete and even dissimilar.

That the specific forms of oppression may not be identical is of little consequence to discontented people in different societies; they are still able to define the general nature of the oppressive forces in the same way. Thus the revolutionary spirit of a given era may be widely diffused in the form of slogans or overarching modes of analysis, as in the characterization of the plight of blacks in both Africa and the United States as consequences of "colonization."

### ***POLITICAL LIBERTY, ECONOMIC WELFARE, AND RESPECT IN PAST REVOLUTIONS***

The great, classical revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English, American, and French, are variously classified as "political," "democratic," "republican," and "bourgeois" revolutions. The central question each posed was, Who shall govern? They created models for popular government that, despite their obvious imperfections, have been praised by their inheritors and emulated by revolutionary movements in other lands, despite obvious dissimilarities in their situations. The French Revolution, in particular, symbolized the wedding of ideas of democracy with the spirit of nationalism in the concept of the people-state.

Economic historians, in attempting to sustain their thesis that the search for material welfare underlies all historical upheavals, have reminded us of numerous forms of economic deprivation existing prior to these revolutions. To demonstrate the existence of poverty, exploitation, and concentration of wealth in certain classes in any prerevolutionary period poses no great challenge. Yet it is recognized that the classic revolutions of Europe and America were bourgeois revolutions. It was in analyzing the background of the French Revolution that de Tocqueville advanced one of the first formulations of what has become familiar as "relative deprivation" and "the revolution of rising expectations." His observation that "the Revolution, though sponsored by the most civilized classes of the nation, was carried out by its least educated and most unruly elements" adumbrated another important generalization about social movements.<sup>8</sup> The fact that the most depressed classes may be vitally involved does not signify that they are the population segments most likely to initiate revolutions, or that their very real depri-

vation is somehow the true cause of revolutions. Nor did the success of these revolutionary movements benefit the lower economic classes nearly so much as it did the more affluent segments who not only had found reasons for discontent but also had felt strong enough to challenge the holders of political power.

Despite the diversity of the social, economic, and political strains that may have predisposed individuals of different classes to join in collective protest against old regimes, the slogans "liberty" and "equality" were rallying cries for all of them, and these slogans had very clear political referents. Regardless of their specific grievances—social, political, or economic—an overriding feature of life for the vast majority of people in western Europe in the eighteenth century was the feeling that they had no control over the governmental processes that determined their fate. Where vestiges of clerical power survived, the clergy appeared unresponsive to popular influence, torn in their allegiance only by the struggle between pope and king. To the extent that the nobility retained a share of power, their possession of it was validated by heredity. De Tocqueville said of pre-revolutionary France, "The nobility had deliberately cut itself off both from the middle class and from the peasantry . . . and had thus become like a foreign body in the State."<sup>9</sup> Where monarchy had become absolute, royal despots, benign or not, were separated from the people by the doctrine that they derived their power from God and not at all from their subjects. By their own definition they were alien to the people, not part of them. In many cases, royal dynasties were alien in a more literal sense: they were foreigners in parts of their own domains. Revolutionaries in France denounced Marie Antoinette as "the Austrian woman"; American rebels ascribed unwarranted significance to the fact that George III was "German."

The revolutionary spirit of political democracy came to be joined with another new theme—nationalism. Rupert Emerson had said of the emergence of the people-state, "The French Revolution presented the challenge . . . of a state which was no longer the king but the people, and thrust across the face of Europe the power of a nation in Arms."<sup>10</sup> After Napoleon's imperial dream was shattered, nationalism survived as a legacy of the French Revolution and continued as a theme of revolutions throughout the nineteenth century.

The revolutionary tradition that received collective definition in the English, American, and French revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries thus centered on two concepts that were predominantly political in tone: democracy, the right of the people to govern themselves, even if through a constitutional monarchy or a republican government; and nationalism, the right of the people to collective self-determination of the nation-state that would constitute the political boundaries of their society. As late as the termination of World War I in the Treaty of Versailles, some of the peoples of Europe still were demanding the extension of the principle of self-determination to themselves, and Woodrow Wilson saw national self-determination as an integral part of his goal "to make the world safe for democracy."

The achievement of political liberty and equality freed "the people" from the oppression and superiority of "higher orders" that claimed legitimacy through heredity or divine sanction. The fraternity of the nation-state bound all, from king or president to commoner and manual laborer, into a political unit in which all were equal in basic civil rights. At the same time that governments became, however incompletely, more responsive to the will of the people, the sense of respect underwent a transformation. The notion of the "rights of man" carried with it a corollary, "the dignity of man." To be a citizen rather than a subject implied a new self-conception, a source of self-esteem, that could cut across differences in socioeconomic status. The power and the glory of the nation-state, now perceived as a natural and mystical union of the people, became a wellspring of pride for even the most lowly placed patriot.

But freedom and equality were not, it is evident, distributed uniformly among the people. Inequality and injustice have continued to exist after every revolution. Different orders, particularly the bourgeoisie, benefited unequally from the political revolutions; moreover, democracy and nationalism facilitated the rise of the middle class and the growth of industrial capitalism.

The Industrial Revolution gave rise to new social classes and set the stage for a new form of social conflict, capital versus labor. Modern socialism developed as an ideology in response to this peaceful, technological "revolution." It must not be for-

gotten, however, that the growth of nationalism was as much a feature of the nineteenth century as was the spread of political democracy and the development of industrial capitalism.

A second wave of European revolutions in 1848 still shared the political definition of freedom and equality formulated in the "classic revolutions." The work of political liberation remained far from complete even after these revolutions, but a new revolutionary spirit became the dominant tone. Economic oppression came to be seen as even more important than political tyranny as a barrier to freedom and equality. With the elaboration and spread of socialistic doctrines the economic connotations of freedom and equality surfaced.

What Engels and Marx observed in England was a state that was the most advanced of the new people-nations in political democracy and in industrial capitalism and yet was marked by inequality, particularly in the economic realm. The transfer of government from kings and nobles to the people, as the nation, had not ended oppression there or in countries that had experienced violent revolutions. Certainly the lower classes of nations that had experienced political revolutions sensed that, no matter what the degree of political success, none of them had ushered in the promised utopia. Inequality and oppression still existed, but Marx and his followers gave them a new name: exploitation. The "oppressors" no longer were identified as an alien group who set themselves apart from the people by the very way in which they claimed the right to rule. Instead, the exploiters were politically of the people but separated from them economically by ownership of property. Political democracy did not produce liberty and equality as long as it was combined with capitalism. The former leaders of the people in the battle against hereditary privilege now were the enemies of freedom, of economic equality, and of respect. Yet there was no single, universal trend from dominance of the political theme to that of the economic. The Russian Revolution of 1917, although led by self-proclaimed Marxists, was not truly Marxist in character. It was soldiers and peasants, not an industrial proletariat, who were the troops of the revolution, and they were, in the last analysis, revolting against hereditary privilege, not capitalism.

The significance of fraternity, as embodied in the nation-state, also was reshaped by the winds of socialist doctrine. Emer-

son notes that during the era of political revolutions, before 1848, "the national principle was itself a revolutionary one, intimately bound up with the democratic aspirations of the masses for whom the troublesome bourgeoisie appeared as self-appointed spokesman."<sup>11</sup> Now the economic interpretation of injustice cast nationalism in the role of an enemy of freedom and equality. Even the people-state, dominated by the capitalistic class, was an instrument of exploitation. The "fraternity" of the new revolutionary spirit was expressed in the slogan, "Workers of the world, unite!" Less than a century after the French Revolution seemed to usher in an age of nationalism, the internationalism of the working classes was proclaimed as the next objective in the world's quest for utopia.

The ideal of national self-determination continued to coexist with the revolutionary myths of socialism. To the Marxist ideologist, the bourgeois class was the obdurate defender of nationalism, as the state, under its control, had become the instrument of exploitation. The proletariat, victims of capitalism and its logical enemies, also proved unable to free themselves of the bonds of nationalism, even while they mouthed the slogans of international communism. The collapse of the Second International with the outbreak of World War I dashed the hopes of Marxist leaders that nationalism had lost its allure for the working class. History was to show that the nationalism born at the end of the nineteenth century would gain even greater vitality during the twentieth, despite both its bloody consequences and the challenge of new ideologies.

The clash of nations in arms in the First World War appeared to many observers as a sign that nationalism had become essentially a destructive and oppressive force. Although Wilson still sought to extend the democratizing effects of nationalism through the principle of self-determination, he dreamed of a new level of political unity, expressed in the idea of the League of Nations. The aggressive nationalism of Germany, Italy, and Japan, threatening the entire world during the second Great War, marked the failure of the League of Nations but did not destroy the dream of "one world." The horrors of that war, culminating in the dropping of the first atomic bomb by the nation that proclaimed itself the champion of democracy, lent greater strength to the conviction that unrestrained nationalism would lead to death, not to freedom and equality. The United



Nations nevertheless constituted a parliament of independent nations, and the superpowers that created it retained an iron grip on their national sovereignty through the veto. Yet this newest world organization, with its declaration of the universal rights of man, represented the second attempt during the twentieth century to usher in an age of internationalism. At the same time, the ideology of international socialism continued to offer its challenge to the value of nationalism despite the very obvious vitality of nationalistic sentiments in socialist societies. The conflict between Tito and Stalin and, later, the rivalry between the USSR and the People's Republic of China were clear indications that socialism in practice fell far short of the internationalism that its theory proclaimed.

Despite the reality of technological progress and the illusions of political and economic progress, the second half of the twentieth century has not appeared to be a period of peace and social order. Movements of protest continue to erupt in every quarter of the globe, emphasizing the old themes of liberation from political repression, relief from economic inequality, and the right to self-government. The theme of nationalism, rather than diminishing, appears in a revitalized form. Peace between nations is disrupted by "wars of national liberation," with the insurgents praising socialism and denouncing capitalist imperialism. The internal order of self-proclaimed democratic nations is threatened by movements that are labeled "nationalistic," black nationalism in the United States being the prototype. The concept of the Third World suggests a rejection, by peoples still striving for respect, of the internationalist dreams of both the communist powers and the "free world." The resurgence of ethnicity among the relatively affluent descendants of poor immigrants in the United States suggests that neither the dream of one world nor that of "one nation, indivisible" satisfactorily embodies the theme of fraternity. The politically oppressed and the economically deprived experience discontent that seems to have obvious sources. But today, as in the past, beyond liberty and affluence lies *respect*. The quest for respect is dominant in the revolutionary spirit of the modern era.

### **RESPECT AND ANTICOLONIALISM**

The revolutionary doctrines of democracy, nationalism, and then socialism were born in Europe. They were quickly carried



to other continents by European settlers, particularly to North America where the American Revolution preceded the French. With the aid of industrial capitalism the new nation-states were able to extend their power and influence to all the inhabited continents. The political revolutions spanning the period from the American to the Russian Revolution made anachronisms of emperors, but they did not bring an end to imperialism. National imperialism supplanted dynastic imperialism.

To the peoples of "the world beyond Europe" the onward march of nationalism, even that of the democratic nations, appeared in the dominant guise of colonialism. The armies, the missionaries, the investors, the administrators, the technicians, and the merchants of the imperialist nations invaded their lands and disrupted their distinctive, traditional patterns of existence. Even in cases where white European colonists achieved political emancipation in the name of democracy, the benefits of their revolutionary movements were not extended to the natives. Thus Pierre Van den Berghe characterizes not only the Republic of South Africa but also the United States, during most of its history, as "*Herrenvolk* democracies," parliamentary regimes "in which the exercise of power and suffrage is restricted, *de facto*, and often *de jure*, to the dominant group."<sup>12</sup> Naked political domination by aliens prevailed in the colonial possessions of the great powers. Although at Versailles the principle of self-determination was being extended to numerous European nationalities, the colonies of the defeated Germans and Turks were treated almost as spoils of war. Mandated territories under the League of Nations remained, *de facto*, in colonial bondage. Economic imperialism and "gunboat diplomacy" kept even nominally independent nations, such as China and Cuba, in a semicolonial status. The policy of white European and American governments toward these subordinate peoples was that while democracy would be good for them, they were not yet ready for self-government. Under even the most benevolent colonialism, government was of and for the people, but not *by* them.

Politically, colonialism, no matter what its form, still incorporated the hierarchical principle against which millions of white Europeans had rebelled. Individual civil liberties were modified to secure the safety and freedom of members of the colonial ruling class and to prevent the development of subver-

sive movements. Suffrage was nonexistent or was differentially extended to strata defined by the colonial government. The most ambitious effort to extend political democracy to colonized peoples was the French assimilationist policy of incorporating some of its colonies into metropolitan France and conferring equal rights of citizenship upon the colonists. Yet even then European and native colonists were elected to separate "colleges" in the Assembly, with different powers. Frantz Fanon wrote bitterly in 1959: "In the French National Assembly eighty Algerian deputies have seats. But today this serves no purpose."<sup>13</sup> Algeria ended as a model not of national assimilation but of successful anticolonialist revolt.

Even where nations appeared politically independent or where colonial powers attempted to combine democracy with imperialism, economic exploitation loomed as a barrier to equality. In the "banana republics" of Latin America and the European quarters of Asian cities the disparity between the wealth of the colonizers and the poverty of the masses of the colonized made inequality visible. In a world in which the nationalism and industrial capitalism of Europe and North America had extended far-reaching imperialist tentacles, a wide range of non-European peoples perceived themselves as sharing a common plight. The cry of the natives of the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, "Strangers, get out!" was part of a chorus that included the demands of citizens of supposedly independent nations in South America and the Caribbean, "Yanqui, go home!" Discontent linked to political domination, where it clearly existed, and to economic exploitation, was traced with growing conviction to yet a third factor that is inescapably linked with the theme of respect: race. As George Lensen expressed it:

In the 1940's and 1950's the people of the world beyond Europe found a common denominator in anticolonialism and, because colonialism had been predominantly Western, in anti-Westernism. Many Westerners would have slept less soundly had they been aware of the intensity with which the majority of mankind hated their white skin. The fact that discrimination was not peculiar to the West did not blot out the memory of personal and national humiliation suffered at the hands of white sahibs.<sup>14</sup>

While the political and economic tones remain strong in the chord that rallies modern people to movements of protest and revolution, the psychological note of respect has become dominant. The ideologists of anticolonialism continue to decry political oppression and economic exploitation. They make it clear, however, that no amount of freedom and equality, political and economic, can be sufficient without the eradication of psychological colonialism.

In lands in which national economic freedom requires dismantling the superstructure of Western capitalism, some form of socialism offers itself as the only feasible course. Marx remains an important prophet for their revolutionary leaders. But it is the spirit of the early Marx, who wrote of alienation as the laborer's loss of his sense of self through loss of control of his work, and of psychologists and philosophers concerned with the selfhood of the individual, that leavens the modern tradition of revolution more significantly than does the economic theory of *Capital*. The rise to prominence in the twentieth century of the varieties of psychoanalytic theory and of existentialist philosophy presaged the emergence of a new revolutionary spirit.

The appeal of the psychological dimension of this spirit is symbolized by the fact that a psychiatrist, Frantz Fanon, became in his short lifetime one of the foremost ideologists of the Third World. His book *The Wretched of the Earth* is characterized by its American publishers as "a manifesto for the Third World"; in 1972 it was listed by a black bookstore owner in Chicago in a "must" reading list for blacks in the United States. It is an analysis, against the background of the Algerian war of national liberation, of how colonized people must go about achieving decolonization, creating a nation, overcoming the pitfalls of the "neocolonialism" of the native bourgeoisie, and creating a national culture. The nation is to Fanon, the psychiatrist, not an end in itself, politically or economically. It and the struggle for its creation are the vehicle for the psychological redemption of oppressed individuals. He totally rejects Europe and condemns it for its crimes, "of which the most horrible was committed in the heart of man, and consisted of the pathological tearing apart of his functions and the crumbling away of his unity."<sup>15</sup> His analysis is self-consciously Marxist, but he goes beyond Marx because of the importance he sees in race. Thus he

declares, "In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. This is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem."<sup>16</sup> At the outset, he proclaims his concern with a goal that is more psychological than it is political or economic. Thus of decolonization he says, "At whatever level we study it . . . decolonization is quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men. Without any period of transition, there is a total, complete, and absolute substitution. It is true that we could equally well stress the rise of a new nation, the setting up of a new state, its diplomatic relations, and its economic and political trends."<sup>17</sup>

It is in Fanon's first book, *Black Skin, White Masks: The Experience of a Black Man in a White World*, that he states most directly his conception of what revolutionary wars of national liberation are, and should be, about. His theme, he says, is "the disalienation of the black man."<sup>18</sup> Disalienation, the achievement of respect, is not something that can be gained by the granting of freedom and equality, political and economic, by the oppressors, for the problem has become that the oppressed is his own oppressor. Fanon reflects the fact that the psychologists have joined the philosophes and the political economists in the academy of revolutionary philosophers when he writes:<sup>19</sup>

The analysis that I am undertaking is psychological. In spite of this it is apparent to me that the effective disalienation of the black man entails an immediate recognition of social and economic realities. If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process:

- primarily, economic:
- subsequently, the internalization—or better, the epidermalization—of this inferiority.

Earlier he says, "At the risk of arousing the resentment of my colored brothers, I will say that the black is not a man. . . . I propose nothing short of the liberation of the man of color from himself."<sup>20</sup>

In his prescription for how this liberation is to be achieved,

Fanon emphasizes two factors: violence and nationalism. His words on the functions of violence for the individual and for the emerging nation give a new and chilling connotation to the revolutionary themes of respect and fraternity. "At the level of individuals," he says, "violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect."<sup>21</sup> Of the effect of the violence of wars of national liberation on the collective level, he writes:

The mobilization of the masses, when it arises out of the war of liberation, introduces into each man's consciousness the ideas of a common cause, of a national destiny, and of a collective history. In the same way the second phase, that of the building-up of the nation, is helped on by the existence of this cement which has been mixed with blood and anger.<sup>22</sup>

Certainly violence is not new to revolutions, and it has been shown that in the classic political revolutions the idea of the nation has been closely linked with both fraternity and democracy. The violence of modern revolutions in the Third World still could be viewed as only incidental to the task of achieving freedom and equality, and colonial nationalism might be viewed as simply an extension of the spirit of nationalism to the world beyond Europe.

But the sort of analysis of revolutionary nationalism that Fanon presents, and the fact that colonialism has been so closely correlated with the intrusion of the white race and the imposition of Euro-American culture, both suggest that this new round of revolutions can be better understood if the focus is on the psychological dimension rather than on the political or economic. Rupert Emerson suggests:

To people emerging from imperial overlordship the major immediate contributions of nationalism are a sense of independent worth and self-respect and a new social solidarity to replace the traditional bonds. It is the sword and shield of those who are achieving independence. From being "natives" they rise to the honorable title of nationals. Through national self-assertion they achieve the spiritual satisfaction of demonstrating that they can make their own the forms on which the superior powers pride themselves.<sup>23</sup>

As Emerson is careful to point out, colonial nationalism does not reject the material welfare that Western culture offers, despite the fact that this nationalism is accompanied by the glorification of a real or mythical national heritage. As in earlier revolutions, the leaders in this new round have not come from the most depressed classes. Fanon did not live out his life as a pidgin-speaking black laborer in Martinique; he went to France as a young man to study medicine. His *Black Skin, White Masks* is to a large extent a cry of protest evoked by the discovery that in continental France, the homeland of which he was officially a citizen, he was not a Frenchman but a Negro.

In an earlier period the rising bourgeoisie in France and colonial America were distressed that they did not have political power. Where hereditary status was important, they also did not receive a full measure of respect. The desire to become citizens instead of subjects encompassed both of these sources of discontent. Today the subject who is also a "native" in the colonial situation experiences the lack of respect in a more acute way, particularly as he acquires the culture of the West. A large proportion of nationalist leaders in Asia and Africa received their advanced education in Europe or the United States, where they not only acquired Western skills but were exposed to the ideology of democracy and nationalism that is the residue of the classic revolutions. Emerson noted, "Having come to intimate acquaintance with the West, the nationalist leaders found peculiarly humiliating their rejection as equals by the Westerners who had taken over their countries."<sup>24</sup>

The Western nations also "exported revolution" in another significant way. In such initiatives as organizing and supporting guerrilla movements in countries occupied by the Germans and Japanese during World War II, the anti-Axis allies took some steps toward implementing the principle proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter of 1941: "The right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live." It should not be forgotten, for example, that the United States, under the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, supported Ho Chi Minh in his early struggles against both the Japanese and the French. The motives for these initiatives were mixed, including both genuine allegiance to Wilsonian principles and the desire to hasten the defeat of the Axis powers. Of even greater import is



that after the war some of these guerilla movements continued as insurgent revolutionary movements that eventually came to define their erstwhile sponsors as opponents. Despite the verbal trappings of Marxism and the fact that most modern revolutions propose to inaugurate some variety of socialism, the revolutionary outbreaks since World War II have been more nationalist than socialist. The communist dream of international socialism has been overshadowed by nationalist aspirations. The dream of one world symbolized by the United Nations must, at the least, be deferred until the nonwhite peoples of the world feel that they can sit in its councils with a dignity that is no longer dimmed by the shadow of white colonialism. The persistent struggle of Yugoslavia to maintain its national identity in the shadow of Russian power, and the abortive revolts of the Hungarians and the Czechs, show that even in countries where socialism has been accepted the striving for respect as nations continues. The North Vietnamese leaders of their war of national liberation have consistently emphasized their intention to remain independent of both their Chinese and Russian supporters, even though they regard the white capitalist power, first of France, then of the United States, as the principal affront to their dignity. In the modern revolutionary era respect is tied even more closely to psychological identity than it is to political freedom or economic equality. Fraternity, as a source of collective pride and individual respect, stands today more than ever before as a significant element of the triadic slogan "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity."

### ***THE RESPECT REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES***

The insurgent nationalism of peoples striving to overcome the heritage of colonialism has been analyzed as a symbol of the importance of respect in the modern spirit of revolution. Even in some newly created nations, the quest for respect as nationals must compete with other group loyalties, which often give rise to even newer nationalist movements. R. L. Sklar has observed, "Tribalism is the red devil of contemporary Africa."<sup>25</sup> Ironically, he then proceeded to argue that the assumption was questionable. His article, published in 1966, was entitled "The Contribution of Tribalism to Nationalism in Western Nigeria."



Only a few years later the tribal and religious loyalties of the Ibo peoples almost destroyed the new nation of Nigeria. The Bengali Muslims united with their co-religionists in the western portion of British India to create an independent Pakistan, but two decades later their own tribal loyalties and pride resulted in revolution and the creation of Bangladesh.

Movements of collective protest that reflect the spirit of the respect revolution are not confined, however, to the natives of areas emerging from colonial domination and seeking to achieve national independence, unity, and pride. Indeed, the term *tribalism* recently has come to be applied to divisive trends in societies in which democracy and nationhood appeared to have been firmly established and deeply cherished. Thus an editorial in the *New York Times* of 26 November 1972 lamented, "The fall of Premier Gaston Eyskens's Belgian Government after ten months in office provides another grim reminder that tribalism and ethnic fragmentation are in ascendancy in nearly every section of our world. It was the old feud between Flemings and Walloons that upended Mr. Eyskens as it had so many of his predecessors."<sup>26</sup> A few weeks earlier the veteran black civil rights leader Bayard Rustin had deplored the Black Power movement in these words: "By drawing a shell of race sensitivity around blacks, black power has infected the rest of society with what might be described as a 'new tribalism'."<sup>27</sup> Harold Isaacs has characterized the return to intraethnic solidarity as "the retribalization of American society."<sup>28</sup>

A kinship between the open insurgency of the natives of many developing societies and the social movements of some population segments in affluent, developed nations is suggested also by the frequent reference to these movements as "nationalistic." Black and Chicano nationalism in the United States, French-Canadian nationalism, and Croatian nationalism in Yugoslavia all denote tendencies toward differentiation, pluralism, or even separatism rather than strivings toward integration within the bonds of the nation. In the United States pluralistic goals are competing with assimilationist goals in the minds of racial and ethnic groups with a vigor that threatens the ideal of "one nation, indivisible." The sons and daughters of people who desperately wanted to be viewed as "Negro-Americans" now demand that they be called "Black Americans," "Afro-

Americans," or even simply "Blacks." The grandchildren of immigrants who wished to divest themselves of the stigma of being "hyphenated Americans" are beginning to place a new emphasis on their Italian, Polish, Jewish, or Mexican heritage.

In the case of black, Indian, and Mexican Americans, there is enough evidence of persistent political and economic inequality to suggest that political and economic goals would suffice to explain their continuing protest. Even then, there is so much evidence of progress that many analysts feel compelled to fall back on the concepts of "relative deprivation" and "the revolution of rising expectations" to explain the vigor of collective protest among these groups. Harder to account for is the fact that the ideology of the black protest movement has shifted so markedly away from integration as a goal. Even more perplexing is the resurgence of emphasis on ethnic identity among more affluent and powerful white groups. It may be postulated that it is the nature of the nationalism that grew out of the American Revolution that produced conditions conducive to the current trend toward pluralism. The manner in which the ideal of democracy was implemented in practice, and those changes that are vaguely subsumed under the notion of "mass society," have combined with the nationalism of 1776 to produce what Orin Klapp has called "the incredible rebellion."<sup>29</sup> Klapp includes in this rebellion not only protests of "the economic and political have-nots" but the "hippie rebellion" and movements of the radical right, rooted in the middle classes. Why does the beacon light of equal, "first-class" citizenship, defined by the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments to the Constitution, shine less brightly than it once did for so many Americans?

### ***THE MAKING OF THE "AMERICAN"***

The Revolution of 1776 started out as a movement of the diverse inhabitants of thirteen separate English colonies to gain rights that certain of them claimed as British subjects. It was transformed into a war to create a new nation. It culminated in the formation of a politically unified republic with a constitution that codified the ideas of democracy derived from the philosophy of the Enlightenment.

Like other colonial revolutions, this one created not only a nation but the idea of a new type of being, the "American."

Although in prerevolutionary times the term "American" may have differentiated the colonial Englishman from his fellow citizen in the homelands, the inhabitants of the colonies were not all Englishmen. They were a diverse lot differentiated by varieties of European culture, by religion, by language, and, in the case of the Africans and Indians, by race. The dominant group, politically and economically, however, was comprised of people who considered themselves "British." A little-known aspect of this early American pluralism is described in Glenn Weaver's account of the long controversy of Benjamin Franklin with the Pennsylvania Germans.<sup>30</sup> The great patriot mistrusted both the business ethics and the political loyalty of these peaceable settlers, who were inclined more toward the pacificism of the Quakers than to the aggressive expansionism of the English-speaking farmers and merchants who were in constant conflict with the Indians and the French. Franklin not only saw the Germans as a political bloc with interests inimical to those of the English colonists, but also bitterly disparaged their non-English ways.

The outbreak of conflict with the British army created a new axis of identity. The British became the enemy, and the English loyalists were despised as Tories. Those inhabitants of the colonies who supported the Revolution were transformed into "patriots" and "Americans" whatever their origin. Thus Weaver observes:

During the eighty-four years of Franklin's lifetime the Pennsylvania Germans had undergone a long process which had made "Americans" of them. From a timid, misunderstood, and misunderstanding national minority they had become accepted by English-speaking Americans, and although they succeeded in preserving much of what was good in their own culture, they came to accept the dominance of the English element in what is "American." The Germans and Franklin, in the course of long association, had come to stand on the common ground of American nationality.<sup>31</sup>

This common ground, for all its promises of freedom and equality for men of all conditions save slaves and Indians, nevertheless had firm roots in English culture. At the time of the very birth of the nation there emerged the theme of assimilation that Milton Gordon has called "Anglo-conformity." Gordon says of

the founding fathers: "There is no reason to suppose that they looked upon the fledgling country as an impartial melting pot for the merging of the various cultures of Europe or as a new 'nation of nations,' or as anything but a society in which, with important political modifications, Anglo-Saxon speech and institutional forms would be standard."<sup>32</sup>

And standard they became, notwithstanding their modification through years of separation from "Mother England" and the infusion of successive waves of non-English immigrants into the population. One of the important implications of democracy throughout the history of the United States has been that every individual citizen should enjoy the opportunity to become as free and as equal as any other American, but at the price of giving up any obtrusively "un-American" values and ways, no matter how prized. As Gordon noted, acculturation has been a two-way process to a significant extent only in the area of religion, and then only in respect to the three principal faiths brought from Europe.<sup>33</sup> For members of the colored races, Americanization has been a chimerical goal and an unreasonable demand, for the unspoken modifier of the label "American" is "white." Traditionally, differences from the ideal of the white, culturally Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish American have been sources of embarrassment or even shame, not of pride. The respect revolution in the modern United States is, in part, a reaction to Anglo-conformity.

During the tumultuous decade of the 1960s the "incredible rebellion" included among its targets not merely the so-called WASP but the "middle-class white American." Values characterized as middle-class were denounced not only by many blacks but by white college students from middle-class families. Yet for an ever-increasing proportion of the population to see themselves as comfortably ensconced in an almost universal middle-class would seem to represent the fulfillment of the promise of equality contained in the concept of a democratic, "open-class" society. The notion of the allocation of civil and political rights on the basis of social class is as repugnant to the professed ideals of American democracy as is their allocation on the basis of race, religion, or national origin. Why, then, should encouragement to move upward in class status be perceived as an oppressive demand rather than as a valuable opportunity?

The perceptive analysis by T. H. Marshall of citizenship and social class in Britain serves well to explain this anomaly.<sup>34</sup> As their English cousins were to do by successive acts of reform over a period of two centuries, the founders of the American republic sought through the Constitution to abolish the vestiges of a class system based on a hierarchy of hereditary status. As Marshall contends, citizenship as "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community" undermined the inequality of the medieval class system.<sup>35</sup>

Marshall saw citizenship as evolving over three centuries in the Anglo-Saxon world. At the forefront of development in the eighteenth century were civil rights, involving the freedom of the citizen; in the nineteenth, political rights to equal participation in government; and in the twentieth, social rights, aimed at the abatement of economic inequality and its social concomitants. Achievement of social rights might even involve the abridgement of traditional "freedoms," as laws restricting the powers of employers and of the freedom of the *individual* worker to contract for his labor outside the framework of collective bargaining made evident. By the dawn of the twentieth century the realities of inequality in politically democratic societies had made evident the ultimate contradiction between freedom and equality as absolutes, long pointed out by philosophers.

Marshall expressed this contradiction in saying, "In the twentieth century, citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war."<sup>36</sup> This was a second type of class, different from the medieval or feudal type. "Class differences are not established and defined by the laws and customs of society . . . but emerge from the interplay of a variety of factors related to the institutions of property and education and the structure of the national economy."<sup>37</sup>

Implementation of the spirit of social rights, primarily through the economic nexus, did not eradicate class inequality although it alleviated its harshest material consequences. It reduced the proportion of the population who experienced abject poverty, unrelieved by systematic public aid. In raising the wage levels of those workers protected by union power or minimum wage laws, it made upward mobility a continuing reality for millions of workers and their children. At the same time, the technology of mass production brought a vastly increased range

of products into the reach of people no longer forced to display the uniforms of low status at all times. Under this type of class system, Marshall says:

Class cultures dwindle to a minimum, so that it becomes possible, though admittedly not wholly satisfactory, to measure the different levels of economic welfare by reference to a common standard of living. The working classes, instead of inheriting a distinctive though simple culture, are provided with a cheap and shoddy imitation of a civilization that has become national.<sup>38</sup>

Thorstein Veblen foresaw the effects of this ideal of an equally accessible, national culture, with its emphasis on individual mobility, in his concept of "conspicuous consumption." Even in a theoretically egalitarian society, material possessions not only served an economic, welfare function but also possessed a psychic significance. The sociologist Michael Lewis has described a further consequence of the growing importance of this psychic function: the development of the "status-market." This, he says, "is a device that caters to widespread aspirations for individual mobility by literally *selling* the illusion of personal success without regard to the quality of actual individual achievements."<sup>39</sup>

Here was not only a new structure of opportunity but also a new demand for conformity. For nearly two centuries in the United States, the seemingly endless reaches of the frontier and the constant expansion of commercial and industrial capitalism lent luster to opportunity and softened the harshness of the demand for upward mobility. Even the early ethnic groups—Germans, Scotch-Irish, French Huguenots, and others—found ethnic as well as class assimilation made easier by the reality of opportunity in the young nation, and many disappeared into an undifferentiated category of (white) "old Americans" that spanned the whole class structure. That their gains were often paid for with the labor and the blood of Indians, blacks, Mexicans, and Chinese was glossed over or justified in the name of "national progress." After the Civil War the growth of industry and the cities made "the immigrant experience" of new white ethnic groups amenable to interpretation as proof of the genuine "openness" of American society.

The pressure for upward class mobility differed from that for Anglo-conformity, for its weight was felt not only by the ethnic



and racial minorities but also by those Americans who fit, by ascription or achievement, into the white dominant group. In some respects it bore even more heavily on them. Popular racism might offer a ready explanation of the failure of blacks or Mexicans to move up in the de facto class system that existed in America despite the rhetoric of egalitarianism and the absence of an institutionalized class system. Even after the spread of scientific theories of racial equality in intellectual circles, white liberals could find an explanation for racial inequality that did not challenge the premise that the nation was essentially egalitarian. This was the emphasis on the prejudice and discrimination of individual bigots, particularly those concentrated in the South, as the prime cause of the various forms of deprivation suffered by blacks.

Such explanations were not so easily accepted in the case of the nonachieving white, particularly after so many white ethnic groups seemed to climb out of their early minority status, proving that even the despised greenhorn could succeed in America if he worked hard. Neither racial inferiority nor race prejudice served to explain the poverty of the white person who failed to be upwardly mobile in a society that offered opportunity for all. Some personal, moral defect must account for his "failure," for his uncouth culture and his poverty. This attitude was adumbrated in the widely felt contempt for "po' white trash" in the antebellum South, which unabashedly denied freedom and equality to blacks while claiming that slavery created even greater opportunities for whites. It was found to be still strong in a southern community long after slavery had been abolished. Davis and Gardner, in *Deep South*, found the "lower-lower" class of whites characterized as "shiftless," "immoral," and "no-count" even by "upper-lower-class" whites who felt that they themselves, even though poor, were still "striving."<sup>40</sup> Lewis concludes that, even in an affluent America committed, since 1932, to the philosophy of the welfare state, the stigmatization of poverty continues as an "unapplauded" consequence of the credo of egalitarianism combined with the fact of inequality. He observes:

We interpret the indicators of poverty in terms of our assumptions about opportunity and just reward; and we therefore conclude that



these indicators mean that the poor are poor because of their ineptness, their laziness, and their general lack of moral fiber.<sup>41</sup>

Thus, in view of the pressure for middle-class conformity and upward mobility, one of the most remarkable aspects of the "incredible rebellion" is the rejection by such a wide variety of discontented Americans of the symbols of "middle America." It is not just that many blacks have stopped straightening their hair and have started to defend as virtues what were traditionally viewed as the pathological traits of lower-class black culture: "street language," soul food, bizarre dress styles, and even the one-parent family. Even a short tour of an Ivy-league campus confronts the visitor with hundreds of white youth who, regardless of background, seem to have adopted both the dress of the poor and the language of the tavern brawler. The professed "career" plans of many emphasize their wish to avoid the very routes to "success" that their parents fought to follow. The traditional values of Americans who have prided themselves not only on the symbols of their success but on their moral respectability repeatedly are affronted by Americans asserting their right to be different rather than their desire to conform to these values. This is, in essence, a new version of the quest for respect.

### **THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BLACK REVOLUTION**

This new revolutionary spirit is manifest in diverse movements and obviously has multifarious roots. Ralph H. Turner has proposed that the unifying theme in current conceptions of injustice is "violent indignation . . . over the fact that people lack a sense of personal worth—that they lack an inner peace of mind which comes from a sense of personal dignity or a clear sense of identity."<sup>42</sup> This is, obviously, another statement of the theme of respect. He finds the new views this theme expresses most fully embodied in the doctrines propounded by the youthful constituents of the New Left. Prior to, and strongly influencing, the New Left, however, were the tumultuous events of what has come to be identified as "The Negro Revolt" or "The Black Revolution." Blacks have suffered deprivation in the areas of political freedom, economic equality, and respect longer and more severely than has any other segment of the American population. The "race problem" has been the most visible and per-

sistent domestic issue throughout the life of the republic. It may be postulated that the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s was the catalyst that stirred up and shaped the new sense of injustice as experienced by many other groups. Most important, in the career of the black protest movement, from victory in the school desegregation decision of 1954 through the civil rights phase to the present phase of black nationalism, may be clearly seen the interaction of the political, the economic, and the psychological aspects of freedom and equality.

The overthrow of the judicial principle of "separate but equal," with the accompanying denunciation by the Supreme Court of the injurious effects of segregation by race on "the hearts and minds" of black children, appears on superficial examination to address itself primarily and directly to the issue of respect. In actuality, the spirit in which the crucial cases were brought by the NAACP and the justifications used by the Court in its decisions bore a much closer relationship to the older concepts of individual civil liberties and equal opportunity than to the new theme of respect or dignity. Removal of the stigma of segregation was an instrument for maximizing these rights rather than an end in itself. The right that was affirmed was the right to equal educational opportunity unimpeded by differences in race, not the right to equal respect regardless of racial identity. The central question before the Court was, in its words, "Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?"<sup>43</sup>

In framing their answer (that "to separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone") the justices relied heavily on social science evidence demonstrating this psychological damage.<sup>44</sup> Denying the conclusion of an earlier Court, in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, that laws requiring separation of the races "do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other," the Supreme Court of 1954 said, in effect, that to remind a person of his blackness was, in the United States, to make him feel inferior. It was to this implication that black nationalists later were to take excep-

tion, contending that it is *who* raises the question of race, and to what end, that is crucial rather than the fact of separation itself.

The famous *Brown* decision of 1954 also reflected the philosophy of opportunity for individual social mobility in the discussion of the importance of public education as a right of citizenship in the political community. After having reviewed the rather insignificant status of public education at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Warren declared, "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments."<sup>45</sup> He went on to say, "In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."<sup>46</sup> If, as has been argued above, "success" in the American tradition actually meant Anglo-conformity, then a question remained as to whether even unsegregated, equal education could offer a route to success for the black child so long as blackness was not accorded respect. This was another question that black nationalists were to raise as they rejected the goal of integration during the next decade.

There is a significant contrast between the liberal-humanitarian overtones of the Court's decision in 1954 and the direct consideration of the question of respect in the famous dissent of Justice Harlan in the case of *Plessy v. Ferguson*, in 1896.<sup>47</sup> It is important to remember that this case did not directly concern the opportunity of children to acquire the prerequisites for upward mobility in a white-dominated society. The issue in question, segregation in public transportation, might seem almost trivial in comparison with the value of education in a technological society. Yet, as Harlan perceived quite clearly at a time soon after the institution of slavery had been declared illegal, an issue more basic than the opportunity to *prove* one's personal worth was at stake. He recognized the social-psychological implications of the segregation law that the majority of the Court voted to uphold. So, without discussion of the intrinsic importance of public transportation and without recourse to social science evidence, he went to the heart of the issue of respect:

The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent

the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution.<sup>48</sup>

Elsewhere he said:

What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens?<sup>49</sup>

Thus Harlan enunciated, far in advance of his times, the principle that freedom and equality included the right not to be humiliated in a society supposedly dedicated to the principle that "there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens."<sup>50</sup>

While insisting that the Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution did, quite literally, make the Constitution color-blind and remove the basis for legal distinctions based on race, this amazingly prescient jurist was not blind to the realities of the American system of class and caste. While he denied the power of the government to stamp a badge of inferiority on any class of persons, he bluntly described the inferiority of blacks in what remained a white society despite the extension of full citizenship to them. So he declared:

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.<sup>51</sup>

This remarkable and seemingly inconsistent statement suggests that although Harlan acted as a "strict constructionist" in dissenting from the majority, he did not believe that the law could ever give blacks a full measure of equality and respect. Even though the Constitution might guarantee the free and equal enjoyment of civil rights by blacks, and though it could not be used to humiliate them, it could not confer prestige or power on them.

The *Brown* decision of almost a century later, with its emphasis on education as a primary and essential qualification for so-

cial mobility, implied an assumption that the law could be instrumental in doing just this. Many blacks and their white liberal allies perceived this ruling as opening the way to Anglo-conformity and assimilation to a color-blind "middle America" through the removal of the barrier of racial segregation. With this handicap removed, thousands of blacks would rise to the level of their individual abilities and aspirations, becoming like middle- or upper-class white Americans in all but the physically identifying marks of race. These, supposedly, would come to be regarded as inconsequential, if not totally ignored, by both whites and blacks. "Blackness" as a personal characteristic would become only an unpleasant historical memento of the shameful years of slavery and then of segregation. "Nonwhite" Americans henceforth would be freed from the prison of color.

A modern black American revolutionary, James Boggs, has succinctly characterized this spirit in which the "integrationist" interpretation of the Constitution was initially acclaimed as revolutionary but subsequently reevaluated by the ideologists of Black Power:

Sometimes a revolution starts because the people believe that the country in its present form can do more for them than it is already doing. So they go out and ask for these things which they call their rights under the system. If they get these rights and don't press for more, then the country has made a social reform. But if they don't get what they believe are their rights and they continue to fight for them, they begin to make a revolution.

In the United States, following the Supreme Court decision of 1954, the Negro proceeded to do just this. They began demanding the rights which they felt the country had admitted were theirs and which many Negroes felt could easily be granted under the Constitution. But in the period since 1954, Negroes have found that every institution in the country, from the Constitution on down, cannot guarantee or give them the rights they are entitled to. . . . The myth that American democracy protects the rights of Negroes has been exploded.<sup>52</sup>

Despite evidence from public opinion polls that the majority of black Americans still respond favorably to the symbol "integration"; despite the continued emphasis of the NAACP on

the implementation of desegregation laws; despite denunciations of what they perceive as "black racism" by Negro leaders such as Bayard Rustin, A. Philip Randolph, and Kenneth Clark, the emergence of the Black Power movement is an historical reality. Activists whose behavior reflects their spirit have, since 1964, precipitated most of the confrontations that have shaped the public image of the racial crisis. Its ideologists, appearing first as brash challengers to the immensely popular Martin Luther King, Jr., succeeded in putting the defenders of integration as the paramount goal on the defensive. Its slogans—"Black Power," "Black is beautiful," and "What time is it? Nation time!"—drowned out the loving, harmonious refrain, "Black and white together, we shall overcome!"

The story of the rise of the Black Power movement has been told many times. Briefly, three factors contributed to the disillusionment of an indeterminate number of blacks, including some of the most dedicated young civil rights workers, with the strategy of interracial cooperation. First, even with the law on the side of blacks and against segregation, white resistance to change proved more adamant and pervasive than liberal optimism had predicted. Massive resistance emerged in the South. Blacks perceived the efforts of the federal government to overcome this resistance as halting and half-hearted. When the civil rights struggle moved into the North with an attack on de facto segregation in schools, housing, and employment, white resistance appeared. As during the period following the end of Reconstruction in 1876, blacks again questioned the depth of the commitment of white Americans to the ideals of democracy when the color line seemed threatened. Not moral suasion, not appeals to a legal structure that was controlled by whites, but the development of *power* to demand change gained favor as the requisite for achieving freedom and equality.

Second, as the legal barriers to black progress were partially and imperfectly stripped away, the extent to which the white dominance that Justice Harlan had described so frankly was based on the structure of the economy became evident. The unemployment and underemployment that oppressed the residents of the burgeoning "black ghettos" of the North and West caused a shift in attention from the segregation laws of the South to the nationwide pattern of subtle, institutionalized discrimination. The conflict between political democracy and capi-



talism, so well analyzed by T. H. Marshall, was emphasized by an increasing number of black ideologists as more important than the contradiction between the "general valuations" reflected in the Declaration of Independence and the "specific valuation" underlying white supremacy that Myrdal had described as "An American Dilemma."<sup>53</sup> Whether blacks could hope to move up even in a politically democratic American system came under question. One black writer, Robert L. Allen, expressed this doubt.

The argument for democratization of the American social system assumes that there is still room in the political economy for black people. But this overlooks, for instance, the fact that black unemployment normally is double the rate for whites, and in some categories it runs at several times the white jobless rate. The jobs which black workers do hold are largely the unskilled and semiskilled jobs which are hardest hit by automation. Government-sponsored retraining schemes are at best stopgap measures of limited value. . . . Integration thus fails, not because of bad intentions or even a failure of will, but because the social structure simply cannot accommodate those at the bottom of the economic ladder. Some individuals are allowed to climb out of deprivation, but black people as a whole face the prospect of continued enforced impoverishment.<sup>54</sup>

Drawing on the analogy of the plight of colonized peoples of Africa and Asia, Allen declared that black America is being transformed into a neocolonial people, which he characterized as follows:

Under neocolonialism an emerging country is granted formal political independence but in fact it remains a victim of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, or military means. Economic domination usually is the most important factor, and from it flow in a logical sequence other forms of control.<sup>55</sup>

From this mode of analysis it is clear that the welfare implications of freedom and equality remain strong in the new ideology of black nationalism. The economic distress that the black population experiences so disproportionately even after numerous federal court decisions and two major civil rights laws, those of 1964 and 1965, has led to a muting of the political strains in their demand for liberty and equality.

Of greatest interest here is the third factor contributing to the

diminishing appeal of integration as a goal. This is the attitude expressed in the notion of black nationalism and the revival of the concept of pluralism among black spokesmen. The pluralism of which they speak ranges from a voluntary and partial sort of separatism in which blacks would have the choice of segregating themselves in both private and public activities and yet would not be compelled to do so; through a form of political pluralism within the framework of the nation, with black-governed cities, a separate black political party, proportional representation, and such devices as the already extant congressional Black Caucus; and finally, to proposals for the formation of an independent black nation on the North American continent. These varied lines of activity have numerous political and economic implications, such as a political strategy based on the idea that the black vote can hold the "balance of power," black economic cooperatives, control of "community" schools, and the development of "Black Studies," but underlying all of them is a turning away from the value of becoming an undifferentiated part of the American nation.

This theme is not new in movements of black protest in America. Part of the motivation for its revival lies in despair over the possibility of making the United States, with its history of white dominance, truly color-blind. After pointing out that nationalism and separatism have been "ever-present undercurrents in the collective black psyche," Allen observed:

In periods of social crisis—that is, when repression and terror are rampant or hopes of progress have been dashed—the resulting suspicion that equal participation is impossible becomes a certainty. Nationalist leaders and intellectuals come to the fore and assert that not only is racial integration not possible, it is not even *desirable*. Such an eventuality, they contend, would destroy the group's distinctive culture and its sense of ethnic identity.<sup>56</sup>

A critical question is whether the present thrust toward pluralism and black nationalism is just another temporary resurgence of an undercurrent, or whether it presages the dominance, for a longer, indeterminate time, of the theme of respect. That the latter may be the case is suggested by the fact that blacks see the United States as entering a second Reconstruction era within a span of a century, by the doubt as to

whether the American economy still offers the same opportunity for economically depressed groups to move up that it once did, and by the growing sense among black Americans that they are part of a Third World that is colored, not white.

In their effort to formulate an ideology of Black Power in the book by that title, Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton compare the experiences of blacks in America with those of colonized natives in Africa.

In a manner similar to that of the colonial powers in Africa, American society indicates avenues of escape from the ghetto for those individuals who adapt to the "mainstream." This adaptation means to disassociate oneself from the black race, its culture, community and heritage, and become immersed (dispersed is another term) in the white world.<sup>57</sup>

This opportunity they define as degrading and dehumanizing to blacks, teaching the subject "to hate himself and to deny his own humanity."<sup>58</sup> As an alternative they call for a new black consciousness, "a sense of peoplehood: pride, rather than shame, in blackness, and an attitude of brotherly, communal responsibility among all black people for one another."<sup>59</sup>

Here, once again, the theme of respect is tied to the value of *fraternity*. Earlier in his career as the prophet of the Black Power movement, while he was still working through the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Carmichael had made it clear that he was calling for a psychological revolution as well as a political and economic one. He wrote in 1966:

The need for psychological equality is the reason why SNCC today believes that blacks must organize in the Black community. Only black people can convey the revolutionary idea that black people are able to do things themselves. Only they can help create in the community an aroused and continuing black consciousness that will provide the basis for political strength.<sup>60</sup>

Long after this first hero of the Black Power movement had lost his position of eminence, other "soul brothers" and "sisters" were playing variations on the same theme. In essence, this is the theme that black people in America can gain political and economic liberty and equality only if they first come to regard their blackness with pride and force white people to view it

with respect. Moreover, pride and respect can be created only through collective efforts and group power, not through individual achievements evaluated from the perspective of Anglo-conformity and middle-class values.

It is the separatist and collectivist implications of black nationalism that are most perplexing and disturbing to all except those blacks who have committed themselves fervently to its philosophy. To whites who cling to an attitude of white supremacy, the comforting thought that blacks do indeed want to be separate is overshadowed by the fear that a black community that is not only separate but powerful will threaten their own power and privilege. To white liberals, dedicated to integration, the call for black pride and black power is even more distressing. It challenges the liberal tenet that race as a highly salient determinant of identity is a lamentable aberration, neither supported by science nor justified by the liberal-humanitarian creed that is the legacy of the Enlightenment. They cannot come to terms with what seems to them the faulty logic of conceding the right of blacks to segregate themselves while denying the right of whites to exclude them. So profound has been the influence of white domination in American society that it is difficult for whites to understand how black Americans might give higher priority to achieving pride in their blackness than to sharing the company of white Americans like themselves or to striving to win the material rewards that the society offers as prizes in the status race.

Even white radicals who are contemptuous of the values of "middle America" and define American society as sick and corrupt find themselves discomforted when they try to form alliances with militant black nationalists. The weight of the black experience in America causes the black radical to think of himself first as black and only secondarily as radical, so he sees the world through different eyes than does his white radical ally. There exists a somewhat different priority of issues, and there is a lurking fear that in any brave new world in which blacks do not have a veto power they once again may find themselves in a subordinate position.

Many blacks who have been victims of segregation and are veterans of the struggle against it perceive tremendous dangers in the ideology of black nationalism, whatever form it may take. Those who cling to a faith in the possibility of individual

mobility in an American class system freed of the artificial barrier of race see the cultivation of black pride and black ethnic identity as a poor and fraudulent substitute for the acquisition of individual skills for competition in the status race. Black leaders like Bayard Rustin, who proclaim the need for a more socialistic economy in the United States, fear that black nationalism will divide blacks from what they regard as their most important allies, the white working class. Both types see any advocacy of black separatism as playing into the hands of their old antagonists, the segregationists.

Although both present momentous challenges to white supremacy, black nationalism is more revolutionary than is integration. One self-proclaimed black revolutionary, James Boggs, sees integration as not truly revolutionary at all:

The first thing that every revolutionist has to be clear about is that integration is not in itself a revolutionary concept. It means assimilation into the system rather than a radical transformation of that system on the basis of new values and new methods. The only thing that has made integration seem revolutionary up to now is the way it has been resisted by whites, and particularly by those whites who have most benefited from it—the former immigrants.<sup>61</sup>

The respect revolution among blacks is profoundly revolutionary in that it demands that white Americans desist from the game of proclaiming that the Constitution is color-blind while the actual workings of the covert class system exert pressure for conformity by all to white middle-class standards. It demands open recognition of, and respect for, differences, particularly those imposed by accident of birth. This acceptance of differences as an ineradicable aspect of a heterogeneous nation implies that every citizen must be accorded not only political freedom and economic welfare but also personal respect, regardless of race and whether or not he demonstrates his right to this respect by achievement. To bring this about in a society in which to be unconditionally "American" is to be white and to be black is a handicap to be overcome may seem an impossible dream. It is a dream for which countless blacks are striving, however, as is evident from their ever more frequent assertion of blackness in their dress, their hair-styles, their music, their art, and their patterns of association.

There has been a close and complex relationship between so-

socioeconomic class and race in the history of the United States, both during and after the era of slavery. For nearly a century after emancipation, most blacks found themselves trapped in a socioeconomic status that was grossly inferior in wealth, power, and prestige. During this time the promise was held out, even in the South, that when and if, despite segregation, they proved themselves qualified to enter the mainstream of American life, the barriers of race would be dropped. This was the dream that Booker T. Washington accepted as valid when he urged blacks to devote themselves to proving they could be good citizens and good workers in order to gain the respect of their white fellow citizens. This was implicit in Gunnar Myrdal's "theory of cumulation," holding that every time a black could take advantage of the slightest relaxation of prejudice and discrimination to improve his condition, there would be a payoff in a further relaxation of the barriers because of his demonstration that the popular stereotypes were wrong.<sup>62</sup> Even while appealing to Myrdal as an authority, however, the Supreme Court declared in 1954 that this promise of achievement of equality through gradualism was false because segregation itself erected an insuperable psychological barrier to achievement. Following the reversal of the "separate but equal" principle, many formal barriers to individual mobility and equality of opportunity were lowered, even though slowly and reluctantly. Then blacks began to discover that the winning of the full rights of citizenship through achievement still remained of critical importance to them.

It became inescapably evident that although individuals might be perceived by whites as exceptions, blacks still were perceived as a group. Centuries of discrimination had given them the collective character of a lower-class group. Their rapidly increasing aggregation in the slums of the central cities made their inferior, disadvantaged position in the status system even more visible. Shackled by the history of discrimination and by the inherited badge of membership in a group that always had been on the bottom, they still felt the traditional American pressures for conformity and upward mobility.

Those individuals who could somehow take advantage of the new opportunities that were opened to them by the Civil Rights movement could enjoy their achievements to some extent. They could begin to receive rewards that previously had been arbi-



trarily denied them. They might even be welcomed and sought after as neighbors, employees, and students. Yet three shadows still dimmed their enjoyment of their progress. One was the fear that they might be only "token blacks," that their actual achievements and qualifications might not be proportionate to the rewards they received. Another was the consciousness that behind them still stood the mass of "unqualified," nonachieving blacks. Experience taught that if many of their brothers and sisters sought to follow on the trails they had blazed, the barriers quickly would go up again. Moreover, their own tenuous integration would be endangered because the controversy over how many and what kind of blacks would enter a neighborhood, a school, a faculty, or a work force would restore an acute awareness of race even in their own interaction with whites who had accepted them. Finally, they were forced to live with the knowledge that in a society that had piously proclaimed that equal opportunity at long last was available to all without regard to race, their own success could be used as weapons for the condemnation of the larger number of their fellows who had not made such progress. Their success could be taken as evidence that the opportunities indeed were real; if others had not taken advantage of them, was this not proof that they simply had not tried hard enough?

Thus even for successfully upward-mobile blacks, achievement of respect in terms of the standards of a white society proves to be a risky endeavor. So long as American society is not color-blind in truth rather than in theory, the individual black cannot divest himself of his black identity even if he desires to do so; his fate remains bound up to some extent with the lot of his fellow blacks who have not climbed as high as he. Not only from frustrated blacks on the streets of the ghettos but from black intellectuals commanding high salaries in prestige universities has come an increasing chorus of demands for compensatory programs to produce "equality of results" instead of "equality of opportunity"; for the recognition of group rights as well as of individual rights; for "reparations" to redress the grievances and hardships generated by past discrimination; and for a new respect for blackness even when it might be accompanied by cultural differences that appeared to be lower-class or even "un-American."

Actions taken by some blacks in the spirit of black pride and

black power, some calculated in advance and others erupting spontaneously, struck the larger American society with a dramatic and far-reaching impact. The defiant, collective action of blacks in spontaneous urban insurrections, carefully planned demonstrations of the right to self-defense by the Black Panthers, and the seizure of university buildings by black students with "nonnegotiable demands" not only captured the attention of the mass media and their audience but, in some cases, actually won concessions. Despite widespread condemnation of these activities as "violent" and "illegal" there was also an extensive public attempt to explain them by defining them as social protest expressing resentment at genuine grievances. As Ralph Turner has pointed out, one consequence of such a definition is that even those who see themselves as targets of the attack may respond with an offer of conciliation involving "a generous interpretation of the trouble-makers' activities, acknowledging their grievances, admitting fault. . . ." <sup>63</sup> Martin Oppenheimer has suggested that even as governmental agencies, federal, state and local, made preparations further to prevent or suppress such collective protest, they adopted a companion strategy of "domestic pacification" designed to ameliorate the conditions that presumably gave rise to such protest. <sup>64</sup> This strategy and the publicity surrounding it gave credence to the belief that collective defiance of the authorities did indeed "work." The nonviolent but disruptive protests of the Civil Rights movement earlier had produced the same kinds of results, including the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Although the majority of black leaders were in agreement that all the programs of domestic pacification fell far short of correcting the injustices to which they were addressed, there developed among white Americans a widespread belief that blacks were receiving not just overdue justice but favored treatment, particularly from the federal government.

At the same time, the inflammatory, antiwhite rhetoric of the most radical black nationalist leaders and the well-publicized personal violence against whites of a minority of blacks added to the fear and hostility that the more massive protests had engendered. Distrust of the ability and even the will of the police to protect the average white citizen from the violence of the black protest was reflected in the purchase of guns by

some white suburbanites. In some urban neighborhoods white vigilante patrols were organized. Although these were not admitted by the members to be antiblack forces, they most often arose in areas that were contiguous to concentrations of poor blacks. Furthermore, many of the white neighborhoods were inhabited predominantly by members of white ethnic groups who themselves only recently had climbed out of poverty and the slums. It was not only the occasional depredations of black criminals that these people feared, however. They were afraid also that large numbers of lower-class, "not-qualified" blacks would invade their neighborhoods and their children's schools. Many of these white people expressed liberal sentiments in regard to the equal treatment of blacks in the abstract, and their actions toward individual, middle-class blacks were friendly and receptive. David Danzig has aptly characterized their new crisis:

The white liberal . . . who—whether or not he has been fully conscious of it—has generally conceived of progress in race relations as the one-by-one assimilation of deserving Negroes into the larger society, finds himself confused and threatened by suddenly having to come to terms with an aggressive Negro community that wishes to enter it *en masse*.<sup>65</sup>

The folklore of the American experience and, for whites, the reality of a competitive status system have placed maximum emphasis on individual rights, individual opportunity, and individual achievement. In its emphasis on pride and respect, the black revolution is a revolt against this sort of individualism. Fearful that "first-class citizenship" has been extended to their people just at the time when opportunities to gain economic equality through individual striving are diminishing; reminded all too frequently that individual achievement does not completely erase the stigma of blackness; heartened by gains in power and prestige won by the participants in the respect revolution abroad, the ideologists of black nationalism have called on their followers to win respect through fraternity.

This spirit has proved to be contagious. The model of black collective protest, with its evidence of success, invited imitation by other minorities who still suffered economic deprivation as well as psychological degradation. For members of groups who were enjoying hard-won status gains but felt insecure in their possession of them, communal black militancy suggested a

model of defense. Finally, the spirit of the new tribalism fell on a society that was receptive to it because so many of its members were asking anew the question "Who am I?"

### **THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY**

The same social changes that free the individual from what are felt as repressive forces may, at the same time, uproot him from familiar anchorages. Social mobility provides the individual with a sense of having achieved equality on a new and higher level of a vaguely defined but always challenging status ladder. To move up requires sacrificing the sense of place that even a lowly status may offer; the insecurity and discomfort of the nouveau riche has long been noted by observers of the human condition. It is not surprising that in a society in which, in the name of liberty and equality, there has been unrelenting pressure for mobility and conformity, the crisis of identity and the problem of alienation should emerge as central issues of our time. Both are related to the fact that in a population of mobile, striving individuals there are many who find the achievement of a secure sense of personal worth an ever-elusive goal.

Hosts of sociologists, psychologists, historians, and journalists have designated a variety of developments as causes of the crisis of identity. The physical mobility that has been correlated with social mobility and made possible by developments in transportation has torn individuals out of the intimate, if confining, bonds of the small community and the extended family. Work, mechanized and bureaucratized, has ceased to be a satisfying central life interest for many Americans. What some observers have said of factory workers might also be said of workers in a wide variety of occupations and professions:

Other observers of factory life have made it abundantly clear that most workers are not happy in their jobs, that they feel trapped and degraded by their working conditions, that they have a powerful desire to escape from the factory, and that what drives them on is the incessant demands of our consumption economy.<sup>66</sup>

What historically have been two of the most important sources of meaning for the individual, religion and nationalism, also have lost much of their potency in modern America. Reli-

gion, on the one hand, has been assaulted by the forces of rationalism and science, so that both the comforts it offered and the demands it imposed lost their mystical, compelling force. On the other hand, it has had to compete with the frantic pursuit of leisure-time activities, particularly during weekends, that modern technology and the consumption economy have made more accessible for even the moderately affluent citizen.

Patriotism, the individual manifestation of nationalism, has always been intimately connected with evidence of national power in foreign relations and, particularly, with victory in war. The effects of intergroup conflict in heightening in-group solidarity and providing meaning for the individual have, in the past, been inescapably apparent. The war against fascism and Japanese imperialism was, however, the last war that could serve for the people of the United States as a great crusade, unifying the nation in the name of patriotism and in a quest for righteous victory. The threat of nuclear, total war made it impossible to romanticize warfare any longer. The prediction that in such a conflict there would be no victor and perhaps no survivors destroyed the illusion that national power and individual dedication could lead to victory. Then came the long and, to many people, senseless conflict in Indochina to strip away the myths of the role of the United States as the defender of freedom. It was not that all Americans came to deny the justification in terms of necessity for the presence of American military might in Southeast Asia, but that the justification offered became increasingly that of the national interest rather than of the extension of liberty and equality. What is important is that the flag, symbol of the nation, was transformed from a unifying into a polarizing symbol. The display of the flag, even as a decal pasted on a car window, became more common, but its display became as much a gesture of defiance of domestic critics of the nation's actions as it was a proclamation of loyalty. On the other side, denunciation and even desecration of the flag increased in frequency. It, the national anthem, the uniforms of servicemen, and military installations, from air bases to ROTC buildings, became for many Americans symbols of an aggressive, imperialist, and racist nation that had betrayed the ideals on which it was founded.

All these influences fell with especially heavy impact on the

youth of the nation. If they came from disadvantaged families, especially if they were not white, they found it difficult to enter the world of work and to find what little meaning it might offer. For the better part of the decade of the 1960s it was they who faced the prospect of fighting in Vietnam without even the assurance of a hero's welcome if and when they returned. To a greater proportion of the young people than ever before in the history of any society, going to college appeared as a not only desirable but necessary step toward achieving respect and a sense of self-worth as well as material well-being. Once in the university, however, many of them felt it to be an impersonal, degrading milieu, an institution insensitive both to their personal, psychic needs and to the critical problems of the society. It is because of their manifestations of discontent that Ralph Turner sees this age group as the leaders in the respect revolution, generating a new conception of injustice:

This new conception is reflected in a new object for indignation. Today, for the first time in history, it is common to see violent indignation expressed over the fact that people lack a sense of personal worth—that they lack an inner peace of mind which comes from a sense of personal dignity or a clear sense of identity.<sup>67</sup>

This new conception arises particularly among the young people of the contemporary era, Turner argues, because:

The problem of alienation and the sense of worth is most poignantly the problem of a youthful generation with unparalleled freedom and capability but without an institutional structure in which this capability can be appropriately realized. Adolescence is peculiarly a "non-person" status in life. And yet this is just the period in which the technical skills and the new freedom are being markedly increased. The sense of alienation is distinctively the sense of a person who realizes great expectations for himself yet must live in a non-status.<sup>68</sup>

But, he adds, this is not exclusively a problem of youth, for there are other segments of the population that experience their own crises of identity:

Today alienation is understandable to other groups than youth. The new sense of injustice can become the leaven for vast social changes



because adults, the elderly, minority groups and other organizable segments of society can see many of their own problems in the terms set forth by youthful activists.<sup>69</sup>

The great variety of movements emphasizing the theme of identity that have sprung up in the past few years reveals that the search may take many forms. Some forms are highly individualistic, although they may involve cults of people who seek in the same way. The individual may attempt to "find his real self" through highly private psychic experiences induced by drugs or by meditation. "Dropping out" of the conventional structures of the society and "doing one's own thing" constitute other forms of striving to find meaning and a sense of self-worth in a world that destroys these very values by its pressures for conformity.

Other forms of seeking reflect the ancient Christian concept of losing one's life in order to find it, signifying the achievement of a meaningful identity through submission to, and immersion in, a group. Many movements that have arisen as responses to the identity problem of modern society are explicitly religious. There has been a Pentacostal revival within the framework of many of the established churches, both Protestant and Catholic, in the United States as well as in Latin America. The so-called Jesus movement among American youth addresses itself directly to loss of religious faith, to joy through community, and to peace of mind. Competing with these Christian movements are numerous varieties of Eastern religions, such as Zen Buddhism and Hare Krishna. Blacks led the way, however, in the contemporary search for identity through religion. The Nation of Islam, or Black Muslim movement, burst upon the American scene in the early 1950s not only as a distinctive religious sect but as the precursor of the subsequent revival of ethnic nationalism among blacks.

The ideology and rigid religious discipline of the Nation of Islam proved to be remarkably successful in engendering a sense of self-worth and pride in the small minority of blacks who could accept them. At the same time, they discouraged many potential followers from being converts and kept the sect from developing the sort of mass following that Marcus Garvey and Martin Luther King, Jr., had enjoyed. Yet the nationalism of

the Black Muslims, and particularly the speeches and writings of their one-time member Malcolm X, contributed significantly to laying the base for the search for identity through the revival of ethnicity.

The flowering of the Black Power movement following Stokely Carmichael's exhortations during the "Meredith march" through Mississippi in 1965 reflected the secularization of the black nationalist gospel that the Black Muslims had already been preaching. As indicated above, the various manifestations of this new spirit among blacks served to sensitize the members, particularly the younger ones, of other minority groups. The Chicano movement developed among Mexican-Americans, with their Brown Berets organization presenting a public image analogous to that of the Black Panthers. A spokesman for this organization, after quoting the old saying "White is Right, Brown can just stick around, but Black must go back," made explicit the kinship between the two movements:

No, our black brothers will not go back and Hell, no, we will not just stick around. We will act like a thorn in the establishment's side. That is the kind of sticking we will do. The Brown Berets have done more to shake up the establishment than any group could accomplish in three centuries. The Brown Berets have led the March for Liberation: liberation for our people, La Raza Unida, through Chicano Power.<sup>70</sup>

The cry for "Red Power" arose among some segments of the American Indian population, along with denunciations of older, assimilationist Indians as "Uncle Tomahawks." An Indian scholar and Pulitzer Prize winner, N. Scott Momaday, has expressed the spirit of his peoples' participation in the respect revolution:

We have robbed the Indian of his pride. He has been a prisoner of war for generations and we have not let him forget it. We've made him dependent on the generosity of the white man spiritually, psychologically, and often materially.<sup>71</sup>

Momaday went on to advocate the cultivation of respect among Indians.

The whole concept of education can be changed so that the objective is to instill within the Indian a pride in being what he is. He can

be taught his own history, which has never been done before. He can be educated into the conviction that his way of life is intrinsically valuable, and valuable to the dominant society.<sup>72</sup>

Mexican-Americans, Indians, and Puerto Ricans, who also developed their own form of nationalism, shared with blacks the disadvantage of suffering material deprivation and political powerlessness; so the older political and welfare themes remained strong for them even as the new emphasis on dignity and respect was asserted. In the case of the Puerto Ricans, nationalist organizations often developed partly out of fear that better-organized, militant blacks would gain an advantage over them in the cities they both inhabited.

Japanese-Americans are a nonwhite minority who, despite their history of political persecution from the end of the nineteenth century through the period of World War II, have been remarkably successful in achieving success as measured by white, middle-class norms. Yet many of their younger members also have found American pressures for Anglo-conformity distressing and success on its terms degrading. A young Japanese-American, Daniel Okimoto, clearly sees the influence of the Black Power movement:

No longer apologetic about being members of a minority nor eager to discard their past, many college-age nisei today are rebelling against remnants of racism and old Oriental stereotypes, and are aggressively raising a cry for Yellow Power. . . . The new ethnic consciousness and defiance against racial prejudice owes much to the Black Power movement which, by boldly challenging the status quo, brought vividly to light conditions of injustice that confront all minorities. . . . Borrowing the insights and even some of the rhetoric of the blacks, the Asian-American movement represents a sharp divergence from the old pattern of silence and passivity.<sup>73</sup>

All of these minorities are defined with increasing frequency by their nationalist leaders as part of the Third World. One of the major targets of criticism by "Third World Alliances" has been a vaguely defined "middle-class white America," its values, its economic advantages, and its political dominance. But by mid-century this middle-class America encompassed numerous members of white ethnic groups that, within the memory of the older generation, had been economically disadvantaged mi-

norities, low in prestige, and struggling to gain some measure of political power. As recent research has shown, they have not disappeared into a "melting pot America" but, in comparison with nonwhite minorities, have been highly successful in taking advantage of the educational and economic advantages that the course of Anglo-conformity offered. Through the successes of the American labor movement, in whose battles they played a heroic part, they gained a measure of job security unprecedented in the nation's history. Much of this security rested, of course, on an almost monopolistic control of entry into organized occupations, and on the ability of the unions to keep wages abreast of prices in the inflationary spiral of the economy. They became an important segment of the consumer market, and they treasured the material possessions they could amass as important signs of their individual success and self-worth. Most importantly, the failure of so many members of the disadvantaged, nonwhite minorities to achieve comparable upward mobility could be taken as evidence of their own moral superiority and as proof that devotion to the work ethic did pay off both in material welfare and in prestige.

The demands, backed up by disruptive, extralegal tactics of the insurgent blacks and other nonwhite minorities gravely threatened their new-found but tenuous sense of economic security. Demands for compensatory treatment in the form of "quotas" in employment threatened their jobs; demands for greater welfare benefits promised to increase their tax load. In his campaign for reelection in 1972, President Nixon and his advisers, guided perhaps by the strategy of George Wallace, played on these fears by emphasizing his devotion to the work ethic. At the base of the Statue of Liberty, the president uttered words of fulsome praise for those immigrants who had proved by their hard work and success that opportunity was abundant in America for those who were willing to take advantage of it.<sup>74</sup> Unmentioned was the fact that while the lady of the statue faced east, inviting Europe to send its "tired, its poor, its huddled masses" to the land of opportunity, blacks in the South were captives in a system of tenant farming that amounted to a new form of slavery. The ancestors of the "welfare loafers" in the black ghettos had worked longer and harder for lower wages than had even the immigrants exploited in the sweat shops, on

the docks, and in the mines and mills of the North, but without the opportunity to pull themselves out of their lowly state by organizing unions, accumulating capital, or developing powerful political machines. By the time that blacks, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Indians were offered the opportunity to move up in the system, they found themselves confronted with a technology that was reducing its need for new workers through automation and a labor force that was highly organized and strongly resistant to sharing its hard-won advantages with new groups that demanded "instant equality" and made explicit a philosophy of "group rights."

It was the justifications advanced for compensatory treatment, group rights, and equality of results that dealt the sharpest blow to the pride of the white ethnic groups. Their material symbols of status were denigrated by the attack on the allegedly materialistic values of the white middle-class. The argument that the ability to acquire these symbols was not the consequence of individual moral superiority but was a combination of luck and collusion, and hence was undeserved, struck at the very heart of the sense of self-worth of these upwardly mobile whites. Furthermore, it was not just angry black nationalists but radical white intellectuals who argued that special, compensatory treatment was justly deserved by individuals simply on the basis of their membership in oppressed minorities, not on the basis of individual achievement. The so-called welfare ethic and the principle of group rights seemed to be about to sweep away the work ethic and the principle of equal opportunity for individuals.

In reaction to these threats, a new tribalism began to appear in the ranks of those ethnic groups that had long striven to become "standard Americans" and to transform their diverse cultural backgrounds into quaint but insignificant reminders of a past that was no longer a compelling force in their lives. Even Jews who could not abide the extreme nationalism of Meier Kahanes's Jewish Defense League felt the need to revive a defense of their Jewish heritage in the face of the angry attacks on their group by black nationalist leaders. An Italian-American Anti-Defamation League emerged, even though under dubious sponsorship, to demand that stereotypes of Americans of Italian descent be censored as strictly as were stereotypes of blacks. An

Alliance of Ethnic Groups held its first annual meeting to consider the problems that a variety of white ethnic groups saw confronting them in the new, polarized America that black power had brought into being. A writer of Slovak descent, Michael Novak, felt impelled to write a book on the rise of the white ethnic groups in America.<sup>75</sup> He said of himself, "I am born of PIGS—those Poles, Italians, Greeks, and Slavs, non-English-speaking immigrants, numbered so heavily among the workingmen of this nation."<sup>76</sup> He went on to express the anguish experienced by the white ethnic groups in the face of the sympathetic response of white liberals to the demands of the non-white minorities:

In particular, I have regretted and keenly felt the absence of that sympathy for PIGS that simple human feeling might have prodded intelligence to muster: that same sympathy that the educated find so easy to conjure up for black culture, Chicano culture, Indian culture, and other cultures of the poor.<sup>77</sup>

In asserting the value of reexamining the worth of his own ethnicity and of the preservation of diversity in the American nation, Novak concluded:

Yet it does not seem evident that by becoming more concrete, accepting one's finite and limited identity, one necessarily becomes parochial. It seems more likely that by each of us becoming more profoundly what we are, we shall find greater unity, in those depths in which unity irradiates diversity, than by attempting through the artifices of the American "melting pot" and the cultural religion of science to become what we are not.<sup>78</sup>

### **RESPECT AND THE NEW NATIONALISMS**

Despite the existence of its covert class system, the United States has from its founding held out to all of its citizens the promise of equality in civil rights, in political power, in economic welfare, and in personal dignity and respect. Yet the actual workings of the system, with its combination of political democracy and economic capitalism, have caused all of these, and particularly respect, to be unevenly distributed. The pressures for Anglo-conformity and for middle-class achievement as prerequisites for respect have been greater than the opportunity for



all citizens, particularly those not of white skin, actually to disappear into the "one nation, indivisible," that the theme of assimilation in a "melting pot America" implies. It is not new for blacks, the minority that has always found achievement of this goal most dubious, to turn their backs on the attainment of equality through sameness and to demand respect for their differences. The most recent resurgence of the spirit of black nationalism has come at a time when opportunities for individual achievement seem to many to be diminishing and when the search for identity and respect reflects a pressing need among many segments of the population. The respect revolution, manifest in the United States in a variety of new "nationalisms" and in the revival of ethnicity as a salient characteristic even for moderately affluent, acculturated citizens, is not likely to be evanescent. Instead, it promises to usher in extensive changes in the social and political structure of the nation.

The new tribalism of the respect revolution should not be mistaken for a mere extension of the political and economic revolutions of the past, as represented by the American Revolution, the new federalism that followed the crushing of the Southern Secession movement, the successes of the labor movement, and the welfare philosophy of the New Deal. The nationalism that was new and democratic in spirit at the founding of the nation has failed to satisfy the quest for identity and respect of citizens of diverse backgrounds who, though declared equal before the law, still have found themselves individually and collectively stigmatized when they failed to forge ahead in the highly competitive, individualistic status race into which they are forced by the combination of political democracy and capitalism. No new internationalism has arisen to satisfy their quest for identity, so there is a growing trend toward the achievement of respect through the glorification of subnational reference groups.

This new "internal nationalism," emphasizing cultural, ethnic, and even racial differences, shares in the revolutionary tradition of respect manifest in the emerging nations of the world beyond Europe. Communication between nationalist leaders of the colored minorities and people whom they regard as their compatriots in the Third World shapes and lends strength to the respect revolution within the United States. At the same

time, it brings them into sharp conflict with the dreams and promises of an older form of nationalism that sought to create an illusion of homogeneity in one of the most heterogeneous societies in the world—and failed.

As a new sense of injustice has arisen among peoples who consider themselves psychologically dispossessed, there have been new and different stirrings of conscience even among those whom they deem to be the oppressors. Despite the many failures of the organization, the ideology of the United Nations does symbolize a new commitment in principle to the further extension of freedom and equality in the world. In the councils of the United Nations, the "developing" nations have achieved some new measure of respect, and their aspirations for independence, welfare, and dignity have received a hearing. At one of its most recent conferences, in July 1972, UNESCO called together experts to consider the concepts of "race, identity, and dignity." These experts focused their attention on the significance of separatist movements among racial and national groups.<sup>79</sup> Even the manifestations of conflict between various parties—black nationalists and the police, Quebecois separatists and the Canadian government, Palestinian guerrillas and Israeli nationals—have caused the quest for respect of numerous, diverse groups to penetrate the consciousness of a large segment of the world's population. The mass media, particularly television aided by satellite communication, convey the jarring impact of struggles for dignity into the homes of the most secure citizens of the most powerful nations. For while newspapers, radio, and television can only report the onus of political repression and the pangs of hunger, they effectively convey the sense of urgency felt by those who seek respect.

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# 5

## LOVE AND INTIMACY: MASS MEDIA AND PHALLIC CULTURE

ARNOLD A. ROGOW

Evidence is accumulating that the mass media have a major share in transforming the socialization process in advanced industrial societies, and that this change in the priority and interpretation of values carries with it a widening circle of consequences for the relationship between man and his political, economic, and social institutions. These transformations have come to the surface most rapidly in American society, where the mass media have attained phenomenal strength. Evidently the competing institutions of family and neighborhood have been relatively weaker in the United States than in less industrialized economies.

Until recent years the principal thrust of the mass media was in substantially the same direction as the values and value interpretations transmitted through the home, school, church, and neighborhood. It is presumably safe to assert that exposure to newspapers and magazines had an *exaggerating* effect on certain norms, especially those that presented success as wealth. It is trite to emphasize the influence of advertising in stimulating demand for consumption. As long as economic opportunities were perceived as open, advertising was a potent incentive to production for immediate or more remote consumer goals.

The author notes that, with permission, he has drawn freely on research studies jointly prepared with Harold D. Lasswell on Sex and Politics in American Society (in manuscript).



As advertising increased, appeals to family love and loyalty were attached to consumption opportunities across the board. How can affection be demonstrated? By an endless stream of commodities and services. Advertisers learned the strategy of the snob appeal. You expressed your love by enhancing the prestige of the loved one, and this concurrently improved your own respect position. You aspired to a house in a prestige neighborhood; you belonged to a prestige church; you joined prestige clubs; your children went to prestige schools; and of course you drove a prestige car, dressed the family in prestige clothes, entertained the relatives in prestige restaurants, took the family to prestige resorts on prestige vacations.

The family appeal would lead to disease and death insurance (artfully labeled health and life insurance). And the family might pay off in politics if a healthy brood of bright-eyed sons and daughters were available for display, and a beautiful, talkative, and discreet hostess-wife did her part.

News selection automatically chose the stories and the pictures that confirmed the advertiser's pitch directly. The media and the merchants were partners in an open conspiracy to demonstrate the "obvious" and to imply that that "bitch-goddess success" really was a goddess after all.

Even in the days of print there were counterimages to the ruling image, and articulate counterideologies to the established myth. Some culture heroes seemed to get on without a family, although not necessarily without a lover. There were grumpy clergymen who condemned luxury and spoke well of pain; and there were prophetic Marxists who forecast a secular hell for the propertied classes. There was an underground literature of pornography, blasphemy, and crime.

With the advent of "yellow journalism," a bridge was built to the day of film, radio, and television; and especially to the television epoch. The discrepancies in outlook and impact began to multiply, and socialization changed. The crisis surfaced in the 1960s and future implications are obscure.

Socialization is the social process by which private motivations are channeled into acceptable public acts. Relatively undifferentiated impulses are restructured into personality structures that conform, in the main, to the requirements of the established culture. The practices of culture are themselves in flux. However, the flux is less rapid than the alterations through

which an individual passes on his way from infancy, through childhood and juvenility, to adolescence, young adulthood, maturity, and late adulthood. The relative stability of the socializing process is a result of the flow of value indulgences and deprivations. In general, compliance with culturally accepted ways of talking and doing is rewarded, and noncompliance is punished. As the child develops he "internalizes" most of the norms of the culture.

To understand the "socialization crisis" in U.S. society we must bear in mind a general model that emphasizes some of the principal features of earlier America. In the beginning American society was rural and agrarian; it has become urban and industrial. The farm family was a basic unit of production, and sexual norms were adapted to the procreation of farm hands and in general to the management of sexuality in ways that did not interfere with the conduct of agriculture. As urbanization and industrialization cut down the importance of the family as a unit of production, large families ceased to be obvious economic assets. Meanwhile, public policy was relatively successful in excluding children and young people from early involvement in mines and factories. In a dynamic technoscientific civilization education was cultivated as a crucial means of personal advancement. The consequences of these changes were cumulative in the sexual sphere: for married partners the tie between sexuality and procreation was attenuated; for young people the postponement of entry into the market and the deferment of marriage meant that permissible modes of sexual conduct were severely curtailed. At this stage of the evolution of industrial society young people were for many years excluded from adult forms of participation in production, in family formation, or in sexual expression.

The deprivations imposed upon the young were much more comprehensive than those in the sphere of physical sexuality. In the interest of acquiring skill the younger generation was consigned to prolonged juvenility. They were respected for their *potential* contribution, to be made after years of education. Meanwhile they did not receive the evidence of respect obtained by those who performed needed chores on the family farm or who brought home pay from a man's job in industry. The community respected education at the lower levels enough to make

it free; they did not respect it sufficiently to pay the adolescent and the young adult for undertaking a responsible role in society. Scholarships continued to have an ambivalent meaning: sometimes they were "charity"; sometimes a recognition of merit. In any case young people were kept in a state of prolonged dependence on parents who were becoming less dependent on children for immediate income or ultimate social security.

The problems of the young in the United States have recently been exacerbated by the communications revolution, which, as indicated above, is largely managed by private interests that depend on the marketing of articles of general consumption. Media specialists have perfected the program techniques of the massive sexual tease. Equally the ethos of the market, the sale of affection, the depersonalization of human relations have been first legitimized then lionized by the media. It has become the accepted pattern to "keep one's cool" emotionally but not physically. This means the acceptance of the physical without any valuation of the partner for anything but market "performance." The emphasis is constantly on "technique" rather than on sharing or mutual development.

All this might suggest that while sex is increasingly sought everywhere, it is found nowhere, and indeed there are good reasons to think that although Americans may be copulating more than ever before, they are enjoying it less. If the reports of psychotherapists are any guide, the sexual malfunctions of impotence, frigidity, and premature ejaculation have been increasing, and even more striking is evidence that many young men in their twenties, to all appearances healthy and normal, are finding themselves invariably or frequently impotent. Psychiatrists are not certain how general this phenomenon is, or what the causes may be, but one explanation, according to Dr. George L. Ginsberg of the New York University School of Medicine, is that the "average expectable sexual behavior" of young women who have ceased to be inhibited or passive is experienced by their male partners as "threatening." Where once women were sexually undemanding and indifferent to their lack of response, says Dr. Ginsberg, they now insist on "sexual performance" from their boy friends, thereby making them anxious and impotent.<sup>1</sup>

But why should a young man feel threatened by his girl friend's demanding sexual satisfaction? One possible reason is the emergence in America of phallic culture, by which is meant a culture whose sexual ethic regards women and men as primarily outlets for gratification.<sup>2</sup> The emphasis of such a culture is less on the mutuality of sexual pleasure than on self-satisfaction, and, even where "performance" is valued, it is valued not because it enables one's sexual partner to experience orgasm but because of the associated narcissism and opportunities for exhibitionism. The entire body, being viewed and treated as essentially a phallus, is endlessly anointed, stroked, groomed, and decorated; the cathexis of the body as phallus is the main reason for the proliferation of body conditioning centers and spas where the body is reverentially treated, and massage, the bath, and exercise take on some of the aura of religious rituals.

Sex in the phallic culture is, therefore, somewhat impersonal and promiscuous; as in the movie *Carnal Knowledge*, which could well serve as a documentary study of phallic culture, scoring becomes an end in itself, whether or not one keeps a record on slides of the body count. Since the dimensions of the sexual organs are of particular importance, great value is attached to being "well endowed" or "well hung." Nor are sexual tastes and preferences unaffected. With the erotic focus on the self, foreplay, oral-genital-anal contacts, and mutual masturbation are increasingly substituted for intercourse as primary sources of gratification, and because there is a strong sadistic and masochistic component, painful sensations are not infrequently associated with pleasure. The paraphernalia of sex in phallic culture abounds with gadgets and devices designed to ward off the always present threat of impotence and frigidity: mirrors, vibrators, special lotions and ointments, aphrodisiacs, pot.

Even if all goes well, the experience of orgasm in phallic culture often is a disappointing one, and here again it is instructive to hear from psychiatrists that many of their male and female patients complain of feeling "letdown" or unsatisfied after intercourse. Apparently many men who are disappointed in this fashion experience some degree of anxiety or depression, and often there is irritability and restlessness as well. As a consequence, not long after intercourse there may be resort to masturbation, but this may only add a feeling of guilt to the exist-

ing anxiety or depression. In effect, so male and female patients report, that deep, satisfying orgasmic experience, about which they have read and heard so much, and which some individuals seem easily to experience, has eluded them.

It is easy to dismiss this as the result of having seen too many movies where the hero and heroine thrash around ecstatically in the throes of orgasm.<sup>3</sup> Yet it remains true, in phallic culture, that whole books and numerous magazine articles stress the importance of full and complete orgasm without always making it clear that there are many varieties of orgasm, and that all persons are not equal in orgasmic capacity. Perhaps because it is erroneously assumed that ejaculation and orgasm are identical, the question of male orgasm has received much less attention than the question of female orgasm.

In the germinal sense, phallic culture began when sexual intercourse became freed of any necessary connection with marriage and procreation, or, to put it another way, phallic culture originated with the discovery that sexual pleasure was an end in itself and not merely a means to an end. But in its mature form phallic culture is founded on the peculiarly American tendency to treat sex as totally separate from personality, that is, from affective involvement. As psychologist Rollo May, in positing a "new Puritanism," has suggested, the typical sexual relationship in America is characterized by a "state of alienation from the body, separation of emotion from reason, and use of the body as a machine." Doubting that there is any less guilt, loneliness, and frustration in contemporary America than there was at an earlier time, May argues that we have simply reversed the Victorians who "sought to have love without falling into sex; the modern person seeks to have sex without falling into love."<sup>4</sup> May, like theologian Harvey Cox and other critics of the sexual values espoused by *Playboy*, *Penthouse*, and similar magazines, regards much of the sexual revolution as, in essence, antisexual because of the treatment of sex as a consumer goods commodity that is promoted and sold much like any other consumption product. From Cox's point of view, a *Playboy* cartoon in which a young man, as he is about to have intercourse with a girl, asks, "Why speak of love at a time like this?" must be regarded as an expression more of reaction than of revolution.

While the divorce of sex from personality can be observed in

many areas of social life, perhaps nowhere is it more perfectly expressed than in the Miss America contests that began in 1921. Designed to promote Atlantic City, New Jersey, as a resort, the Miss America competition by its success has spawned not only the Miss Universe, Miss U.S.A., and Miss Black America contests, but also the assorted queens of businessmen's conventions and football bowl games. Contestants are said to be of "good moral character," and sponsors, sensitive to certain criticisms, have alleged that the girls must demonstrate a skill or talent. Apparently this requirement is satisfied by demonstrating an ability to sew clothes or play "Abide with Me" on the piano. But the winners are usually described only in terms of 36-24-35 or thereabouts. Rarely is the public supplied with anything more than the names, ages, hometowns, and measurements of the rivals.

The numerous sex manuals and guides, by focusing on the purely physical aspects of sexual behavior, also contribute to the tendency to detach sex from any affective involvement. Beginning with the Kinsey reports of 1948 and 1953,<sup>5</sup> the behavioral scientists, in particular, have been guilty of depersonalizing sex by treating it as almost entirely a stimulus-response phenomenon. Kinsey himself, in tabulating the frequency of orgasms no matter how achieved, was inclined to regard all "outlets" (a remarkable expression in itself) as essentially equal, thereby implying that there were no important differences between sexual intercourse and masturbation in terms of sexual satisfaction.<sup>6</sup>

The Kinsey tradition continues in the more recent investigations of William H. Masters and Virginia E. Johnson, but the Masters-Johnson approach to sexual behavior is even more impersonal and detached. Whereas Kinsey based his findings on what was reported by volunteer respondents, Masters and Johnson have devised elaborate techniques for measuring orgasmic response in a variety of situations. In their first book, *Human Sexual Response*, the result of an eleven year inquiry into the anatomy and physiology of sexual response, Masters and Johnson and their associates reported in detail the orgasmic experience of 382 women and 312 men, mostly between the ages of twenty-one and fifty, almost all of whom were paid volunteers.<sup>7</sup> The total of more than ten thousand orgasms, of which three-quarters were experienced by females, were recorded by camera,



electrocardiographs, electroencephalographs, and other devices while the volunteer subjects were engaging in coition and masturbation. The conclusions in *Human Sexual Response*, tending to confirm what had long been known about physiological aspects of sexual experience, nevertheless were given extensive coverage in every major newspaper, and the book itself was widely reviewed; the *New York Times*, for example, devoted forty-one column inches to the book, including a two-column article about it on the front page of the second section, 18 April 1966.<sup>8</sup>

Unlike Kinsey, Masters and Johnson have long been interested in sexual malfunctions such as impotence, premature ejaculation and inability to ejaculate, frigidity, vaginismus (involuntary spasm of the muscles at the entrance to the vagina, thus preventing entrance of the penis), and painful intercourse. In *Human Sexual Inadequacy*, their second book published in 1970, they reported the results of eleven years of work on these problems, during which they treated 510 married couples and 57 single persons, all but 3 of whom were men. The immediate and five-year follow-up results were impressive: the overall success rate was a striking 80 percent, with primary impotence (men who had never experienced intercourse) accounting for the highest failure rate, or 40.6 percent, and premature ejaculation, the least important, for 2.7 percent. Failure was defined as the inability to achieve orgasm during the two-week treatment period, or as a return to the sexual malfunction within a period of five years after treatment.

Certainly these results are impressive, but again it should be noted that the Masters-Johnson approach to sex is to treat it as almost entirely a physiological and nonaffective response to a variety of stimuli. This emphasis is reflected even in the clinical setting; since they will not administer sexual therapy to persons without partners, "carefully screened female volunteers" were selected to work with the single men. Couples saw the therapists one hour or more each day, seven days each week for two weeks, during which the emphasis was on uninhibited communication and mutual participation. In keeping with the assumption that sexual satisfaction is always a stimulus-response outcome unless there is blocking, inhibition, or anxiety, separately or in combination, at some point in the sequence, the couple was gradually

led to maximize their "sensate pleasure" in each other's bodies through tactile explorations. Toward this end the entire sensory apparatus of touching, feeling, hearing, tasting, and smelling was enlisted, and it was only when the therapists were convinced of the probability of successful intercourse that the couple was permitted to make the attempt.

As might have been expected, the sexual therapy techniques of Masters-Johnson Reproductive Biology Research Foundation have been widely copied, and almost as widely distorted. Many sex therapy clinics, in fact, are designed not to remedy sexual malfunctions in a relationship but to compensate for them or provide substitutes in the form of extramarital experiences. Thus there are nude encounter groups specializing in massage and other kinds of body exploration, and clinics where the "therapy" is supplied by surrogate sexual partners. Whether or not many such clinics are hardly more than disguised houses of prostitution, frequently the surrogate partners are former prostitutes who are paid well for their services. In at least one New York sex therapy center, the therapists themselves, who mainly are psychiatrists or psychologists, function as surrogate partners, while in other centers, therapists and their patients are encouraged to observe each other performing sexual acts.

In effect, the sex therapy centers, and phallic culture in general, tend to eliminate distinctions between what is public and what is private, just as they make it difficult to determine which behavior falls on the side of exhibitionism and which on the side of voyeurism. In the name of sexual liberation from inhibition and repression, all sexuality is deemed to be of public interest, and all citizens are at once both participants and observers, exhibitionists and voyeurs. Thus in phallic culture no biography, even of the most scholarly type, will be regarded as complete or "thorough" unless the author has discussed in detail the sexual life of his subject or, if factual information is lacking, has speculated at length about it. A female anthropologist who has done a study of aboriginal culture will be shown in a provocative pose on the book's dust jacket; the jacket photo of a young and pretty ethnologist will display her in shorts and a halter. Advertisements for novels increasingly will feature photos of authors made to look as sexually enticing as possible if they are women, or, if they are men, as rugged and handsome

as the photographer's art will permit. In phallic culture, everyone is or must appear to be an object of sexual desire.<sup>9</sup>

Since celebrities, almost by definition, thrive on exposure and a willingness to exhibit themselves, they usually offer no objection to having their sexual lives become public property; perhaps this is particularly the case if they are persons of uncertain achievement whose celebrity status derives not from any accomplishment but from the space accorded them in the mass media. Prior to the emergence of phallic culture there were relatively few magazines publishing intimate information about the private lives of well-known individuals. The most successful ones, such as *Confidential*, were based on the formula that in every celebrity's life there is a secret vice, aberration, weakness, or departure from the moral norm about which many people would like to know, presumably because such knowledge satisfies the desire to see the famous, powerful, and rich reduced to the common condition of mankind, and also provides vicarious relief for lives that are drab and mediocre. Thus it was possible to read articles in the so-called scandal magazines about the alleged adulteries, promiscuities, alcoholism, homosexuality, and illegitimate children of a large number of Hollywood personalities.

In recent years, the *Confidential* formula has been adapted to a large number of general circulation magazines and newspapers, where, in the guise of a "profile" or "close-up," the private lives of celebrities are written about at length. For example, the "profiles" in the "Sunday Drama Section" of the *New York Times* invariably discuss the marital, drug, and drinking problems, if any, and the current sexual liaisons of "profile" subjects. Magazines such as *Good Housekeeping*, *Ladies Home Journal*, and *McCall's* regularly publish articles about the private lives of the Leonard Bernsteins, the Nelson Rockefellers, Princess Margaret and Lord Snowdon, the Shah of Iran and Queen Saroya, in addition to pieces about leading actors and actresses. John J. Miller, a widely read syndicated newspaper columnist, has made a career of reporting the fistfights, "emergency operations" (that is, abortions), and underworld connections of celebrities, in addition to their extramarital affairs, paternity suits, drunken episodes, and the like.<sup>10</sup>

For the most part, these stories are rarely challenged in the

courts, and when they are it is rare for the court to rule in favor of the plaintiff. In a case brought against now-defunct *Look* magazine in 1957, Frank Sinatra, at that time the leading *persona* of many "profiles" and "close-up" articles, disputed "the right of the press to report publicly the personal or private lives of celebrities, as distinguished from their professional activity." *Look* "welcomed" the challenge as an "ideal test . . . if the press is to be restricted as to facts it can publish about such a public personality, it is important that the limits be clearly defined."

Sinatra's suit was settled out of court, but by now it is clear that *Look's* position, implying that "public personalities" are entitled to much less privacy than ordinary citizens, has been accepted by most courts and, needless to say, almost all magazine editors. But, quite apart from the legal issues, it could hardly be otherwise in phallic culture, considering the supreme importance the culture accords to sexual performance. Indeed, the impact of the sexual revolution is such that what used to be regarded as loose and promiscuous behavior is now viewed as sexual emancipation or enlightenment, and those once stigmatized as tarts and gigolos are now admiringly referred to as "swingers." It follows that the male and female sex symbols in society must be capable, or appear to be capable, of outstanding sexual achievement, and this in turn requires open and frequent evidence in the mass media that they are "making out." Hence subsequent articles about Sinatra, depicting at length his numerous romances with leading actresses, did not occasion response from the singer other than satisfaction, with the result that by his retirement in 1970, he had been accorded the supreme accolade of phallic culture. He had become not merely the chief male celebrity, or the leading "swinger," but, as the *New York Post* put it, a "happening."

The Sinatras of real life have their counterparts in popular novels, and here, too, the isolation of sex from other personality components, which is the central feature of phallic culture, can be seen in the treatment of love. Prior to World War II, love in best-selling novels usually was depicted in romantic terms, which is to say that the lovers in these novels were drawn to each other by something more than the purely physical, clinical aspects of sex. Frequently the occurrence of the sexual act itself

was hinted at rather than made explicit, and where the sexual relationship was described, as in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* or *Anthony Adverse*, it was done with tenderness and romantic feeling.<sup>11</sup>

The clear tendency of much current fiction is to treat sex in purely clinical terms and to emphasize deviant practices such as rape, incest, and homosexuality. Even in the work of distinguished writers, such as Mary McCarthy, John Updike, and Philip Roth, the reader is better informed about the sexual experiences of the leading characters than about any other aspect of their lives or personalities. In Mary McCarthy's *The Group*, to take one instance, there are episodes of defloration and lesbianism, and although the people in the novel live together in and out of wedlock, marry and divorce, bear children, have jobs, even commit suicide, what is most vivid is their sexual behavior depicted at length and in careful detail. In *The Group* as in other novels, any emotion corresponding to love or affection, respect, and tenderness is subsidiary to sexual desire, or altogether absent.

But sexual desire itself may be muted, as in the novels of John O'Hara where sexual intercourse is without passion and sometimes almost as if the couple were bored by the whole business. Much of the copulation in contemporary fiction is casual and totally lacking in commitment, the result of chance encounters in bars, hotels, offices, planes, ships. What seems to matter is the sexual act itself, reduced to its simplest fundamentals, namely, the achievement of orgasm or "climax." Frequently a relationship proceeds to this as expeditiously as possible, with a minimum of characterization and of description of setting and scenery. We hear only of the physical and/or sexual attributes of the couple as they proceed to an orgasm free of psychological or emotional nuances. In O'Hara novels, which express a literary mastery of this orgasmic style, even conversation is reduced to the barest essentials.

Given the clinical emphasis of phallic culture, one begins to think of one's own autobiography as a sex drama that can be performed in front of a live audience; a husband's depiction of his wife's orgasm becomes simply another instance of life imitating not so much art as living theater.<sup>12</sup> Popular books and movies, such as *Last Tango in Paris* starring Marlon Brando,

begin to resemble pornography, and pornographic works take on some of the attributes of an art form. Hence the necessity to make further distinctions, as between "hard-core" and "soft-core" pornography and between "X"- and "R"-rated movies. What was formerly pornographic in the art world and bought and sold behind the scenes is now relabeled erotic and becomes a legitimate subject for gallery exhibitions. Off-Broadway theater simulations of sex acts and nude shows presented in cellar cabarets to select audiences now move to big midtown playhouses and ultimately are performed nationwide by touring companies; *Deep Throat* is shown in Princeton, New Jersey. Phallic culture, in other words, inevitably gives rise to pornographic imperialism, the expansion of which is marked by a horizontal movement toward the mass audience, and an upward thrust toward acceptance as a genuine aesthetic experience.

Contributing to the rise of phallic culture is a basic change that has taken place in the practices by which the young are provided with basic enlightenment about the roles they are supposed to play in society. Where once there was a long and clearly defined time in youth during which one learned the etiquette and rules by which one would be expected to live and by means of which one could cope with one's developing sexuality, now no such period exists. Almost from the time a child can walk and talk, more accurately from the time he or she can turn on a television set, children are bombarded with sexually charged matter. Toys, television, advertisements, clothes, and most particularly records and news media all contribute to the pressure that brings children of today into adolescence with a veneer of sophistication that is no thicker than tissue paper. No doubt it is to the credit of those who survive such a beginning that they mature at all, and one cannot help wondering whether the failure to develop into adults capable of giving and receiving affection can be attributed in no small measure to the brutal confrontation between the myths of the sexual communication industry and the realities of everyday social life. The demands for immediate gratification that the society generates cannot be satisfied at anything near the rate necessary to keep everyone happy, nor would it necessarily be a good thing if they could.

One way to describe the changing trends in socialization is to



say that family norms of right and wrong (rectitude), which are negatively sanctioned by acts of punishment and feelings of guilt, are replaced by the style-norms of the commercial entertainment industry, which are negatively sanctioned by expressions of contempt and feelings of shame. In terms of value-institution analysis these shifts can be perceived in several dimensions. Dominant impacts on socialization pass from an institution primarily specialized to affection to an institution of fun (well-being and wealth), the commercial entertainment and merchandising industry. The family transmits enlightenment about society, and takes special responsibility for eliciting behavior that conforms to the norms of rectitude and for generating a conscience that uses feelings of moral integrity and of guilt to sustain the norms. The mass media branch of the commercial entertainment and merchandising industry takes special responsibility for selling commodities and services, and incidentally it trains the young to accept changing styles of sexual and affectionate conduct and hence to feel pride (positive self-respect) in being "with it" and shame in being out of it.

Further exploring the shift from rectitude-based norms to norms founded on fun and fashion (well-being, respect), it is well to remember that a unified code of responsible conduct regarding love and sex is more a matter of doctrine than behavior in American or in western European society. When the peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Islands are added to the picture, and when the practices of the past are taken into account, no one can fail to recognize the great variety of ties that have bound different modes of sexuality with different expressions of affection. Evidently the explosive development of a mass communications industry in the United States, an industry that has remained relatively free of political censorship, has allowed the new technology to be exploited in the main for economic purposes.

It is obviously impossible for any social institution, and particularly for a major structure of communication, to operate in a social vacuum. This is demonstrated in all the chapters of the present work. It is no surprise to find that familial and educational institutions have been affected. What will puzzle future interpreters, perhaps, is the seeming passivity with which these traditional strongholds of the socialization process—the family

and school, to which we might add the church—allowed their functions to be appropriated to such an extent by the mass media—commercial entertainment—merchandising industry.

Many psychologists, psychiatrists, and social scientists are in substantial accord in presenting the often-destructive consequences of an appeal to guilt as the supreme negative sanction of sexual norms, and hence by extension to other norms in a culture in which rectitude values are emphasized. They stress the self-righteousness, self-confidence, and inflexibility of rectitude-oriented persons. Much of this seems to stem from incipient guilt at recurring sexual impulses, and from the relief from self-condemnation by the device of projecting blame onto public objects. Hence autopunitive tendencies that otherwise might contribute to severe depressions are directed away from the self toward an "other." Is the implication that as shame is substituted for guilt, the internal tensions generated within personalities become less malignant?

In attempting to answer this question we distinguish between the potential significance of respect deprivations and the *actual* magnitude of such factors in the history of American society. There are no grounds for asserting that, in general, shame is less intensively deprivational than guilt. Psychiatric and anthropological data seem to show that both deprivations can be equally devastating. Our problem is whether a shift from rectitude to respect in this specific context is *in fact* more or less conflict-generating in regard to sexuality.

Viewed in historical depth, rectitude has been utilized by ecclesiastical authorities to control sexuality and also to benefit from the role of the church in alleviating the guilt generated by either overt or fantasied sexual acts. Hence the symbolic source of sexual practices endorsed by ecclesiastical authorities has been trans-empirical (Divine Will). Theologians have elaborated the chains of doctrine that connect the imputed source with explicit norms and applications. After the Reformation the number of competing ecclesiastical authorities increased as religious denominations became more numerous. More individuals accepted religious doctrines whose teachings in regard to sexual gratification might be either more or less deprivational than the Roman Catholic church of the early sixteenth century. Individuals often withdrew from organizations based on divine revela-

tion and joined associations that asserted a metaphysical source of authority. Individuals also joined associations that purported to derive their norms from neither source (for example, ethical culture societies).

The obvious results of the fractionalizing trend are these: (1) guilt-generating norms in reference to sexuality, with the exception of an overreactive minority, have relaxed; (2) many new norms have been developed in the sphere of respect that are prescribed by the leaders of fashion (personal style), and enforced by feelings of embarrassment (shame) referred to above. The leaders of personal style are the popular heroes of the mass media, who compete with one another to navigate the largely unknown sea of vague predispositions (including the sexual) of young and old.

What, then, is the significance of these factors for frustration, self-deprivation, and politics? The guilt generated by sexuality is most intensely felt by those who have been exposed in early life to social environments in which older—that is to say, obsolescing—norms of a restrictive character were sought to be imposed. Subsequently, the norms might be vigorously rejected, an act that usually was accompanied and strengthened by the rejection of other patterns of traditional culture. However, the relatively rigid self-system could not shed its fundamental mode of seeking to solve its problems. Hence the erratic and extreme political positions taken up by "authoritarians of the Left" and "authoritarians of the Right" who succeed in utilizing the public objects of politics to reduce inner turmoil without becoming alienated from earlier codes.

In a society of accelerating diversity of role and heightened mobility among roles, the substitution of shame and pride for guilt and self-righteousness cannot fail to affect many institutions, including the political process. When personal style in sexuality, as in other life situations, depends on fashion models who gain visibility through the mass media, the expectation is that conceptions of politics will spread in the same way. For instance, the norms of family, student, and work groups will become more changeable and diverse. The formation of coalitions among the leaders of territorial and pluralistic groups will be favored by the increased openness of response.

In recent years depth psychologists who are concerned with

the emerging culture of highly industrialized societies have identified a socialization process that is closely entwined with the outlook disseminated through the many channels at the disposal of those who operate an opulent economy. A deprivation of love is indifference. Indifference is conveyed not by hatred, but by withdrawal and impersonality. If sexual blocking is accompanied by indifference, and indifference is the pattern incorporated by the self in dealing with the self, the personality that results differs from the guilt-ridden or shame-driven model. The individual is deeply alienated from himself, treating his sexual impulses with relative indifference. Will the individual be unconcerned with people, and at home only with abstractions and with "things"? Will such a person adopt defense mechanisms that draw intensity from subterranean sexual impulses while operating with detached ruthlessness if circumstances catapult him into a ruling role?

It has been suggested that a fundamental source of difficulty in an "affluent" society is the lack of intensely expressed love by the primary socializers. The analysis is that with affluence the mother is permissive and evasive in dealing with the child, finding it easier to achieve conformity by the use of bribery than by facing the emotional turmoil of suppressing the child's demands and of giving genuine and intense love as a reward for the renunciation of unacceptable forms of gratification. The political implication is that young people in an affluent society become alienated from lack of properly timed frustration combined with love; hence they continue to pursue ego gratifications with no firmly organized self-system that identifies with the value position and prospects of large groups in society. The classical picture of personality growth as outlined by Freud emphasized the Oedipal situation, whose fundamental feature is the acceptance of frustration in the immediate context, and the incorporation of models that permit eventual gratifications to become acceptably specialized as to object choice and strategy of expression. The frustration is bearable because in return for love the completion of disapproved acts is relinquished. The hypothesis outlined above alleges that affluent societies incapacitate their rulers, their most privileged classes, from achieving their potentialities for responsible participation in decision.<sup>13</sup>

Absence of "successful" frustration (that is, renunciation

combined with affirmative evaluations of the self) leads to "acting out," and acting out adds to the difficulties of collective action. Any failure to achieve a self that includes identification with the aspirations of the body politic is a danger to the integrity of the commonwealth. It diminishes the chances of orderly agreement, and increases the strength of factors that provoke coercion.

The self-indulgent mother presumably perceives herself as permissive in a sophisticated and self-fulfilling manner, and as a source of "things" that gratify the child and contribute to the material richness of the environment that challenges his skill and enlightenment. It is a chilling thought that she has failed as a meaningful source of affection and that this failure lets loose in our dangerous world a growing contingent of thing- and power-oriented persons whose capability for love and loyalty is deeply damaged.

The implication of the changes in love and intimacy, and in the socialization process of a technoscientific society, is not that the mass media of communication are solely responsible for what has happened. It would be untenable to affirm, on the contrary, that an institution of such pervasive scope can be regarded as free of impact on matters that receive cumulative attention. At the very least it is credible to affirm that the mass media act as accelerators and resonators of market initiatives and preferences in a high-consumption economy. The traditional institutions of love and intimacy are exploited and attenuated by the pervasive propagandas of goods and services. Small wonder that a widening span of disassociation separates affection from sexuality, and substitutes the strategy of bribery, even in the home, for the intensities of the emotional confrontations required for achieving a postphallic approach to life.

#### NOTES

1. George L. Ginsberg, *New York Times*, 15 March 1972. Formerly, Dr. Ginsberg reported, "patients with impotence were, for the most part, married men who gradually began to abandon sexual activity with their wives after a period of more successful functioning. They complained that the excitement

had passed, and that their wives no longer provided the variety in sexual practices they craved. Impotence was accompanied by minimal anxiety; they usually had conscious fantasies about the secretary at work, the girl next door, etc., and felt confident that novel objects or practices could revive their interest."

2. The term *phallic* is borrowed from psychoanalytic usage, but is not used here in precisely the same way. In psychoanalysis, phallic refers to the stage of psychosexual development that follows the anal phase. It is characterized by a heightened awareness of and interest in the penis or phallus of the male child (usually at ages three to five), and the clitoris of the female. Masturbation is common, as are pleasurable sensations associated with urination.

3. I am speaking of mass audience movies, not pornographic fare, where, as in the love scene between Karen Black and Jack Nicholson in *Five Easy Pieces*, the moment of climax is marked by visual and sound effects as dramatic as those that accompany depictions of battle scenes. The fantasy elements in cinema orgasms have been too little noted by critics and viewers. Novelists, too, have been prone to this kind of exaggeration. In J. P. Donleavy's *The Onion Eater* (Penguin, 1972) for example, one of the female characters achieves orgasm simply by being touched on the inside of her arm "by the elbow." The hero has three testicles, while in Donleavy's *A Singular Man* (Penguin, 1966) the central male figure's penis is unusually large.

4. Rollo May in *Saturday Review*, 26 March 1966.

5. Alfred C. Kinsey, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (1948) and *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (1953), both published by W. B. Saunders Co. in Philadelphia.

6. Nothing said here is intended to minimize the fact that the Kinsey studies were significant pioneering contributions to knowledge. The point is that they did not deal with aspects of sexual behavior other than physical, thus denying, in effect, their importance.

7. William H. Masters and Virginia E. Johnson, *Human Sexual Response* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970).

8. Despite the statement by the book's publisher that it would be of interest primarily to physicians, the book was on the *New York Times* best-seller list for thirty-two consecutive weeks following publication. The two Kinsey reports had been best sellers also, although they, too, had been billed as being of interest primarily to physicians and marriage counselors. Since publishers are not known for their naiveté, the hypocrisy of the initial statement deceived no one.

9. While it is conventional practice for paperbacks and record albums to feature nude female models on their covers, even if the material within originated with Thomas Mann or Mozart, a recent innovation in the record field is the nude appearance of the performing artist. Outstanding examples include front views of John and Yoko Lennon on an album released in Britain al-



though not in the United States, and a back view of Joni Mitchell on the inside jacket of one of her records. The dust jackets of recent books by Mickey Spillane feature photographs of his wife, nude.

10. Techniques of snooping and spying have been transformed in recent years by a revolution in electronic gadgetry that has effectively destroyed what remained of privacy in and out of the bedroom. No doubt most of the eavesdropping devices—a microphone hidden in the martini olive, a tape recorder concealed in the attaché case, and so forth—are used for purposes of business espionage, but it is probable that these and other devices are coming into extensive use for personal and social entertainment. Magazines such as *Esquire* have advertised "The Snooper—World's Only Private Listening Device," guaranteed to pick up normal conversations at a distance of five hundred feet. A New York firm specializes in one-way bedroom and bathroom mirrors that can be seen through from one side, and wall-attachment listening gadgets that can pick up whispered conversations in the next apartment.

11. It is arguable that the character of hard-core pornography has also changed with the emergence of phallic culture. For example, in *Fanny Hill*, first published in 1748, the kindness and thoughtfulness that Fanny's successive lovers display for her sensibilities as well as erogenous zones almost justify characterizing the book as a novel of manners and courtly behavior.

12. In an article about his release from prison after having served an eight-month sentence, *Eros* publisher Ralph Ginzburg writes of his reunion with his wife: "Wordlessly, we undressed. . . . I was overwhelmed by the lush revelation of things about her that are precious to me: a certain look in her eyes, the conformation of her hands, the smell of her hair, the curve of her hip. . . . Lost to all reason and restraint, we made love. The force of our orgasm shattered the damming walls of anxiety . . . at the moment when the tidal wave of my wife's sexual passion burst through, all her other passions flooded close behind" (*New York Times Magazine*, 3 December 1972).

13. See Alexander Mitscherlich, "Changing Patterns of Political Authority: A Psychiatric Interpretation," in Lewis Edinger, ed., *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967); also Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Systems, Styles and Personalities," in Edinger, *Political Leadership*.